Peace is over for the Baltic States

Thomas Theiner
in Euromaidan Press 2015/04/03

The Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are the most endangered. Freed from the Russian yoke but 25 years ago and for centuries oppressed and enslaved by Russia, the Baltic people are most aware of the threat posed by Russia’s resurgent nationalism… or at least Estonia is, because Latvia’s and Lithuania’s defense preparations are ridiculous. They scream for help, solidarity and Western forces to defend them, but have way too few soldiers, way too small defense budgets and an amazing lack of urgency. Personally I believe that if within this year both do not rectify this situation, NATO should only defend them while on its way to stand and fight with Estonia.

Latvia, with silly grandstanding, which would embarrass every other nation, announced that for 2015 it will spend an additional €28 million on its defense… let that sink in: €28 million or in the words of Latvia’s defense minister Vejonis: “Boosting national defense capabilities is our priority, which is clearly visible in the increased 2015 budget.” Now Latvia spends 1% of GDP on defense. NATO’s target is 2%, but for a nation under threat it should be more like 3%. According to the EU commission, Latvia’s GDP in 2014 was €23.8 billion and by the end of 2015 it should be approximately €24.5 billion. If Latvia would spend the bare minimum on defense, namely 2%, it would spend at a least €490 million for 2015. It’s actual spending: €253.8 million.

Lithuania used to be a similar defense spending laggard, but this year it increased defense spending by over 30% and will now spend €424.5 million. Lithuania also re-introduced conscription. However, as Lithuania was spending the lowest percentage of GDP on defense in the entire EU, even after this increase its spending is still a paltry 1.11% of GDP. Estonia, on the other hand, always took defense seriously and continuously spent 2% of GDP and increased this to 2.05% for 2015. This year the smallest of the three Baltic nations will spend €412 million.

All three of the Baltic nations can spend more on defense. Their economies are growing; their national debts are low and their budget deficits well under the EU’s threshold of 3%. According to the EU Commission on 5 February 2015, Lithuania’s budget deficit was -1.4% of GDP and its national debt 41.8% of GDP, Latvia’s deficit was -1.1% and its debt 36.5% and Estonia’s -0.6% and 9.6%. Lithuania and Latvia could easily ramp up defense spending to 2%, especially as their corporate income taxes rates are 15%, which are the lowest in the European Union safe for Bulgaria. And radically raising defense spending is absolutely viable as shown by a guy named Vladimir Putin, who increased the Russian defense budget by 43% in his first year in office and by an average of 21% every year since.

If all the Baltic nations were as serious as Estonia and spent 2% on defense, then their combined defense budget would be €1.62 billion instead of the current €1.09 billion. But 2% is not enough. At the end of the Cold War, Germany was spending 2.8% of GDP on defense, South Korea will spend 2.5% this year and Israel 5.6%. Therefore, the Baltic nations should spend at least 2.5% a year on defense. That would amount to €1.83 billion a year or nearly €750 million more than now. With a defense budget of this size, the Baltics could finance the forces to withstand a Russian attack for the three to four days it will take the US Air Force to smite Kaliningrad and attain air supremacy.

But even with an increased defense budget, the Baltics will not withstand a Russian attack because of the insanely small amount of active and reserve troops they field. Israel fields 2,142 active soldiers per 100,000 citizens, Greece 1,008 and the most serious Baltic nation Estonia 418 active troops per 100,000 citizens. That is actually an exceptional high number compared to Lithuania’s 269 troops and Latvia’s 232 troops. Why should an American president ask his 425 troops per 100,000 citizens fight and die for Latvia or Lithuania, who don’t ask the same of their citizens?

The whole lack of seriousness of Latvia and Lithuania becomes evident when compared to Finland and Israel: Finland with 12% less population than the three Baltic nations combined fields six brigades in peacetime with 208 Leopard 2A4 tanks and an air force with 62 F-18 fighters, whereas the three Baltic nations field three active brigades with 0 tanks and 0 fighters. Israel with a population that is 32.4% bigger fields nine active brigades with over 2,000 tanks and over 400 fighters during peace; in case of war Israel will field an amazing 41 combat brigades, the while the Baltics will field at best 10 brigades during a war.

The Baltic States do not need to reach Israeli levels in active personnel numbers or field 1,677 active citizen-soldiers per 100,000 people as Switzerland does, but the Baltic Nations must increase their forces substantially. Estonia is already on the right path and aims to have 90,000 reserve forces by 2022. With such a high number of reservists Estonia will even overtake Israel and will be on par with the reserve levels of Finland. However, to its South Latvia and Lithuania are both undermining the brave work of Estonia by not fielding more troops. At least all three should field 600 active troops per 100,000 citizens and thus give them an active force of 37,000 troops, which is 5,000 more than the Russian troops garrisoned within 100 km of the Baltic States.

