Knowing the Enemy

by Ariel Cohen

How to cope with global jihad

(at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6144)

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The conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan and the global Islamist insurgency have revealed that Western democracies and their political and military leaders do not fully comprehend the multifaceted threats represented by radical Muslim nonstate actors. In this, they violate the most famous dictum of Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategic genius of2,500 years ago: “If you know yourself and understand your opponent you will never put your victory in jeopardy in any conflict.”

The broad support that al Qaeda jihadis and radical Islamist militias such as Hamas and Hezbollah enjoy in the Muslim world and in the global Muslim diaspora, as well as among non-Muslim anti-American political forces around the world demonstrates that describing the global Islamic insurgency as a fringe or minority phenomenon is unrealistic and self-defeating. Since 9/11, democracies have fought three wars against nonstate Islamist actors. The West needs to draw important lessons from Iraq, Afghanistan, and the clash between Israel and Hezbollah to address these strategic deficits. Lack of clarity in defining the enemy and delays in formulating political and information strategy severely endanger U.S. national interests and the security of the West.

SÕJAVÄELINE KIRJAOSKUS

Peeter Kukk, PhD, Kaitseväe Ühendatud Õppeasutused

Artiklis analüüsitakse, kuidas on erinevatel ajajärkudel muutunud sõjaväelaste kirjaoskus selle sõna laiemas tähenduses. Kirjaoskus hõlmab seejuures nii väljaõpet kui ka teenistuse korraldust koos otsustusõiguse ulatuse ja vastutuse määraga. Artikli esmaste lugejatena nähakse Kaitseväe Ühendatud Õppeasutustes (KVÜÕA) õpinguid alustavaid põhi- ja keskastmekursuse õppureid.

Rene kommentaar: Tegemist on väga hea ülevaatega ülesandekeskse juhtimise filosoofia arengust ja mõjutustest. Pealkiri võib jätta esmapilgul eksitava mulje (mulle jättis), nagu tuleks juttu sõjaväelaste kirjutamise oskusest. Sellest see artikkel siiski ei ole. Väärt lugemine.

Artikkel siin: http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/KVUOA_Toimetised_16_7_Kukk.pdf

An elusive command philosophy and a different command culture

By Jörg Muth

2011 in Foreign Policy

Best Defense department of Auftragstaktik affairs

Auftragstaktik. The word sounds cool even when mangled by an American tongue. What it means, however, has always been elusive to Americans. The problematic translation of that core German military word into "mission type orders" completely distorts its meaning. Auftragstaktik does not denote a certain style of giving orders or a certain way of phrasing them; it is a whole command philosophy.

The idea originates with Frederick the Great, who complained after more than one battle that his highly experienced regimental commanders would not dare take action on their own but too often ask back for orders and thus waste precious time.

Nearly one hundred years later the military genius Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke was the first to formulate the concept of Auftragstaktik. Moltke was a diligent student of Frederick's campaigns, of military history in general and philosophy. At a time when he was not yet famous and, not yet the victor of three wars, he observed the annual General Staff war games in 1858. The paperwork and the detailed orders appalled him because he knew that in war there was no time for such nonsense. During the war game critique he decreed that "as a rule an order should contain only what the subordinate for the achievement of his goals cannot determine on his own." Everything else was to be left to the commander on the spot.

War—Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity

COLIN S. GRAY

War can only be understood holistically. If one focuses on continuity in change, one is near certain to undervalue the change in continuity. One has to be bifocal. Carl von Clausewitz is uncompromising on this matter:

But in war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together.

The subject of most interest here is future war, all of it. Future war will include both change and continuity from the past. Many people have difficulty understanding the relationship between continuity and change; this article will try to provide some useful guidance. Similarly, satisfactory comprehension of the connection between theory and practice is frequently missing.

These deficiencies in intellectual grasp can be important and damaging to national security.

Read more: http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2010summer/Gray.pdf

Wake-up call

Julian Borger

The Guardian, Friday 6 September 2002 

If the US and Iraq do go to war, there can only be one winner, can't there? Maybe not. This summer, in a huge rehearsal of just such a conflict - and with retired Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper playing Saddam - the US lost. Julian Borger asks the former marine how he did it.

At the height of the summer, as talk of invading Iraq built in Washington like a dark, billowing storm, the US armed forces staged a rehearsal using over 13,000 troops, countless computers and $250m. Officially, America won and a rogue state was liberated from an evil dictator. 

What really happened is quite another story, one that has set alarm bells ringing throughout America's defence establishment and raised questions over the US military's readiness for an Iraqi invasion. In fact, this war game was won by Saddam Hussein, or at least by the retired marine playing the Iraqi dictator's part, Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper.

Teaching How to Think, Not What to Think

by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey N. Rule

United States Marine Corps

United States Army War College, Class of 2013  

“Machines don’t fight wars. People do, and they use their minds.”

— Col John R. Boyd

Numerous articles and books have recently appeared criticizing current leadership of the Armed Services and their collective inability to think critically, to adapt, or to innovate quickly — as well as their lack of tactical, operational, or strategic agility.[1] Additionally, many of the same critiques have emanated from the services for decades — most notably during and after the Vietnam War. Furthermore, there is a large body of literature in the broad realm of “strategic studies” that seeks to offer insight and knowledge about how to operate in the most fraught wartime environments characterized by friction, uncertainty, disorder, fluidity, and complexity regardless of the type of competition. From Sun Tzu’s time, through Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and to the modern era, those elements of the environment remain constants in the nature of war.

