By Donald E. Vandergriff
Introduction
The emphasis of Training and
Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept: Operational
Adaptability—Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era
of Persistent Conflict[1] discusses evolving toward the practice and culture of
Mission Command. The essence of this approach is to ensure that the Army leads
through Auftragstaktik, a German word
that implies that once everyone understands the commanders’ intent (two levels
up), then people are free to and indeed duty-bound to use their creativity and initiative
to accomplish their missions within the intent, adapting to changing
circumstances.
Emerging at the same time at an accelerated pace are command and control networks, which already have placed up-to-date tactical information in the hands of squad leaders, while several layers of higher command maintain overwatch. At any level the urge will always remain for the senior officer to micro-manage his subordinate, particularly given the legacies of the Army’s culture. Contemporary force structures (hardware and organizations), as well as operational doctrines (ideas, style of war and traditions) are largely legacies of events over the entire 20th century, although one can discern influences reaching back to the Civil War and the Napoleonic era. The assumptions underpinning the Army’s force structure, the personnel system and how the Army recruits and develops its enlisted Soldiers and accesses commissioned officers, on the other hand, extend back to the late 18th century, beginning with the widespread fear of a standing army held by the framers of the Constitution.
The question arises: Can the Army
integrate the latest 21st century information technologies adhering to the
philosophy of Mission Command while its personnel system and force structure
remain in the 20th century? An analysis of the how the German army instituted
the doctrine of Auftragstaktik
through their professional military education (PME), as well as through
widespread practice in their culture during peace and war, provides insights
for the U.S. Army as it takes on this incredibly complex problem. The Germans
aligned their leader development with Auftragstaktik;
thus, future applications of technology to their system only enhanced Auftragstaktik. The review of history
will find that the U.S. Army cannot successfully integrate the latest command
and control technology with the philosophy of Mission Command without seriously
examining changes to its force structure, education and personnel system.
A solution to how to implement
Mission Command—Outcomes-Based Training and Education (OBT&E)—is already
occurring. OBT&E is being implemented at several Centers of Excellence
across the Army. As Army G3 Lieutenant General Daniel P. Bolger stated in August
2011, “OBT&E best supports Mission Command.” Implementing OBT&E now
will allow the Army to take the time it needs to reform its personnel system
and force structure to better support Mission Command while developing the next
generation of Soldiers and leaders to operate in Mission Command.
It is impossible to calculate all
the factors in advance; some things one must leave to chance. He who is worried
about everything will achieve nothing; however, he who is worried about nothing
deludes himself.[2]
Is Mission Command yet another
buzzword to be spread liberally on PowerPoint® presentations? Who really knows
what it is going to take to change Army institutions to fully implement the
true meaning of Mission Command?
We must understand what causes us
to comply, even today, with the Anglo-American method of central, hierarchical
planning and tight control cycles (“red tape”) that cause mistrust, while
maintaining a centralized personnel system that causes undue competition
between officers and noncommissioned officers, when trust is needed. This, of
course, also influenced the manner in which strategic planning developed in
U.S. corporations and the Allied armies over a hundred years ago in the
Industrial Age, but still lays the foundation for our culture today. This kind
of planning can be applied in a stable environment. But war is turbulent and this
form of bureaucratic, strategic long-term planning is inadequate to counter the
often fast and unpredictable changes in the environment.[3]
First the Prussian and then the
German military began their cultural movement toward what we know as Mission
Command, which they eventually called Auftragstaktik.
At the Battle of Jena in October 1806, Napoleon achieved an incredible victory
over the Prussians, destroying their army and overrunning their country in six
weeks. By 1809, the great Prussian reformer Gerhard von Scharnhorst had come to
the conclusion that the commanders behind the battlefield, due to the “fog of
war,” were unable to obtain an accurate view of what was really happening at
the front and in the chaos of combat. Those who knew what was actually
happening were the subordinate commanders and officers in the field.[4]
As a battle is always plagued by
uncertainties and characterized by unforeseen situations, the Prussians tried
to find a concept of planning—a culture of command—that would ensure flexibility.
This system should ensure that commanders in the field would react quickly to
the situation at hand and take the initiative independently, without first
consulting higher command to exploit an unexpected favorable situation or
respond immediately to an unfavorable development. The result of this requirement
was Auftragstaktik, what we call
Mission Command.[5]
The Prussians institutionalized
it in 1870, on the verge of the Franco–Prussian War, after years of
experimentation; while the word itself did not appear until the manual of 1888,
the practice of Auftragstaktik had evolved almost a hundred years earlier. Auftragstaktik is not only about delegating
decisions to subordinate commanders; it implies a whole set of measures that
have to have been developed during the implementation of this concept. In fact,
it required the whole German army to be reorganized, a process comparable to reengineering
the U.S. Army today if we were truly to practice Mission Command. Applying Auftragstaktik meant that the overall commander
would formulate the broad goals that had to be achieved by the officers in the
field, who would be given a relatively large amount of latitude for the manner
in which the desired goals were to be achieved. In other words, the goals were
known, what had to be achieved (the outcome) was known, but how they should be
achieved was left to the subordinate commanders.
This system of command and its
closely related doctrine are a far cry from the rigid, hierarchical and
bureaucratic Befehlstaktik, the
centralized/top-down command of today. This new form of planning and its
command doctrine were perfected by von Moltke the Elder, who in the 19th
century embedded it deeply into the organization of the German army.
Integrating technological advances (such as the telegraph and, during World War
II, the radio) along with their instillment of Auftragstaktik, the Germans were able to strengthen their military
effectiveness.[6]
Two questions are addressed here:
First, can the U.S. Army integrate the latest in command and control technology
with the recurring concept of Mission Command while freeing itself from its
legacy of over-control? Second, how can the U.S. Army revolutionize its leader
development in order for its leaders to grasp and perform under a culture that
embodies Mission Command?[7]
Answering the second question
through a revolution in professional military education will also provide an
answer to the first question.
What are Auftgrastaktik and
Mission Command?
The idea of Auftragstaktik originated with Frederick the Great. He repeatedly
chastised his seasoned and experienced regimental commanders for not taking
independent action when they saw it was necessary. Such a request was unheard
of on the rigid battlefields of the 18th century. Because all
Prussian/German commanders were great admirers of Frederick the Great, they
brought along most of his teachings. But the leadership became so enamored of
past successes under Frederick that they ignored the revolutionary changes to
warfare that France was making, predominately involving decentralization at the
operational level and combined arms at the tactical level.[8]
With the defeat at Jena-Auerstedt
at the Battle of Jena, several reformers took notice and began the necessary
changes to the culture. Gerhard von Scharnhorst was the first to focus on the
development of leaders in the art of war.[9]
The reforms after 1806 were more
about a flexible army structure and the development of light units than about
command reform. With the light units necessarily came the need for a greater
independency of command, but there is no codification of Auftragstaktik in the writings of Scharnhorst and Prussian field
marshal August von Gneisenau.[10]
By 1860, the Army had taken up
the practice of trust through strenuously selecting and rigorously developing
subordinates. In 1860, Prince Frederick of Prussia described the character of
the Prussian army: “[A]n unusual desire for freedom from above and a desire for
responsibility, unlike any other Army, has developed in the Army, supporting
the ingenuity of the individual in full measure; hold the reins more loosely,
and support every success.” The concept prevailed during the wars of 1866 and
1870.[11]
During the 1866 Koniggratz
campaign, it was demanded of each soldier that he make use of his initiative
first and foremost. If a leader was unsure whether to intervene in the battle
or follow his initial—now conflicting—orders, the military culture recommended
in most cases the former, as the opportunity for a tactical victory overshadows
all other considerations. To allow subordinates more initiative, the 1888
Exerierreglement für die Infanterie (Drill Instructions for the Infantry)
called for higher headquarters to issue orders only when necessary.