I group the Baltic nations together since the best way forward for the three is to merge part of their defense structure: a trilateral treaty binding Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to spend 2.5% of GDP on defense, obliging them to have 600 active troops per 100,000 citizens, forcing them to coordinate acquisition of equipment and establishing joint units for the most expensive equipment would create much stronger, more capable and harder to defeat armies. Right now the three countries waste immense amounts of money by going alone on everything. If they want to remain free, they need to stop this.

A few examples: together the three nations field 18 helicopters of 5 different types, thus needing 5 different training teams, 5 different maintenance teams and 5 different logistic supports units. Last year Estonia bought 44 CV90 tracked infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) from the Netherlands, while Latvia bought 123 CVR(T) from the United Kingdom. Two sets of vehicles with completely unrelated maintenance needs. If Lithuania will now buy something else all three countries will have to build up their own training, maintenance and logistic structure for their vehicles instead of one training center and one central logistic/maintenance depot. Also if the three nations coordinated and bought the same weapon systems together, the price per item would drop. But now the Latvian CVR(T) Scimitars have a 30mm cannon and the Estonian CV90 have a 35mm cannon, making even ammunition sharing impossible.

Next in Estonia’s plans is buying a self-propelled artillery system. If it buys it alone then it will be able to afford 24 at best. Lithuania’s artillery is also in dire need of modernization as the M101 howitzers it uses were produced between 1941 to 1953… Latvia uses an old Czech model, which cannot even fire standard NATO ammunition. Now if the three nations agreed to merge their procurement and agree on a common brigade structure, then they could acquire a modern and much more capable artillery system together. As together the three nations would buy up to 72 systems, all sellers would be very open to produce the system in the Baltic States, thus giving the three nations a chance to develop their own defense industries and thus spend their money on their soil. The brilliant Swedish Archer, the light French CAESAR, the tracked Polish AHS Krab or the American M109A7 – all of them could be partially produced and assembled in the Baltic States and with one system in use a single common training center will suffice. Spares and supplies – again buying in bulk will reduce the cost and having just one main depot will cut costs again. With defense spending at 2.5% and costs reduced by cooperating closely, it will be possible for the Baltic States to buy larger amounts of more modern equipment.

What the triple alliance members need: for their armies – tanks, tracked infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled artillery, for their territorial defense units – wheeled infantry fighting vehicles and light howitzers, for their air forces – utility helicopters, drones and a medium-range air-defense system. What they do not need is more ships and a fighter wing. A fighter wing is highly expensive and with all Baltic air bases in range of Russian anti-air and cruise missiles, fighters either won’t be able to take to the skies or will be shot down within minutes. And if the Baltic nations ever invest in their own fighter wing, then Western NATO members would abandon the Baltic Air Policing mission. Therefore NEVER ever must the Baltics buy their own fighters. As for the Baltic Naval forces: the Russian Baltic Fleet is too strong and therefore a coastal missile battalion must suffice. Poland already employs the Norwegian Naval Strike Missile and the Baltic nations should acquire it too to sink Russian ships before they come near a Baltic shore.

But, like with other expensive and highly specialized equipment, the Baltic nations should first set up common battalions to employ this equipment. If they buy the Naval Strike Missile, then beforehand they should create a tri-national Coastal Artillery battalion. Such a tri-national battalion would field three Naval Strike Missile equipped companies, one Estonian, one Latvian, one Lithuanian, supported by a maintenance company and a supply company, with three platoons each (an Estonian, a Latvian and a Lithuanian platoon). During peacetime, the battalion would be managed by a tri-national command company, which will ensure that the three combat companies are well trained, maintained and equipped. If Russia attacks, the three companies, with their respective support platoons, will leave the battalion’s base and head to their nation to fight there.

With the same structure the Baltic nations should set up a tri-national helicopter wing with 24 utility helicopters in three squadrons that can deploy to their respective nations in case of war. Possible models are the American UH-60M Black Hawk and the European NH90. A common airlift wing providing tactical transport to all three nations can be set up with the same structure and a tri-national paratrooper battalion should be located right next to it. A HIMARS multiple rocket launch system with MGM-140 ATACMS missiles, if bought by the three nations together and managed in a common battalion, suddenly becomes a feasible weapon system. A UAV battalion, an Electronic Warfare battalion, even an air wing flying 12 South Korean KAI TA-50 Golden Eagle or Italian M-346 Master trainer aircraft would be a possibility. Unite and be strong or do your own thing and be weak and easy prey.

Most importantly, the three Baltic nations need a modern medium range air-defense system and tanks. The air-defense systems currently in service, namely RBS-70, Mistral, Stinger and Grom systems, do not reach higher than 4-5km and have a range of just 6-8 km. The three Baltic nations do not need a high-end long-range system like the SAMP/T or the MIM-104 Patriot as Putin won’t fire a nuke at the three nations and risk contaminating his own troops, country or main shipping lane. Naturally, if the US, pleased by the common Baltic defense alliance and the increase in Baltic defense spending, increases its Foreign Military Financing to the Baltic nations, then one could always ask to get a battalion worth of MIM-104 launchers and radars for a tri-national battalion. 