All U.S. military institutions understand these constants and have, through the years, sought to comprehend and conquer them. The services have not sat idle: their individual doctrines, educational institutions, and professional journals abound with the need to create more adaptive and agile and thinking leaders — and have done so for quite some time. So, why is there a constant criticism inside and outside the services for collective failures in creating agile leaders able to cope successfully with the inherent complexity and unpredictability of war?

Misinterpretation and Confusion: What is Mission Command and Can the U.S. Army Make it Work?

By Donald E. Vandergriff

Introduction

The emphasis of Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept: Operational Adaptability—Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict[1] discusses evolving toward the practice and culture of Mission Command. The essence of this approach is to ensure that the Army leads through Auftragstaktik, a German word that implies that once everyone understands the commanders’ intent (two levels up), then people are free to and indeed duty-bound to use their creativity and initiative to accomplish their missions within the intent, adapting to changing circumstances.

The Invasion of Iraq: A Balance Sheet

by Brian Michael Jenkins March 22, 2013 in RAND

Historically, wars were fought primarily for material gain: livestock, treasure, tribute, or territory. More recently, however, the profit motive for war has declined as life has become more precious and conquest and plunder have become less acceptable, although conflicts waged for control of diamonds and other precious commodities continue in parts of the world. International law generally prohibits military action by one state against another except for reasons of self-defense. In modern warfare, “gains” must be measured in less-tangible forms, such as preserving national security, liberating threatened populations from tyranny, protecting human rights. Military action to achieve such ends is considered unavoidable and is rarely assessed as an investment.

The invasion of Iraq was a war of choice, however, and therefore should be assessed in terms of costs and benefits. Neither the United States nor its allies had been attacked by Iraq, and there was no evidence that any attack was imminent. Saddam Hussein was a brutal tyrant, and his regime was an affront to human rights, but the country had suffered under his rule for many years. Iraq's liberation was not the reason for going to war. The official purpose of the invasion was to remove any threat posed by Iraq's presumed arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Regime change was a consequence, not a cause. And although Iraq's citizens are freer now, they are by no means more pro-American.

Six steps to fix a broken Mali

By Greg Mann

 

Posted on March 18, 2013 in Bridges from Bamako

 

It’s too soon to declare Operation Serval a success, and there are already concerns about its eventual end, but the French-led military intervention in Mali has at least brought the country back from the brink of disaster, and opened up a space in which Malians can finally begin to chart a way forward for their nation. If I were advising the people who hold Mali’s fate in their hands — not only Mali’s interim president, but members of influential donor governments in North America and Europe — here’s what I’d recommend: six steps to reform the Malian state, settle conflicts and restore stability.

Gen. McMaster: Raiders, Advisors And The Wrong Lessons From Iraq

By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

Published: March 20, 2013 in AOL Defense

WASHINGTON: On the tenth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq one of the Army's leading thinkers, warned Washington not to learn the wrong lessons.

Army Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster, now chief of the tank and infantry school at Fort Benning singled out two pitfalls in particular, one about over-reliance on Special Operations raiders, the other about over-reliance on proxies and advisors. Call them (our words, not his) the Zero Dark Thirty fallacy and the Lawrence of Arabia fallacy.

The first mistake is what McMaster called "a raiding mentality": the idea that we'll get a "fast, cheap, and efficient" victory if we can only identify the crucial "nodes" -- enemy leaders, nuclear weapons sites, whatever -- and take them out, whether with a Special Ops team like the one that killed Bin Laden, a long-range smart weapon, or a drone, McMaster said in his remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Mali's Model Democracy Myth

The international community seems intent on "restoring democracy" to Mali. But it was the pre-coup status quo that led to collapse in the first place.

Article | 8 February 2013 by Joe Penney 

Bamako, Mali:

Both the Malian people and the international press have been almost unanimous in lauding the French military campaign in Mali, which started in earnest on January 11. The ultimate French goal appears to be returning Mali to its status quo circa 2011 – i.e. before the start of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) campaign in the north. In accordance with this plan, Mali’s interim president, Dioncounda Traoré, recently announced imminent elections for July 2013.
Thus France will claim to have completed its dual objectives of regaining Mali’s ‘territorial integrity’ and accomplishing a ‘democratic transition’. The French then plan to withdraw smoothly, replacing its fighters with a UN peacekeeping force and conceding the presence of some jihadist fighters in the Adrar des Ifoghas Mountains.

Making sense of Mali's armed groups

After spending weeks reporting from the country's restive north, Al Jazeera's May Ying Welsh reviews some of the different groups and what they want.

May Ying Welsh   Last Modified: 17 Jan 2013 10:19 French planes have bombed targets in Mali in what they consider a fight against al-Qaeda-linked fighters. But the region is a cauldron of instability with a diverse blend of religious fighters, ethnic militas and secularists. MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) The secular separatist Tuareg rebel group wants an independent state in northern Mali called Azawad. MNLA say they want this state for all the peoples of northern Mali (Tuaregs, Songhai, Arabs, and Fulani are the main ethnic groups). They have some token members from the Songhai ethnic group, but the fact is that 99 percent of MNLA fighters are Tuaregs whose motivation is to have a Tuareg state.