The first person to use the term Auftragstaktik was Moltke the Elder. Author
Jörg Muth wrote in his 2011 book Command Culture, Knowing the superiors’
intentions, however, is a prerequisite for the successful employment of the
famous Auftragstaktik, a cornerstone
of the German military culture. . . . Moltke the Elder is one of the earliest
proponents of this revolutionary concept. As early as 1858, he remarked at the
annual great general staff wargames, which were traditionally held in a
different part of Germany every year, that “as a rule an order should contain
only what the subordinate for the achievement of his goals cannot determine on
his own.”[12]
Moltke and his pupils promoted
the system, but it was not institutionalized until written down in the Army
Manual of 1888, the same year Moltke retired. Yet the cultural foundation, a
result of intellectual rigor, had been set. This allowed for changes in other
institutions to enhance Mission Command as they were developed to deal with the
changing face of war.[13]
How the United States Interprets Auftragstaktik
into Mission Command
Since the 1870s, when the U.S.
Army sent General Philip Sheridan and Lieutenant Colonel Emory Upton to study
the Prussians—along with the other armies of Europe and Asia—the U.S. Army,
like many others, has tried and failed to understand and apply the meaning of Auftragstaktik to its own culture. Muth
writes, Auftragstaktik. The word
sounds cool even when mangled by an American tongue.
What it means, however, has
always been elusive to Americans. The problematic translation of that core
German military word into mission type orders completely distorts its meaning. Auftragstaktik does not denote a certain
style of giving orders or a certain way of phrasing them; it is a whole command
philosophy.[14]
Others have been just as critical
of the continual attempts and failures of the U.S. Army to adapt Auftragstaktik. Dr. Daniel J. Hughes
remarks on the cultural reason that the U.S. Army has failed to implement it:
One prominent example of the
failure to understand German terms and concepts is the term Auftragstaktik. This was not a basic
word used by the old Prussian army or the German army of World War II. It has
no meaning when rendered as “mission-type order.”[15]
In contrast, the U.S. Army
continues to worship at the technological and management science altar by
combining Mission Command with emerging communications technology, as if one
will not work without the other, or simply and constantly saying that this
combination will somehow magically work and that the harder decisions about
aligning the force structure, providing the necessary training, education and
personnel system can be avoided:
Network enabled mission command
will require an institutional culture that fosters trust among commanders,
encourages initiative and expects leaders to take prudent risk and make
decisions based on incomplete information. Network enabled mission command will
also require commanders, staffs, and logisticians who understand the complexities
of the emerging operational environment, as well as the highly-integrated joint,
multinational and interagency characteristics of full-spectrum operations.[16]
Thus, Mission Command, as it did
in the 1980s, is becoming a method of orders and control rather than a cultural
philosophy that can greatly enhance a leader’s ability to make rapid and sound
decisions without waiting for permission. Additionally, examinations of the
recently released Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0 and Army
Doctrine Publication
(ADP) 6-0—both titled Mission
Command and both released in May 2012—reveal no “how to” in implementing
Mission Command, no use of case studies, no examples of good and bad command
cultures. Instead, the doctrinal manuals are filled with theories, philosophies
and charts on how the U.S. Army interprets Mission Command. No one at any level
of the Army has conducted the difficult analysis of how Mission Command would
be implemented across the
operational and, more important,
the institutional or generating forces. Implementing Mission Command as a
powerful combat multiplier must begin at the top and filter down by example to all
ranks, military as well as civilian.[17]
But confusion reigns. In May
2012, while attending the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Army Learning
Model conference, several senior leaders were asked by the audience how Mission
Command would be practiced by TRADOC and the institutional Army. The responses
ranged from, “I will refer this to others to answer,” to “We cannot have seven different
courses doing seven different things; we must standardize.” The audience then
asked, “Why does it matter as long as your outcome for that course is met, and
they operate under the resource parameters you put them under?” Other senior
leaders answered, “We will bring in commanders that are good at it [Mission
Command] from the operational Army to be in charge of our Centers of
Excellence.”[18]
Yet, there is hope. Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staffs (CJCS) General Martin E. Dempsey’s April 2012
“Mission Command: A White Paper” expresses the need to train and educate officers
to operate under Mission Command on two pages of a seven-page document, which
is more than any official Army or Department of Defense document has said on
the subject since Mission Command was introduced in the 1982 U.S. Army Field
Manual 100-5, Operations. Yet, as a high-level document should, the CJCS paper
provides a well-versed concept without going into great detail on how
subordinates should meet the intent of preparing leaders to operate in Mission
Command. For the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense to effectively
implement Mission Command, the drive must come from the top and the bottom.
General Dempsey’s paper is a good start for the top-down implementation of the
concept.[19]
Mission Command is more than a
method of control; it is a cultural philosophy that demands the highest in
professionalism. The way the institutional Army practices through top-down control,
endless regulations and inspections focused on inputs rather than outcomes, is
in contrast to what is needed to practice Mission Command: rigorously selected,
highly competent leaders with the strength of character to stand by their
decisions regardless of the career consequences. The personnel system is the
biggest contrast to what Mission Command needs to succeed.20
Rhetoric Does Not Match Reality[21]
While the quote from the 2009
Capstone Concept mentions the importance of “institutional culture” in the
embracing of Mission Command, the Army culture is dominated by a personnel system
that runs on out-of-date assumptions and facts. The regulations, policies and
laws that guide the personnel system impact all behavior throughout the Army.
Personnel bureaucrats fight the wars of today with practices from the past.22
Little has changed since Vietnam.
While the names of key players are different, the substance of their policies
is not. As Jörg Muth recently wrote in reference to the 3d Infantry Division’s
5 April 2003 “Thunder Run” into Baghdad:
The episode shows a command
culture that has only gradually evolved from the days of World War II. While
the technical knowledge of today’s U.S. Army officers is far superior to that
of their predecessors, their leadership capabilities are not. There are exceptions
as some of the aggressive officers of the 3rd Infantry Division have
demonstrated.