US politicians would love such a common battalion, but in case the US will not provide an anti-air system, either the Norwegian NASAMS 2 or the Swedish BAMSE must be on the Baltics’ shopping list. The NASAMS 2 can use a mix of IRIS-T and AIM-9X Sidewinder infrared homing missiles, and AIM-120 AMRAAM and RIM-162 ESSM radar homing missiles and a range of up to 40km and can hit targets 14km above ground. Likewise, the Swedish BAMSE system can hit targets up to 15km above ground and 20km away. Eight nations already field the NASAMS 2, including Norway and Finland, while the BAMSE is in service with Sweden. The big advantage for BAMSE is that both Lithuania and Estonia already operate BAMSE’s Giraffe AMB radar, thus making integration of the Fire Control Radar and missile launchers easy.

As for tanks, the Baltics would be well advised to opt for a light tank design as those are more agile than main battle tanks (MBT). MBTs weigh around 60 tonnes due to their thick composite armor while light tanks weigh 25-30 tonnes and are much cheaper to procure. Combining a light tank with an active protection system like the Israeli Trophy or the German AMAP-ADS would offer the same level of protection against anti-tank missiles and rocket propelled grenades as the thicker armor of MBTs, but at half the price. Two light tank models that would operate well in the Baltic States are the Polish-British PL-01, which is based on the Swedish CV90, and the CV90105, which is a variant of the CV90. Poland intends to buy a large number of PL-01 to equip its armored  forces and as Poland, like the Baltic States, also needs a large number of tracked IFV, all four nations should agree on a common tank and IFV design and then produce and maintain it together to reduce costs and improve interoperability. 

Fielding a large number of mixed units of light tanks with a 105mm canon and tracked IFVs, some of which armed with anti-tank guided missiles, would give Baltic Armies the ability to ambush and decimate Russian forces and then retreat into the vast forests of the three nations to redeploy unseen for the next strike (Lithuania’s soil is 33% forested, Latvia’s 42% and Estonia’s 50%). A mobile short-range air-defense system and an engineering vehicle built on the same chassis as the tank and IFV should be added to the aforementioned units to protect them from Russian attack helicopters and provide them with a vehicle capable to clear a path through the forests.

Ultimately, the defense of the Baltic nations stands and falls with their level of cooperation. Sweden has the easiest task: defend and hold Gotland, while Poland faces the unenviable task to fend off attacks on two sides: from Kaliningrad and Belarus, while at the same time being the main reserve force for the Baltics. Therefore, Poland has much higher financial, logistic and preparatory hurdles to clear before its military is capable to withstand each and every type of Russian attack. But as for the Baltics, nothing will give them as better chance to deter a Russian attack and in the worst case withstand it until help arrives, than combing their defense structures and leaving just operational command in national hands (for now).

All five nations under threat along the Baltic Sea will have to plan and prepare to fight on their own, as help from Western European nations is not something they can count on. Therefore, these nations, just like Romania and Ukraine, will have to prepare for the worst and with the current nationalistic hysteria sweeping Russia the worst is yet to come and it will come. Therefore either be prepared or surrender and acquiesce to living under the Russian yoke once more. I for my part say: Never!

This article is part of the article series Peace is Over, which also includes the following in-depth analysis of the current military capabilities and the required changes to defend Sweden and Poland:

1. Sweden
2. Poland

 

Unconventional Deterrence Strategy

Mindaugas Rekasius
Naval Postgraduate School 
June 2005

ABSTRACT 

This thesis examines a largely unexplored area of deterrence theory – unconventional deterrence. Unconventional deterrence is defined herein as “persuading the opponent not to attack, via threats of unconventional warfare, such as guerrilla resistance and terrorism.” It treats terrorism as a punishment strategy, through which the one deterring threatens to punish the aggressor’s population. Guerrilla warfare is a denial strategy, through which the one deterring threatens to protract a war and deny the aggressor his political objectives. This study questions the underlying hypothesis of deterrence theory which says that the balance of the opponents’ military capabilities is the basic determinant of successful deterrence. Rather, the hypothesis here is that the deterrer may deter the aggressor from attacking by adopting a strategy that makes the aggressor’s military superiority irrelevant. The present thesis focuses primarily on relatively weak states. Unconventional deterrence is explored as a means for a weaker state to deter a considerably stronger opponent.

This thesis discusses the requirements for successful deterrence, and the peculiarities of unconventional deterrence. As well, the dynamics of small wars are explored in order to unfold a paradoxical phenomenon: the possibility of an underdog’s victory in war.  Two  case  studies:  (1) the  Vietnam  War  of  1964-73 and (2)  the Afghanistan War of 1979-89 – are explored as examples of the weak denying the strong their objectives.

Read more: PDF

SÕJAVÄELINE KIRJAOSKUS

Peeter Kukk, PhD, Kaitseväe Ühendatud Õppeasutused

Artiklis analüüsitakse, kuidas on erinevatel ajajärkudel muutunud sõjaväelaste kirjaoskus selle sõna laiemas tähenduses. Kirjaoskus hõlmab seejuures nii väljaõpet kui ka teenistuse korraldust koos otsustusõiguse ulatuse ja vastutuse määraga. Artikli esmaste lugejatena nähakse Kaitseväe Ühendatud Õppeasutustes (KVÜÕA) õpinguid alustavaid põhi- ja keskastmekursuse õppureid.

Rene kommentaar: Tegemist on väga hea ülevaatega ülesandekeskse juhtimise filosoofia arengust ja mõjutustest. Pealkiri võib jätta esmapilgul eksitava mulje (mulle jättis), nagu tuleks juttu sõjaväelaste kirjutamise oskusest. Sellest see artikkel siiski ei ole. Väärt lugemine.

Artikkel siin: http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/KVUOA_Toimetised_16_7_Kukk.pdf

An elusive command philosophy and a different command culture

By Jörg Muth

2011 in Foreign Policy

Best Defense department of Auftragstaktik affairs

Auftragstaktik. The word sounds cool even when mangled by an American tongue. What it means, however, has always been elusive to Americans. The problematic translation of that core German military word into "mission type orders" completely distorts its meaning. Auftragstaktik does not denote a certain style of giving orders or a certain way of phrasing them; it is a whole command philosophy.

The idea originates with Frederick the Great, who complained after more than one battle that his highly experienced regimental commanders would not dare take action on their own but too often ask back for orders and thus waste precious time.

Nearly one hundred years later the military genius Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke was the first to formulate the concept of Auftragstaktik. Moltke was a diligent student of Frederick's campaigns, of military history in general and philosophy. At a time when he was not yet famous and, not yet the victor of three wars, he observed the annual General Staff war games in 1858. The paperwork and the detailed orders appalled him because he knew that in war there was no time for such nonsense. During the war game critique he decreed that "as a rule an order should contain only what the subordinate for the achievement of his goals cannot determine on his own." Everything else was to be left to the commander on the spot.

War—Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity

COLIN S. GRAY

War can only be understood holistically. If one focuses on continuity in change, one is near certain to undervalue the change in continuity. One has to be bifocal. Carl von Clausewitz is uncompromising on this matter:

But in war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together.

The subject of most interest here is future war, all of it. Future war will include both change and continuity from the past. Many people have difficulty understanding the relationship between continuity and change; this article will try to provide some useful guidance. Similarly, satisfactory comprehension of the connection between theory and practice is frequently missing.

These deficiencies in intellectual grasp can be important and damaging to national security.

Read more: http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2010summer/Gray.pdf

Teaching How to Think, Not What to Think

by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey N. Rule

United States Marine Corps

United States Army War College, Class of 2013  

“Machines don’t fight wars. People do, and they use their minds.”

— Col John R. Boyd

Numerous articles and books have recently appeared criticizing current leadership of the Armed Services and their collective inability to think critically, to adapt, or to innovate quickly — as well as their lack of tactical, operational, or strategic agility.[1] Additionally, many of the same critiques have emanated from the services for decades — most notably during and after the Vietnam War. Furthermore, there is a large body of literature in the broad realm of “strategic studies” that seeks to offer insight and knowledge about how to operate in the most fraught wartime environments characterized by friction, uncertainty, disorder, fluidity, and complexity regardless of the type of competition. From Sun Tzu’s time, through Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and to the modern era, those elements of the environment remain constants in the nature of war.

All U.S. military institutions understand these constants and have, through the years, sought to comprehend and conquer them. The services have not sat idle: their individual doctrines, educational institutions, and professional journals abound with the need to create more adaptive and agile and thinking leaders — and have done so for quite some time. So, why is there a constant criticism inside and outside the services for collective failures in creating agile leaders able to cope successfully with the inherent complexity and unpredictability of war?

John Boyd and strategic theory in the postmodern era

John Boyd and strategic theory in the postmodern era
By Frans Osinga

We live in the postmodern era, the French sociologist Francois Lyotard told us in the early eighties. Postmodernism has come to signify a break with traditional modes of behavior. This includes warfare. Two dominant strands of strategic thought have both earned the label of postmodern warfare: Network Centric warfare (NCW) and Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW). One takes its inspiration from the postmodern information society, the other from the eroding authority and power of the modern-era political institutions. Both are also unified in a common conceptual father: the late USAF Colonel John Boyd, the first postmodern strategist. Few people in the past three decades have surpassed his influence on western military thought, but, like Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, he has also often been superficially read and understood.

Read more: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/boyd/osinga_boyd_postmod_copyright2007.pdf

Great debate on military reform!

Great debate on military reform!