Before the second Thunder Run,
[Colonel David] Perkins outlined for his officers which decisions were his to
make and which ones they could make. That is as close as the U.S. Army has ever
come to Auftragstaktik, but Perkins
has proven to be an exceptional officer. This most effective and democratic of
all command philosophies has, 120 years after its invention, been studied but
not yet understood nor yet found a home in the armed forces of the most
democratic of all nations.23
As a retired command sergeant
major who spent his career in special operations stated, “Soldiers succeed in
spite of the system, not because of it.”[24] For example, standards in officer
accessions (how we prepare individuals to become officers), leader development,
promotions and attendance to military and civilian education opportunities were
recently lowered to meet the need for “bodies” or “spare parts.” Despite lessons
that ought to have been learned from the mistakes made in the personnel arena
during World War II, Korea and Vietnam, these mistakes were repeated during the
past 10 years due to being fenced by legacies of the past. In 2010, the Defense
Science Board report on the personnel system concluded that the Defense Officer
Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) [with “up or out” as its centerpiece] and
other policies and regulations “have the effect today of inhibiting the
Department’s flexibility and adaptability.”[25]
A 2011 Secretary of the Army
Human Dimension Task Force found that the Army’s solution was to balance input
with output by pumping up the input, in this case by beginning to demand more
from accession sources, raising the percentage of Soldiers who just made major,
considering cutting down pin-on time to major, and, one of the worst decisions,
sending lieutenants to a combat zone without going to Ranger school in order to
fill “lieutenant slots” in battalions deploying to an insurgency war. In short,
despite past evidence of its weaknesses, the conveyor-belt method of mass
production of Soldiers and officers ensures only that the quantity of
servicemembers remains high; their quality, on the other hand, is compromised
by the inadequacies present in these current methods of educating them.[26]
This leads the Army to do two
things that undermine its ability to practice Mission Command. Today, and in
the future, asking lieutenants to make decisions with strategic implications, while
decreasing their development opportunities and the time available to learn the
soldierly arts at the small unit level, is a recipe for disaster. However, we
continue to move them along this conveyer belt.[27]
For the past 10 years, the Army’s
solution has been to increase the size of the bilge pump rather than to plug
the hole that is sinking the ship. Why is this happening in the 21st century?
The Army still views the
management of its people through the tired old eyes of Secretary of War Elihu
Root and turn-of-the-century industrial theorist Frederick Taylor. This was
further impacted by the institutionalization of management science by Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara in the 1960s.[28]
In recent years, the Army has
retained officers by promoting them, trying to solve a structural problem by
bribing people to stay, hoping that the positive incentive of faster promotions
could buy their loyalty, patriotism and the moral strength to go into harm’s
way. Yet this kind of appeal to self-interest is precisely the kind of policy
that has failed repeatedly in the past and will actually increase the exodus of
our “best and brightest” young people, thus jeopardizing the Army’s future. It
is based on the dehumanizing assumption that our officers (and noncommissioned officers)
are mindless, undifferentiated, replaceable cogs in a machine. This implies that
any body of a certain rank will do—so much for highly developed professionals.[29]
A little history will help us
understand where this hidden assumption came from. In 1899, President McKinley
picked Elihu Root as Secretary of War to bring “modern business practices” to
the “backward” War Department. Root was a highly intelligent lawyer
specializing in corporate affairs. He acted as counsel to banks, railroads and
some of the great financiers of that era. Root’s approach to reforming the
American military was to insert the ideas of management science then in vogue
into the Army’s ossified decisionmaking process. He wanted the Army to run like
a modern large corporation (sound familiar?).[30]
To this end, Root took
Progressive ideas in personnel management—ideas such as social Darwinism—and
applied them to the Army’s personnel management. This approach should not be
surprising. Root was a product of the big corporations that dominated the
Progressive Era and would soon dominate the U.S. government.[31] Root was also
a disciple of the management theories propounded by Frederick Taylor. He
believed that Taylor’s theories could be used to make the military more
efficient.[32]
Fredrick Taylor is one of the
intellectual fathers of the modern industrial production system. Perhaps his
greatest contribution to production efficiency was to break down complex production
tasks into a sequence of simple, standardized steps. This permitted him to
design a standardized mass-production line around a management system that
classified work into standard tasks and workers into standard specialties. This
combination established work standards, and the people who were trained to
these standards became interchangeable cogs in the machine. This greatly
simplified personnel management in a vast industrial enterprise.[33]
To be sure, Taylorism transformed
industrial production, but it also had a dark side: Taylorism treated people as
unthinking cogs in a machine. By necessity, these people had to accept a social
system based on a coercive pattern of dominance and subordinance and centralized
control from the top. Every action and every decision made in the organization
was spelled out in the name of efficiency. In theory, the entire regimen flowed
from the brain of one individual at the top of the hierarchy.[34]
A complimentary management dogma
also emerged during the Progressive Era. This was the theory of “Ethical
Egoism,” which asserted that all people are motivated solely by selfinterest. By
extension, all people would respond predictably to a variety of positive
incentives (money, pleasure, advancement, distinction, power, luxurious
prestige goods and amenities) or negative incentives (which took the primary
form of a fear of losing the positive benefits, but also of outright punishment
and pain).[35] Easier accessions, faster promotions, no obligation to attend
professional courses and quicker pay raises are fully consistent with this
theory of human behavior.
Taken together, the idea that
people are interchangeable cogs in a machine and the idea that self-interest is
the only significant motivator of behavior help explain why the Army thinks
that increasing its “production” of lieutenants, cutting out necessary training
for young leaders and reducing the promotion time to major will solve its
statistical readiness issues with deploying units, meet near-term requirements
mandated by the Army and Congress for field grades and solve potential
retention problems.
The ideas of Taylor and Root
dominated management science and War Department circles a century ago, but
their ghosts are haunting the Army’s Human Resources Command and the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) staff. Moreover, the ghosts of Taylor and
Root will continue to haunt the Army’s personnel managers as long as Congress
shows no interest in rooting out the causes of our personnel crisis.
But Congress and the press are
blinded by the sterile promises of another techno-centric analogy—the Air-Sea
Battle (“Revolution in Military Affairs on steroids”)—which is based on the
idea that war is a mechanistic process and that machines are the true source of
military prowess as U.S. opponents stand in the open all day and let us kill
them. It was with this belief that the Army went to war with Iraq. As soon as
the troops were out of Iraq and starting to pull out of Afghanistan, the
Air-Sea Battle, the specter of Root and Taylor, began to haunt the Pentagon
once again.
There are dangers of reasoning by
analogy. Used properly, analogies are powerful reasoning devices because they
unleash the genius of imagination and creativity, Einstein’s thought experiments
being cases in point. But analogies are also very dangerous, because they
simplify complex problems and capture our imaginations. Used improperly, they
shackle the mind and take it over the edge of the cliff. Believing that the
Army is like a business, or that good business practices will solve military
problems, are examples of misplaced and dangerous analogies.
Effective business practices are
often very different from effective military practices such as Mission Command.
This is particularly true in the area of personnel policies, where the idea of soldierly
virtue embodies the ethos of self-sacrifice and where, as Napoleon said, the
moral is to the material as three to one.[36]
Numerous studies over the years
have pointed out these issues with the American way of war. In 2011, Eitan
Shimar stated in Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the
U.S., British, and Israeli Armies, The American approach [to war] was
influenced by Frederick Taylor’s principles of scientific management. They
sought to control war through efficient planning and execution processes. Thus,
for example, the regulations emphasized loyalty as opposed to independent
action.[37]
Army Chief of Staff General
Raymond Odierno and Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff General Martin
Dempsey have endorsed a belief in Mission Command and Leader Development as
their top priorities. To succeed, they must also boldly take on the personnel
bureaucrats to undertake the necessary reforms in regulations and work with Congress
to change laws such as DOPMA 1980. To make Mission Command a powerful combat
multiplier, they must exorcise the ghosts of Root and Taylor from Human
Resources Command and the staffs of DCSPER and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command.