Here is a two and 2/3 hours of greatest debate I have ever heard on military affairs. It is on what is actually important in building a force to be able to win wars. I strongly recommend watching it to all military and military related people – makes you think and understand the priorities in creating the really successful defense of any State.

You will see Colonel John Boyd, Senator Gary Hart etc in front of the House Committee Armed Services in 1991. I can promise that the time will be well spent.

Some keywords: personnel policy, military education, doctrines, bureaucracy, high tech, maneuver warfare, Gulf War.

Credit goes to Major Donald Vandergriff (U.S.) for appointing it out. Thanks Don!

See the video: http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/AfterO

Valgustatud kindral Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst

Aivar Jaeski
 

Ajateenistusele pani Euroopas aluse Prantsuse revolutsioon, mis kukutas Bourbonide ülemvõimu, tõi õigused kodanikele ning lõi vabariigi. Kuidas juhtus nii, et Esimese maailmasõja alguseks oli loodud õlitatud, hästi toimiv süsteem? Kes olid nende muudatuste taga?

 

Revolutsioonis tekkinud Prantsuse vabariik ei kestnud kaua, kuid see kogemus valgustas paljude Euroopa mõtlejate meeli. Käesolev artikkel käsitleb ühte valgustatud meest, kindral Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorsti, kes tutvustas ajateenistuse ideed Preisi aristokraatidele. Scharnhorst väärib tutvustamist ka juba kas või seepärast, et ta oli kuulsa sõjandusteoreetiku Carl von Clausewitzi õpetaja. Huntington on nimetanud Scharnhorsti refomistiks, kes pani aluse tõelisele lääne sõjaväelase elukutsele.

Teema käsitlemine on raske, sest vähene hulk seda puudutavaid materjale elas üle Teise maailmasõja. Maailmakaardilt on kadunud ka Preisi riik ning jäänud on vaid mälestus vapratest meestest, kes 1815. aasta juunis jõudsid Waterloo lahinguväljale napilt enne Wellingtoni armee kokkukukkumist. Ühe põhjuse, miks Scharnhorsti vähe teatakse, toob välja Charles Eduard White raamatus „Valgustatud sõjamees" („The enlightened soldier"). Tema väitel ignoreerivad nüüdisaja ajaloolased Preisimaa toonased reforme seetõttu, et Natsi-Saksamaa kolleegid neid liigselt imetlesid.

Loe edasi: http://www.horisont.ee/node/1455

Mission Command —A Multifaceted Construct

Mission Command —A Multifaceted Construct

Richard N. Pedersen 

Mission Command is emerging as a multifaceted construct that integrates the functions and techniques of the art and science employed during the exercise of command authority over missions applying military and other instruments of national power.

The Army Operating Concept (AOC) defines mission command as the exercise of authority and direction by commanders and their staffs to integrate the warfighting functions using the operations process and mission orders to accomplish successful full-spectrum operations. This is a dramatic expansion of how Army doctrine previously defined mission command—the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders. This new definition is expected to be incorporated into the forthcoming FM 3-0 update.

The central idea expressed in the Mission Command Army Functional Concept (MC AFC), a derivative of the AOC, is that mission command fosters mutual trust, encourages initiative, and empowers lower echelons with the combined arms capabilities and authority to fight for information, create opportunities, and exploit advantage consistent with the commander’s intent and concept for accomplishing the mission. Although this describes the benefits of the new mission command, its net effect is to renew emphasis on existing ideas.

The outlook is that mission command is fundamentally the exercise of power to determine, adjudicate, or otherwise settle issues revolving around the warfighting functions during the conduct of the operations process. Currently, the Army’s warfighting functions line up directly with the six joint functions described in JP 3-0. The Army sees the newly defined mission command as an evolved concept encompassing both the Army’s philosophy of command and the integrating function that effectively combines all warfighting functional capabilities.

Army Supporting Ideas for Mission Command:

1) Empower the lowest possible echelon

2) Become skilled in the art of design

3) Educate and train leaders for an uncertain and complex operational environment

Army Tenants for Mission Command:

1) Mutual trust, understanding, and dutiful initiative

2) Decentralized decision-making

3) Decentralized combined arms capabilities

4) Adaptive, bold, audacious, and imaginative leaders

5) Well-trained, cohesive units

6) Nerve and restraint

7) Calculated risk

Marine Corps Key Ideas for Mission Command:

1) Decentralized decision making

2) Mission tactics

3) Human approach: boldness, initiative, personality, strength of will, imagination

4) Commanders forward

5) Shared danger and privation

6) Professional trust

7) Familiar relationships

8) Ability to thrive in chaos, uncertainty, and friction

Read more: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/602-pedersen.pdf

Defending the Baltics

by William S. Lind
y William S. Lind

I recently returned from Estonia and the Baltic Defence College, where the Russian counter-attack on Georgia had left a residual case of nerves. They have little to fear in the short run, unless they duplicate Georgia’s folly and attack Russia. But the question of how the Baltics might be defended is worth considering, both in itself and in terms of what it means for defending other small countries.