German Integration of the Telegraph and Railroad within Mission Command
Helmuth von Moltke was the
crucial figure in late 19th century European warfare. Following the French
Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815), technology, such as the telegraph,
railroads and new weaponry, grew rapidly and complicated military operations. In
particular, offensives became increasingly difficult, as experienced in the
Crimean War (1854–56) and the American Civil War (1861–65). This new technology
coincided with the dramatic rise of mass armies.[38]
More than any other individual,
Moltke balanced the new technology and mass armies with the unchanging
characteristics of war. He guided Prussia to victories over Denmark (1864), Austria
(1866) and France (1870–71). Prussia became the leader of a new, unified German
Empire. Moltke’s art of war was not based on a strict set of rules but rather
followed general outlines that allowed for flexibility. Most important,
however, it was practiced by highly developed professionals.[39]
Moltke was a follower of Carl
Maria von Clausewitz, one of the most influential military writers of the
modern age. Clausewitz argued that war was too unpredictable to be explained by
specific theories. In his book On War, he stated that “Everything in war is
very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult,” and “No other human activity
is so continuously or universally bound up with chance.” He went on to declare,
“War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”[40]
Moltke believed that war was too
uncertain to be guided by a strict set of rules. He also followed Clausewitz’s
belief that probabilities would determine each encounter while an army adapted
to each circumstance as it arose. Moltke served as chief of the Prussian General
Staff from 1857 to 1888. He almost immediately expanded the General Staff’s
influence, developing it into a permanent, peacetime war planning organization.
To achieve this, he divided the
General Staff into several planning divisions. These departments included a
Geographical–Statistical Section, a Military History Section and a Mobilization
Section. The Geographical–Statistical Section estimated numerous aspects of specific
theaters of war. Some items analyzed included cartography, weather charts and
opposing armies. The Military History Section studied past campaigns, such as
the Seven Years’ War (1756–63) and the Franco–Austrian War (1859), distilling
important lessons of operational combat.[41]
Finally, there was the
Mobilization Section, which organized detailed plans for initial deployments of
the military in future conflicts. Within this section, a Railway Section was
created to prepare timetables for the quick mobilization of troops toward the
front lines via railroads. It is interesting to note that while these
departments operated under strict timelines and mobilization tables, they did
not diminish the impact of Auftragstaktik
on the culture.
Moltke’s consistent use of rapid
mobilization was a key ingredient of his art of war. Besides reorganizing the
General Staff, Moltke issued a series of guidelines—1869 Instructions for Large
Unit Commander—for its training.[42] He organized these teachings into
maneuvers and free-play force-on-force war games. Maneuvers, which often
included entire divisions, involved simulated war exercises on realistic
terrain; war games primarily featured theoretical war situations in huge
sandboxes. The most important exercise was the annual staff ride. It included both
maneuvers and war games and involved intimate contact between the chief umpire and
a small group of officers chosen for combat. These games often resulted in
promotions and provided strategy for future wars. Since the purpose of
maneuvers, war games and staff rides was to form leaders of one mind, these exercises
were taken very seriously. A unique characteristic of warfare quickly
developed.[43]
The Prussian General Staff was
the first organization to formulate a “common body of military doctrine.”
Beyond the vast Prussian military reforms, Moltke is historically significant
for his great accomplishments as a field commander. Although a Clausewitz
disciple, he exhibited definite beliefs on military strategy, operations and
tactics. He balanced the strategic offensive with the rise of technology, which
usually favored the tactical defensive. Moltke’s art of war can be organized
into three distinct characteristics: the importance of the Aufmarsch (initial deployment); a preference for the Kesselschlacht (cauldron or envelopment
battle); and the use of Auftragstaktik (mission tactics).
Moltke’s first constant in war
was Aufmarsch, the initial deployment
of the army. Efficient orders via the telegraph, as well as proper assemblage
of troops, would result in a rapid mobilization of forces. He emphasized that
if these demands were not strictly adhered to, the entire campaign could be
ruined:
Even the first deployment of the
army—assembling the fighting means in readiness— cannot be planned without a
previous plan of operations, at least in a very general sketch. One must
consider in advance what one intends in the defense, just as for the attack.
The first deployment of the army is inseparably connected with the operations themselves.
. . . If the views shaping original deployment are incorrect, the work is completely
without value. Even a single error in the original assembly of the armies can
hardly ever be made good again during the entire course of the campaign.[44]
Moltke’s second constant in war
was Kesselschlacht, the envelopment
of the enemy army. Here, he applied his doctrine that preached the strategic
offensive and the tactical defensive. Utilizing this formula, one army pinned
the enemy in place while another army hit him in the flank and rear:
Another means is to fix the
enemy’s front with part of our strength and to envelop his flank with the other
part. In that case it is necessary for us to remain strong enough opposite the
hostile front so as not to be overpowered before the flank attack can become effective.
We must also be very active in his front to prevent the opponent from throwing himself
with superior numbers on our flank attack.[45]
He stressed that the goal of Kesselschlacht was the complete
destruction of the enemy army: Victory alone breaks the will of the enemy and
forces him to submit to our will. Neither the possession of a tract of land nor
the conquest of a fortified position will suffice. On the contrary, only the
destruction of the enemy’s fighting power will, as a rule, be decisive. This is
therefore the foremost object of operations.[46]
Moltke’s third constant in war
was the use of Auftragstaktik,
mission tactics for army officers. The supreme commander gave his subordinate
commanders a general mission. The application of these orders was left to the
field officers. In other words, Moltke’s officers carried out his plan, as
general headquarters played a secondary role. He devised a simple plan and then
trusted his General Staff, which had undergone vast reforms, by placing
well-developed staff officers alongside the large unit commanders to advise
them on the higher’s intent.
Moltke also stressed that orders
must be direct, clear and concise. Otherwise, the main objective might be
misunderstood or even forgotten. Moltke stated “strategy is a system of expedients”
and “no plan survives contact with the enemy’s main body.” As Clausewitz had already
stated, Moltke understood that war was completely unpredictable. Therefore,
planning the entire campaign in immense detail was senseless:
One does well to order no more
than is absolutely necessary and to avoid planning beyond the situations one
can foresee. These change very rapidly in war. Seldom will orders that
anticipate far in advance and in detail succeed completely to execution. This shakes
the confidence of the subordinate commander and it gives the units a feeling of
uncertainty when things develop differently than what the high command’s order
had presumed. Moreover, it must be pointed out that if one orders much, then
the important thing that needs to be carried out unconditionally will be
carried out only incidentally or not at all because it is obscured by the mass
of secondary things and those which are valid only under the circumstances.[47]
The classic example of Moltke’s
art of war was Prussia’s 1866 campaign against Austria. The Austro–Prussian War
began in June, and Moltke was eager to mobilize the Prussian army as soon as
possible. However, Prussian King Wilhelm I delayed mobilization orders. Wilhelm
finally unleashed Moltke on 2 June, empowering him with complete control of Prussian
forces. But he was already behind the Austrians, who had begun troop deployment
weeks earlier.
Fortunately, he had already
finished Prussian mobilization plans. Austria had only one railroad leading
into Bohemia, the main theater of war, as opposed to Prussia’s five. When the
demands for efficiency under mobilization ended, the German army began to be
effective as German subordinate commanders operated under the philosophy of Auftragstaktik.[48]
Consequently, efficiency and
effectiveness under Auftragstaktik
prevailed as Prussia mobilized in three weeks, while Austria took twice as
long. On 22 June, Moltke ordered the concentric advance of two Prussian armies
into Bohemia. The 2nd Army was commanded by the Crown Prince; the 1st Army was
led by Friedrich Karl (the “Red Prince”). Thus began the initial stage of
Moltke’s planned Kesselschlacht. His
armies, widely separated by several days’ marches, were to converge near the
town of Sadowa and link up only during battle. One army, whichever was closest
to the Austrians, would pin the enemy in place, while the other was to attack
from the flank and rear. In the next two weeks, Prussian armies won a series of
engagements and were within a day’s march of each other on 2 July.
The 1866 campaign effectively
illustrated Moltke’s art of war. He solved the problems of mass armies and new
technology by formulating a simple yet well constructed plan. In achieving this,
he enacted his Kesselschlacht
doctrine, the ultimate goal of the Prussian army. When the 1866 operations
began, Moltke’s Aufmarsch gave
Prussia a tremendous advantage over Austria. Furthermore, he utilized Auftragstaktik, allowing his
subordinates to carry out his general orders. Most important, his consistent
use of flexibility saved the Prussian army from several possible disasters.
When all else failed, his iron will thrived amid great adversity.[49]
The best way to summarize
Moltke’s art of war is Clausewitz’s famous dictum: “What genius does is the
best rule.” Although he emphasized war’s uncertainty, Clausewitz believed great
commanders could rise above this “fog of war.” The past is filled with striking
examples, from Alexander in ancient Greece to Napoleon in revolutionary France.
Whether Moltke belongs in this tiny, elite group of military geniuses is open
to question. In any case, he had undoubtedly placed his mark on the modern
German army. However, it remained to be seen if Moltke’s successors could
duplicate his astonishing victories. This would only be ensured by linking
German professional education with the culture of Auftragstaktik.[50]
Practicing Mission Command in the Institutional Setting
The best way to implement Mission
Command is to examine how others have done it through case studies. Until
recently, most historical studies focused on the Prussian and German practice
of Mission Command on the battlefield. But emerging today are studies that
examine the “peacetime practices” that enabled the Germans to put Mission
Command to practice once they went to war. Even the U.S. Army has recently
stated in its Field Manual 7-0, Training, “If mission command is not practiced
in training, leaders will not use it in operations.”[51]
Recent examination of how the
Germans prepared their leaders and soldiers to execute Mission Command was tied
to their personnel and professional education systems and how their
institutional side practiced it. All of these institutions had evolved since
the reforms of Gerhard von Scharnhorst, which began in 1809. Over a century
they evolved together with the emphasis being developing and nurturing leaders
of strength of character, of independence, who took and sought responsibility,
even took joy in making and standing by decisions.[52]
The German personnel system was
decentralized. Leader development was held as the premier mission of commanders
in the German army. Officers were strenuously developed and selected through
one of the finest professional education programs in the world. Intensive professional
education came first in an officer’s career, beginning when he was a new cadet and
continuing through the last course he would take as a captain at the
Kriegsacademie. After that, professional education, though on the shoulders of
the individual, was highly encouraged.
There was not centralized control
of training and education except through guidance from the General Staff and
commanders. If leaders needed updating on the latest tactics, techniques and technology,
it was left to corps and divisions to set up their own courses to provide
notifications to their subordinates about these advances.[53]
Commanders used staff rides and
after-action reviews of free-play force-on-force exercises to further develop
their subordinates. Additionally, from the time they were cadets at the
military academies throughout their time as junior officers attending army
schools, German officers were given time off and then evaluated on their
character and conduct during this unsupervised time. Conduct off duty was as
important as performance on duty. One cannot determine a leader’s potential to
innovate, problem solve or make decisions if he is completely controlled in his
professional educational environment, be it on or off duty.[54]
Another way to practice Mission
Command on the institutional side was to keep written correspondence as concise
and short as possible. This began in the education of officer cadets. Examinations
were used to screen candidates as they advanced from different levels of cadet through
lieutenant and then to captain. Examinations centered around tactical problems
that put the cadet and junior officers in roles of responsibility two to three
levels above their current position. For example, the German cadet or
lieutenant would be given a regimental problem to solve, but the solution had
to be expressed in the form of written orders as concise as possible, one page
being preferred, with no school solutions on which to base their prior
knowledge. Their problem-solving ability had been developed through numerous
map and staff exercises and an exhaustive study of military history.[55]
Another example is how the
Germans approached and evaluated training. In 1888, records indicate that
German army guidance on training was based on principles and outcomes. A German
cavalry squadron was expected to do certain tasks, expressed in German army
training guidance: attack, defend, screen and conduct reconnaissance. The
guidance expressed how the desired outcome of success was defined, but
determining how best to train to this was left to the squadron and regimental
commanders within the parameters of their resources, also given to them by the
German army. Each commander could deviate from the other squadrons as long as
he adhered to the principles (or outcomes) of the General Staff and his
commanders.[56]
When members of the General Staff
later inspected the performance of the seven different squadrons in free-play
force-on-force maneuvers, six succeeded and one failed. The German army took
actions by relieving the failed officers and promoting the most successful
commanders from the exercise. This example is just one of thousands of how the
Germans applied Auftragstaktik to their training institution. British officers
after World War I and U.S. Army officers in World War II were amazed by this
decentralization of training based sometimes on “little more than a page of
yearly guidance.” German officers replied again and again that their army
valued the independence and innovation of their subordinate commanders over
standardization so that all units could reach a minimal standard for war.[57]
In Command Culture, Jörg Muth
describes the outcome that the culture of Auftragstaktik
had on German military effectiveness:
The strength of the Wehrmacht
officer corps lay in the creativity, leadership capabilities and tactical
finesse of officers who commanded anything from platoons to corps. They had
been taught to be innovative and inventive, to disregard doctrine when
desirable, to surprise the enemy whenever possible, and to live and survive in
the chaos of war. They were taught to welcome that chaos and use it against the
enemy instead of making sense of it with a “school solution” or a preconceived
doctrine. German officers were able to give oral orders an instant after a
short tactical deliberation, employing Auftragstaktik,
trusting their subordinate commanders to carry out those orders with minimum
interference.
They would go forward with their
troops into battle to observe the fighting and go into combat themselves if
necessary—from lieutenant to major generals. Those abilities were the power of
the German officer corps that enabled them to hold out for so long, inflict
catastrophic casualties on their enemies, and made them the terror of Europe.[58]
Already mentioned is the need to
reform the U.S. Army personnel system, and there are multiple efforts beyond
the scope of this paper that promise effective reform if put to practice. What
can take place today to enable Mission Command is the revolution in training
that is already occurring in the U.S. Army by the application of Outcomes-Based
Training and Education (OBT&E), which best supports Army Learning Model
(ALM) 2015. It is happening in the best spirit of Auftragstaktik in that leaders and Soldiers are taking the spirit
of ALM 2015 and implementing methodologies and doctrines that, after 10 years
of war, they believe best prepare Soldiers and leaders for the future.