The worst option, which Georgia took, is to create a toy army. A handful of modern jet fighters, a battalion or two of tanks, a frigate for the navy, all add up to nothing. Against a Great Power, a toy army goes down to defeat in days if not hours. More, even a few modern jet fighters or tanks cost so much there is no money left for a real defense. Unless the Baltic states want to fight each other, they should leave military toys to children.

Second, the Baltics could try to ally with other near-by Powers strong enough to balance Russia. But this option exists only in theory. Germany could fill the role but has lost all Great Power ambitions, while Sweden has been out the game for two centuries. There could be benefit for all concerned in a union of the Baltic states and Finland under the Swedish crown, all retaining complete domestic autonomy but united for defense and foreign policy, but it is probably only historians who can see the potential.

A third option is to ally with distant Great Powers in order to balance the threat from a local Great Power. That is what the Baltic States have done through their membership in NATO. Unfortunately, while central European states have attempted this over and over again for centuries, it never works. It may involve Western Powers in war with Russia, or in the past with Germany, but it does nothing to protect the country in question. Poland is a recent example: Britain and France went to war with Germany in 1939 over Poland, but Poland remained an occupied country for 50 years.

NATO membership also increases the pressure to build a toy army, or to specialize in "niche" capabilities like water purification that serve NATO but not home defense. Both are roads to military irrelevance.

There is a model that would work for the Baltic states and other small countries: the Iraqi model. Instead of creating a toy army, they should plan an Iraq-style insurgency against any occupier. This requires a universal militia like Switzerland’s, where every male citizen knows how to shoot and how to build and emplace IEDs and where weapons and explosives are cached all over the country. In the Baltics, this would be a rural rather than an urban defense: Russia could take the cities but not the countryside. The "Forest Brothers" kept up just such a resistance to the Soviet presence well into the 1950s.

An Iraqi-model defense would not make it impossible for Russia to conquer the Baltic states. It could only make such a venture expensive for Russia, hopefully too expensive.

For long-term security, the Baltic states must approach the problem not just at the military but at the grand strategic level. What that means is that, like all small countries bordering Great Powers, they must accommodate the Great Power’s interests. The model here is Finland during the Cold War. Finland maintained complete sovereignty in her domestic affairs, but she was careful to accommodate the Soviet Union in her foreign and defense policies. She was a good neighbor to Russia, as the Baltic states should strive to be good neighbors to Russia now. Their goal should be to create a situation where it is more in Russia’s interests for the Baltics to remain independent than to reincorporate them into the Russian empire.

I realize this advice is unpalatable to the Baltic peoples. Half a century of Soviet occupation has left a residue of hatred for all things Russian. But grand strategy must be based on facts and reason, not emotion. The most important fact is geography. Geography dictates that the Baltic states must accommodate Russian interests, whether they want to or not. If they refuse, then the recent example of Georgia may have more relevance than anyone would wish.

September 9, 2008

http://www.lewrockwell.com/lind/lind147.html

When Do We Teach the Basics?

When Do We Teach the Basics?

By Donald E. Vandergriff

We have to develop leaders who understand that context matters. The complexity of today's challenges and the uncertainties of tomorrow require a much broader approach to leader development and a clear understanding of the operating environment.

— General Martin E. Dempsey
Commander, Army Training and Doctrine Command
October 2009

By-the-book answers to specific wellknown situations are not good enough. It is the ability to think that allows a leader to take the knowledge from personal experiences, education, and training and adapt it to the imperfect information of the present situation to arrive at a timely, sound, and workable solution.

The Army is taking on and evolving a new approach to training and education called Outcomes-based Training and Education (OBT&E) while developing a new teaching method under the umbrella of OBT&E called the Adaptive Leaders Methodology (ALM).

The OODA Loop

Fundamental to applying Boyd's concepts is the realization that the OODA loop isn't really a loop at all. Boyd, in fact, never drew it that way. Instead, the loop is more appropriately considered as a way of thinking about conflict based on the concept of keeping our orientations better matched to reality than our opponents can. Boyd demonstrated, by combining examples from both military history and modern science, that the side that can do that not only can respond to changes more quickly, but also can shape the situation to its liking, and then exploit the advantage before the opponent can react. Another key is to use training and experience to assemble an arsenal of potentially effective actions that will flow intuitively, smoothly, and quickly from orientation. The end result is, as Boyd described it, to "operate inside an opponent's OODA 'loop'" and thus produce rapid, jarring changes that disorient and demoralize the opposition.

At the heart of ALM is the essence of the Boyd Cycle, a 4-step theory of decisionmaking that was first articulated by Col. John R. Boyd following his study of fighter pilots in combat during the Korean War. . . . Commonly known as "OODA" (observation, orientation, decision, action), the Boyd Cycle is a useful framework for the assessment of students throughout the course. We focus on the critical step of "orientation" because this is where the cadet attempted to make sense out of the information at hand. The decision that the cadet makes is important, but how they arrived at that decision is just as important.