The Future is Now
Training is what an army does most of the time when it is not actually
fighting, and it is in training that the heart of an army’s culture lies.
Training is where ideas are instilled and refined, and it is the best place to
analyze how an army really thinks about things and behaves.
Colonel Casey Haskins, June 2008[59]
Outcomes-Based Training and
Education best supports Mission Command principles in that it operates on
outcomes while subordinates select the appropriate way to achieve those
outcomes. Results show that adaptive and innovative Soldiers and leaders who
continually engage in problem-solving and learning have proven abilities to
make timely decisions under stress.
In this case it would be
TRADOC/the Combined Arms Center (CAC) that would define the outcomes for each
Center of Excellence (CoE) for the operational Army as well as the resource parameters,
and allow the CoEs and their subordinates to figure it out.[60]
Current Army learning methods
teach Soldiers and leaders how to apply approved, doctrinal solutions to
specific tasks, whereas OBT&E teaches them how to frame and solve problems,
focusing on the results rather than the methods. OBT&E seeks to shift
leader training from a traditional construct that focuses on teaching
doctrinally approved solutions to one that equips leaders with solid
fundamental skills and builds expertise in critical thinking and
problemsolving.
OBT&E is designed to develop
leaders and organizations adept at framing complex, ill-defined problems and
making effective decisions under stressful conditions with less than perfect
information. From the instructor perspective, it seeks to encourage the trainer
to teach rather than present, to coach rather than direct, to develop rather
than instruct.[61]
OBT&E differs in that it
focuses on the outcomes, not specific tasks, and the skills necessary for the
Soldier and leader to accomplish the mission. With OBT&E there is more
emphasis on small-unit (down to squad level) leadership, a much more varied
operational environment and availability of much more situational information.
These factors also extend the requirement for critical and adaptive thinking
down to lower levels. As a result, our institutions will not only be conducting
education but also training at the small unit level.[62]
OBT&E represents an evolution
of decades of experience in planning and executing “good training” and reflects
bottom-up refinement and application of best training and education practices within
the Army. OBT&E improves instructor and faculty quality and focuses
assessments on learning outcomes. It relies on the credibility and influence of
experienced instructors and trainers who are accountable for instructional
strategies and integral to assessment of outcomes achievement, rather than
enforcement of external controls and processes. OBT&E is “learnercentric” and
requires increased importance to be placed on developing and rewarding quality instructors.[63]
OBT&E can best be described
as “developmental learning”—development occurs while training a military task.
OBT&E and Outcomes-Based Learning are the intersection of training and
education. The Outcomes-Based Instruction Model (shown in the figure on page 15)
outlines the three elements of an outcome: Tangibles, Intangibles and
Context.64 Each element provides an essential component to the training and
education to maximize the overall impact that the Soldier and leader will have
on their unit due to their training experience. The Outcomes-Based Instruction
Model provides an approach to leader development that employs “context-based, collaborative,
problem-centered instruction” in accordance with the ALM 2015 framework to ensure
development of 21st century leader competencies.65
OBT&E builds on the Army
Capstone Concept (ACC), the Army Operating Concept (AOC) and the Army Training
Concept (ATC ) 2012–2020 and directly aligns with Army Learning Model (ALM)
2015 by developing 21st century leader competencies through a learner-centric outcomes-based
approach that enables career-long learning. OBT&E is specifically
highlighted in the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) Imperative #3—Prepare leaders for hybrid threats and full-spectrum
operations through Outcomes-Based Training and Education.[66] Additionally,
the ALDS indicates, “Leaders must have the ability to reason, to think
critically and creatively, to anticipate consequences and to solve problems.”[67]
OBT&E provides this competitive learning advantage.
OBT&E also has a direct
linkage to the development of Profession of Arms essential characteristics (trust,
military expertise, espirit de corps, service and stewardship). It provides
guideposts for teaching leader skills and competencies critical to the development
and certification of professional Soldiers and leaders who exercise “repetitive
discretionary expert judgment.”[68]
Today’s highly complex operations
have underscored the importance of sound moral judgment and decisionmaking at
junior levels. According to the AOC, “Junior leaders conducting operations
guided by mission orders at the ends of extended lines of communications in noncontiguous
areas of operations require the maturity, judgment and confidence to develop creative
solutions to ill-structured problems and implement those solutions through
effective action.”[69] Even with modern command, control, communications,
computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities,
the noncommissioned officer or junior officer on the ground sometimes has the
best situational awareness and is more likely to make the best decision—but
only if he or she is equipped, intellectually and culturally, to properly assess
the situation and creatively arrive at the best solution.
OBT&E employs two innovative
teaching techniques: the Combat Applications Training Course (CATC ) and the
Adaptive Leader Course (ALC). CATC trains individual Soldier tasks, while ALC
focuses on problem solving and development of strength of character; both
techniques aim to develop effective decisionmaking skills. As a means of
demonstrating OBT&E and providing context for understanding OBT&E
principles, the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) developed CATC, a field-based
course in rifle marksmanship.[70] It includes scenariobased exercises that
introduce teamwork and activities focused on problem solving. CATC is a catalyst
for educating leaders and instructors about OBT&E. Developed by Army
Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Forward, ALC uses situational exercises
in a tactical and operational environment to stress effective decisionmaking
and adaptability through experiential learning.[71] ALC is also based on the
latest learning work of Dr. Robert Bjork of UCLA.[72]
As of June 2012, OBT&E
application has been explored in a variety of programs of instruction (POIs)
throughout the Army. It is currently being successfully implemented at the following
learning institutions: Fort Benning (Georgia) Army Reconnaissance
Course—designed using OBT&E principles including curriculum development and
instructor preparation; Fort Huachuca (Arizona) Intelligence Center of
Excellence—implemented OBT&E in the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) B
and the Captains’ Career Course; Fort Leonard Wood (Missouri) Maneuver Support
Center of Excellence—integrated OBT&E in selected Military Police, Engineer
and Chemical branch courses; Fort Sill (Oklahoma) Fires Center of Excellence—incorporated
OBT&E in the Noncommissioned Officer Academy’s Army Basic Instructor Course
and is attempting to establish OBT&E as the standard throughout the Center;
the Department of Military Instruction at the United States Military Academy,
West Point, (New York)—revised the cadet training curriculum to incorporate
OBT&E principles. A few Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs have
also successfully integrated the OBT&E approach. These examples can provide
TRADOC useful context regarding the advantages and challenges of including
OBT&E in the current training and education system, particularly as it looks
to implement ALM 2015.
Not Invented Here: The Challenges
I am the Commander of the Intelligence Center of Excellence and have
very little say in how my Captains’ Career Course is run.
Major General John M. Custer III (April 2009)[73]
Moving beyond traditional
instructor-led “blocks of instruction” will require a “cultural learning
evolution” affecting significant changes to established TRADOC institutional
processes. TRADOC’s Army Learning Coordination Council has taken on the task of
synchronizing learning across the Army to ensure implementation of ALM 2015.
They have identified key institutional challenges that involve reforming
current training resourcing and policy to accommodate One Army School System
initiatives and Regional Learning Center fielding; improving instructor quality
and utility to ensure selection, assignment, development and sustainment of the
best personnel as faculty cadre; enhancing network access and infrastructure to
ensure Soldier accessibility and point-of-need delivery of learning content;
and retooling the current training development model to develop, maintain and
assess learning outcomes across TRADOC.
OBT&E requires a different
method of allocating resources to training and more flexibility in using them,
as resources are currently aligned to tasks being trained rather than to skills
attained. Furthermore, OBT&E can be instructor intensive. It requires a
much different level of instructor quality than do current practices. It
necessitates reexamining instructor selection, promotion and development,
including empowering instructors as leaders. The key to quality training and
education relies on a cadre of experienced faculty who are leadership mentors, coaches
and teachers.
One of the advantages of the
Army’s having been at war for more than a decade is the increased level of
tactical and operational experience its instructors now possess. OBT&E requires
additional instructor training not currently provided by the Army Basic
Instructor Course. In OBT&E, the instructor is required to change the
conditions of the operational environment based on the ability of each student
to produce the desired level of skill proficiency, versus one standardized
instruction approach. This instructor skill set requires additional training not
currently offered.
Delivery of training and
education dependent on actual learning outcomes requires that some
consideration be given to multiple learning models, including OBT&E. The
“goodness” of ALM 2015 is that we do not have to choose a single
“one-size-fits-all” approach to how the Army trains and educates. It further
emphasizes that the Continuous Adaptive Learning Model must continually assess
outcomes in meeting the needs of the force and be responsive to operational changes
and evolving trends in learning technologies and methods.
Difficult, But Not Insuperable
Adapt leader development to meet our future security challenges in an
increasingly uncertain and complex strategic environment.
General Raymond T. Odierno
Chief of Staff, Army[74]
According to “Marching Orders,
38th Chief of Staff, Army,” the Army is expected to fight and win on difficult
and rapidly changing complex battlefields. Aligning the institutional Army to
the culture desired through Mission Command will vastly increase Army
capabilities. But some hard decisions must be made in terms of how to support
and institutionalize Mission Command.[75]
While reforms to the personnel
system may take years to implement and must overcome deep bureaucratic
resistance, OBT&E is already providing an alternate route to prepare
leaders to operate under Mission Command. It aligns more closely with the way
individuals actually learn and communicate. While results are preliminary and
anecdotal, evidence is clear that OBT&E results in superior mastery of
fundamental skills, increased retention, higher levels of confidence and
improved judgment, initiative and accountability. Further, as an approach that
encourages broader development of capabilities, its implementation will better
position Soldiers and units for the uncertain missions and ambiguous realities
consistent with full-spectrum operations.[76]
OBT&E represents an
integrated approach to planning, managing and delivering training, education
and self-development. It teaches Soldiers and leaders how to think rather than
what to think by developing a deep sense of understanding and increased will to
adapt tasks under realistic, complex conditions. It connects the schoolhouse to
the operating environment, leveraging combat experience of the force and
integrating mission command. OBT&E is consistent with FM/ADP 6-22, Army
Leadership; FM/ADP 7-0, Training; and the ALDS and is linked to the development
of Profession of Arms essential characteristics, attributes and competencies.
OBT&E has diverse application
across the force. However, achieving an outcomes-based learning approach
consistent with the ALM 2015 framework and the ALDS imperatives will require a
“cultural learning evolution” that includes major institutional challenges for
TRADOC (i.e., resourcing and policy, instructor quality and utility, network
access and infrastructure, and training development). Implementing OBT&E
also requires an organizational climate with a consistency of collaboration and
flexibility in doctrine, policy and allocation of resources to ensure
accountability for results. Finally, OBT&E necessitates reexamining
instructor selection and development that includes empowering instructors as
leaders.[77]
Endnotes
1 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept—Operational
Adaptability: Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an
Era of Persistent Conflict, 2016–2028, 21 December 2009.
2 Attributed to Raimondo Montecuccoli (Italian general,
1608–1680), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raimondo_Montecuccoli.
3 Edward N. Luttwak and S. L. Canby, Mindset: National
Styles in Warfare and the Operational Level of Planning, Conduct and Analysis,
partial report submitted to Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense, 10
March 1980, pp. 4–5, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA142722.
4 See Dr. Charles E. White, The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst
and the Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin 1801–1805 (Westport, CT: Praeger,
1989) for a great description of the beginning of the cultural transformation
of the Prussian (then German) army from centralized to decentralized control.
5 Michael Goodspeed, When Reason Fails: Portraits of Armies
at War: America, Britain and Israel and the Future (Westport, CT: Praeger,
2002), pp. 15–16.
6 Helmuth von Moltke, Geschichte des deutsch-französischen
Kreiges von 1870–71, vol. 3 of Gesammelte Schriften und Denkwürdigkeiten des
General-Feldmarschalls Grafen Helmuth von Moltke (Berlin: E.S. Mittler &
Sohn, 1891–1893), p. 8.
7 This issue was raised as recently as the May 2012 Army
Learning Conference: Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015 by Combined Arms Center (CAC)
commander Lieutenant General David Perkins: “We don’t even have a packet to
train Mission Command.”
8 Christopher Duffy, The Military Life of Frederick the
Great (New York: Atheneum, 1986), p. 167.
9 E-mail from Dr. Charles White to author, 4 June 2011.
10 E-mail from Dr. Jörg Muth to author, 3 March 2012.
11 Dieter Ose, “Der ‘Auftrag’ Eine deutsche militärische
Tradition,” Europaische Wehrkunde, June 1982, p. 264.
12 Jörg Muth, Command Culture: Officer Education in the U.S.
Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901–1940, and the Consequences for World War
II (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2011), p. 22.
13 Antulio J. Echevarria II, After Clausewitz: German
Military Thinkers Before the Great War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 2000), p. 38.
14 Jörg Muth, quoted in Thomas E. Ricks, “An elusive command
philosophy and a different command culture,” The Best Defense (blog), 9
September 2011, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/09/09/an_elusive_command_philosophy_and_a_different_command_culture.
15 Daniel Hughes, “Auftragstaktik,” in International
Military Defence Encyclopedia, vol. 1 A–B, ed. Trevor N. Dupuy (London:
Macmillan, 1993), p. 332.
16 TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept, p. 29.
17 Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP)
6-0, Mission Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, May 2012),
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adp6_0_new.pdf.
18 Author’s personal notes, 1–3 May 2012, TRADOC Army
Learning Conference, Army Learning Model 2015, Fort Eustis, VA.
19 General Martin E. Dempsey, “Mission Command: A White
Paper” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April 2012), pp. 6–7.
20 Richard Lock-Pullen, U.S. Army Innovation and American
Strategic Culture After Vietnam (Oxford: Rutledge, 2006); Rodler F. Morris et
al., Initial Impressions Report: Changing the Army (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1996). Concerning the British, see: Sangho Lee,
Deterrence and the Defence of Central Europe: The British Role from the Early
1980s to the End of the Gulf War (London: King’s College, 1994).