The OODA loop serves as the centerpiece of how an adaptive leader makes decisions. Unlike the Army's Military Decisionmaking Process—a linear and analytical decisionmaking approach—the OODA loop provides a guide to how to think faster and more effectively than the enemy. However, it is a guide and not a process. Students should first be guided through many scenarios to discover the loop on their own. When finally introduced to the formal theory, students will say, "Wow, that is what I was doing!"

The essence of the ALM is not to arrive at the school solution, or even to teach the students to go down a prescribed checklist of steps. For an era where we cannot predict what leaders will be doing—or even if it should be called "war" at all—the checklist mentality is irrelevant at best. Instead, the method requires instructors to put students into increasingly complex and disorganized scenarios. A good scenario employing TDEs gives students a tactical problem and then puts them under stress—often a time constraint, but there are other means limited only by the instructor's imagination. The students must not only present their solutions, but also explain why they did what they did. The instructor and the other students will critique the solution as well as the explanation and the technique for solving the problem. Did the students, for example, use an effective balance of written and verbal instructions? Why did they micromanage their NCOs? Did the local population think better of the coalition as a result, or did the "favorable" body count just help recruit more insurgents?

Read more: http://www.ndu.edu/press/teach-the-basics.html

Warfighting

Warfighting

U.S. Marine Corps doctrine MCDP1

War is a violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force. These groups have traditionally been established nation-states, but they may also include any nonstate group—such as an international coalition or a faction within or outside of an existing state—with its own political interests and the ability to generate organized violence on a scale sufficient to have significant political consequences.

The essence of war is a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other. War is fundamentally an interactive social process. War is thus a process of continuous mutual adaptation, of give and take, move and countermove. It is critical to keep in mind that the enemy is not an inanimate object to be acted upon but an independent and animate force with its own objectives and plans. While we try to impose our will on the enemy, he resists us and seeks to impose his own will on us. Appreciating this dynamic interplay between opposing human wills is essential to understanding the fundamental nature of war.

The object in war is to impose our will on our enemy. The means to this end is the organized application or threat of violence by military force. The target of that violence may be limited to hostile combatant forces, or it may extend to the enemy population at large. War may range from intense clashes between large military forces—sometimes backed by an official declaration of war—to subtler, unconventional hostilities that barely reach the threshold of violence.

Read more: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/mcdp1.pdf

12 articles on systems thinking

12 articles on systems thinking

By H. William Dettmer

Part 1: An Introduction to the Systems Approach

Winners make things happen. Losers let things happen, or watch things happen and wonder what happened.  —Unknown

There is a paradigm shift underway, from analytical thinking to systems thinking. In time, it will transform the way business is done, in commercial enterprise, government, and the not-for-profit sector. You can ride the leading edge of this wave, or you can swim like the devil to try to catch up with it arter it's passed.

We'll see how theory and sound methods will contribute to the challenge of learning more about our systems, how they function, and how to get improvement efforts right the first time.

Subtopics:

Analysis versus Synthesis

A Paradigm Shift

The Importance of Theory

The Scientific Method

http://www.goalsys.com/systemsthinking/documents/Part-1-IntrotoSystemsApproach.pdf

Part 2: Business and the Blitzkrieg

Success depends on responsiveness and agility, which in turn depend on the independence of team members to act without constantly requiring approval. Such independence depends on their willingness to take initiative, which in turn rests on a climate of mutual trust (einheit), intuitive skill and capability (fingerspitzengefühl), the confidence and assurance of an implied mission contract (auftragstaktik), and an unswerving focus on the most important effort (schwerpunkt).

Subtopics:

Learning from Experience

Maneuver Warfare

The Conceptual Foundation of Blitzkrieg Tactics

Leading by Intent

http://www.goalsys.com/systemsthinking/documents/Part-2-BusinessandtheBlitzkrieg.pdf

Part 3: Destruction and Creation: Analysis and Synthesis

The core of Boyd's argument was that creativity was essentially the outcome of a process of analysis and synthesis, which he referred to as destruction and creation. Boyd suggested that new ideas and breakthrough solutions to particularly challenging problems resulted from mentally deconstructing multiple known existing concepts or processes, then selectively reassembling key elements to form a completely new concept—thus, the characterization as “destruction and creation.”

Subtopics:

Analysis Equals Reductionism

Deficiencies in Analysis

Synthesis: The Second Half of the Equation

Creativity and Synthesis: Building Snowmobiles

Paradigms

Our OWN Synthesis

http://www.goalsys.com/systemsthinking/documents/Part-3-DestructionandCreation.pdf

Part 4: Operationalizing Sun Tzu: The O-O-D-A Loop

“O-O-D-A” is an acronym that stands for observe, orient, decide, and act. These are sequential activities that guide leaders to effective decisions. The act step that culminates this process ultimately produces changes in the environment that merit a new, subsequent round of observations, followed by a second cycle of orientation, decision, and action. Boyd suggested that individuals or groups that could cycle through these four steps faster than their adversaries had a tactical advantage. To the extent that they could execute the cycle two or more times faster than their opponents could complete one, they would actually increase the opposition's confusion about the competitive situation to such a degree that the opponent's efforts might totally collapse.