21 Dr. Tim Kane, Bleeding Talent: How the U.S. Military
Mismanages Great Leaders and Why It’s Time for a Revolution (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2012).
22 Lieutenant Colonel Scott M. Halter, “What is an Army but
the Soldiers? A Critical Performance Assessment of the U.S. Army’s Human
Capital Management System,” Military Review (January– February 2012), pp.
16–23.
23 Muth, Command Culture, p. 209.
24 Comment from unnamed command sergeant major to author,
June 2010.
25 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Understanding Human Dynamics, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, March 2009, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA495025.pdf.
26 Halter, “What is an Army but the Soldiers?”
27 Brigadier General Mark C. Arnold, “Don’t Promote
Mediocrity,” Armed Forces Journal, May 2012, http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2012/05/10122486.
28 Ronald Barr, “High Command in the United States: The
Emergence of a Modern System 1898– 1920,” in Leadership and Command: The
Anglo-American Experience Since 1861, ed. G. D. Sheffield (London: Brassey’s
Defence Publishers, 2002), p. 57.
29 Arnold, “Don’t Promote Mediocrity.”
30 David E. Johnson, Commanding War: The Western Origins of
American Military Hierarchy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), pp. 157–158.
31 Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army
Performance, 1939–1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 178–179.
32 Morgen Witzel, “Where Scientific Management Went Awry,”
European Business Forum, no. 21, Spring 2005, p. 91.
33 Dr. Eric A. Sibul, “The Military and the Management
Movement,” Baltic Security and Defence Review, vol. 14, no. 2, 2012, pp.
156–159, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=156768.
34 James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army
Administration and Organization (Washington, DC: Center of Military History,
U.S. Army, 1975), p. 14.
35 Steven M. Sanders, “Is egoism morally defensible?”
Philosophia, vol. 18, no. 2–3, July 1988, pp. 191–209.
36 Maturin M. Ballou, Treasury of Thought (Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin and Company, 1899), p. 407.
37 Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of
Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies (Palo Alto, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2011), p. 62.
38 Eberhard Kessel, Moltke (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1957),
pp. 9–19.
39 Trevor Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and
General Staff, 1807–1945 (Annandale, VA: The Dupuy Institute, 1991), p. 62.
40 Kessel, Moltke, pp. 210–224.
41 Walter Gorlitz, Geschichte des deutschen Generalstabes
von 1650–1945 (Augsburg, Germany: Bechtermünz Verlag, 1997), p. 27.
42 Author’s correspondence with Dr. Bruce I. Gudmundsson,
April 2012.
43 Captain. J. R. Lumley, “On the Training of Prussian
Officers, their Promotion, and How their Capabilities Are Tested,” in Journal
of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, vol. 25 (London: W.
Mitchell and Son, 1882), pp. 745–764.
44 Moltke, Geschichte des deutsch-französischen Kreiges von
1870–71, p. 34.
45 Kessel, Moltke, pp. 100–103.
46 Ibid.
47 Moltke, Geschichte des deutsch-französischen Kreiges von
1870–71, p. 38.
48 Martin van Creveld, “On Learning From the Wehrmacht and
Other Things,” Military Review vol. 68, no. 1 (January, 1988): p. 62–71.
49 Kessel, Moltke, pp. 100–103.
50 Otto Friedrich, Blood and Iron: From Bismarck to Hitler
the Von Moltke Family’s Impact on Germany (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), p.
64.
51 Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0, Training for
Full-Spectrum Operations, Draft, June 2007.
52 Dr. Charles E. White, The Enlightened Soldier:
Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin 1801–1805 (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1989), pp. 45–54.
53 Bruce I. Gudmundsson, “The Evolution of Mission Command,”
Tactical Notebook, Summer 1995, pp. 52–57.
54 William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1985), p. 87.
55 Muth, Command Culture, pp. 85–112.
56 Lumley, “On the Training of Prussian Officers,” p. 747.
57 The author is indebted to the insights of Dr. Bruce I.
Gudmundsson and William S. Lind in reference to examples of German application
of Mission Command in peacetime. See also, Robert T. Foley, “Institutionalized
Innovation: The German and the Changing Nature of War, 1871–1914,” Royal United
Services Institute, vol. 147, no. 2 (April 2002), pp. 84–90.
58 Muth, Command Culture, p. 205.
59 Casey Haskins, “A Good Answer to an Obsolete Question,”
unpublished paper, United States Military Academy, June 2008), p. 3.
60 This comment brought high praise from trainers and
educators from Army Centers of Excellence, 1 May 2012, Army Learning
Conference, Fort Eustis, VA.
61 Discussions with COL Casey Haskins, Director, Department
of Military Instruction (DMI) at the United States Military Academy, West
Point, NY, 24 July 2011. See also, Haskins, “A Good Answer to an Obsolete
Question.”
62 OBT&E tends to blur the lines between training and
education; the methodology, as the original name implies, was intended to apply
to both operational (training) and institutional (education) domains.
63 Donald E. Vandergriff, Raising the Bar: Creating and
Nurturing Adaptive Leaders to Deal with the Changing Face of War (Washington,
DC: Center for Defense Information, 2006), pp. 83–118.
64 Saul Magana, “Revised ‘ABIC’—Army Basic Instructor
Course,” Fires Center of Excellence, Intellectual Warrior’s Conference
Briefing, 13 April 2011. E-mail from Mr. Magana to author,
21 March 2011. Also based on discussions with Mr. Magana,
1–3 May 2012. Mr. Magana has been instrumental in developing the ABIC at Fort
Sill, OK, based on OBT&E principles.
65 E-mail from Saul Magana to author, August 2011.
66 Department of the Army, The Army Leader Development
Strategy, Draft, 25 November 2009, p. 10.
67 Ibid., p. 9.
68 U.S. Army, “Study of Professionalism” (study, Center for
the Army Profession and Ethic, West Point, NY, 2011–2012).
69 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525- 3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, 19 August
2010, pp. 10–11, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf.
70 The AWG has also developed CATC Courses for land
navigation, urban operations and Soldier-first-responder.
71 Vandergriff, Raising the Bar; COL Casey Haskins refers to
ALM as the classroom version of OBT&E. 72 Dr. Robert Bjork, “Why the Way
the Army Learns is Backwards,” unpublished briefing to General William Wallace,
TRADOC Commander, at the University of California, Los Angeles, School of Psychology
in August 2006.
73 Quote came from April 2009 discussion at Military
Intelligence Center of Excellence Cultural Center Conference in Tucson, AZ,
referencing the fact that the institutional Army does not practice Mission
Command.
74 General Raymond T. Odierno, “Marching Orders, 38th Chief
of Staff, Army,” January 2012, http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/c/downloads/232478.pdf.
75 Ibid.
76 Dr. Gary Riccio and Frederick Diedrich, “An Initiative in
Outcomes-Based Training and Education” (study, U. S. Army Asymmetric Warfare
Group, Fort Meade, MD, 2009).
77 Haskins, “A Good Answer to an Obsolete Question,” pp. 45–48;
Haskins lays out the best way to implement OBT&E in TRADOC.
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