Subtopics:

The O-O-D-A Loop

Speed

http://www.goalsys.com/systemsthinking/documents/Part-4-OperationalizingSun-Tzu.pdf

Part 5: The Learning Organization: Adapt or Die!

The chief problem: people's world view becomes entrenched—static—while at the same time reality is anything but static. To the extent that there is a mismatch between an organization's orientation and reality, policies or practices based on that orientation become increasingly invalid or even irrelevant. Performance deteriorates and failures occur.

Subtopics:

The Learning Organization

Team Learning: What is it?

Team Learning Versus Teamwork

Systems Thinking: The Key to Effective, Efficient Teamwork

Observation and Orientation

The Solution

http://www.goalsys.com/systemsthinking/documents/Part-5-TheLearningOrganization.pdf

Part 6: Systems and Constraints: The Concept of Leverage

All systems, whether open or closed, are limited (or constrained) in some way. Organizational systems are no exception. What, exactly, is a system constraint? It's some factor that limits what the system can achieve. Were it not for this limiting factor, the rest of the system might be able to achieve much more in realizing its goal. The limiting factor may be internal or external to the system. It may be a physical component, a condition, or an imposed policy of some kind. Whatever it is, however, it does frustrate efforts from within the system to achieve better performance.

Subtopics:

The Pareto Principle

The Concept of a System Constraint

The System Constraint: An "Archimedes Point"

The Myth of Efficiency

Breaking Constraints: How Much Improvement?

Five Focusing Steps: A Prescription for Maximizing System Performance

http://www.goalsys.com/systemsthinking/documents/Part-6-SystemsandConstraints.pdf

Part: 7: Logical Thinking: The Categories of Legitimate Reservation

Decisions under uncertainty will always be...well, uncertain. But there are ways to reduce uncertainty to a reasonable level. One approach is to combine verifiable facts or evidence, to the extent that it is available, with logically verifiable causality. Most people are comfortable with the idea of basing decisions on facts or evidence, but they're less certain about how logic and facts combine to provide the best available basis for decision making.

Subtopics:

Epistemology

The Three Decision-Making Conditions

Intuition

Mathematical Models or Simulations

Making Better Decisions Under Uncertainty

Rules of Logical Causality: The Categories of Legitimate Reservation

http://www.goalsys.com/systemsthinking/documents/Part-7-LogicalThinking-TheCLR.pdf

Part 8: Policy Analysis: What to Change,What to Change To, and How to Make the Change

The thinking process is a tool of unique capability. Governed by the Categories of Legitimate Reservation, it provides a rigorously logical cause-and-effect picture of the reality as it exists now, and as it might exist in the future. As no other tool does, it excels at revealing the complex interdependencies among system components, and between the system and its environment.

Subtopics:

Formal or Informal

Policies Obsolesce

Identifying and Changing Obsolete Policies

The Logical Thinking Process

An Example: The Solomon Trees

http://www.goalsys.com/systemsthinking/documents/Part-8-PolicyAnalysis-TheTP.pdf

Part 9: Strategic Navigation: Strategy Development and Deployment

By losing your goal, you have lost your way.  —Friedrich Nietzsche

Even a breakthrough idea is only an idea. It doesn't become a robust solution until and unless its effects are thoroughly mapped out, the "law of unintended consequences" accounted for, and the effectiveness of the strategy in reaching the goal is validated. The process of doing all this is, in effect, the creation and logical verification of a strategy. This is the heart of the strategy development process. Besides creating a new "map," it also ensures that the map truly leads logically to the desired outcomes. A key part of this map is the major initiatives or projects that must be implemented to produce the desired directional change.

Subtopics:

Strategic Planning

The Systems Approach

The Constraint Management Model

http://www.goalsys.com/systemsthinking/documents/Part-9-StrategicNavigation.pdf

Part 10: Leadership in Complex Systems

"Leadership" is one of the most-used and most-abused words in the English language. Yet few people can agree on a common definition for it. Leadership is different from management, through the two words are often (erroneously) used interchangeably. Leadership is closely related to power—and power comes from sources other than just formal authority.

Subtopics:

What Is It?

Manager or Leader?

Our Definition

Leadership: Essential to Effective Systems

Leadership and the Blitzkrieg

The New Leadership Conflict

http://www.goalsys.com/systemsthinking/documents/Part-10-Leadership.pdf

Part 11: The Wingman Concept: Security and Reinforcement

The wingman concept is based on three characteristics one might even call them virtues: loyalty, integrity, and commitment. The similarity between the blitzkrieg concepts of einheit (mutual trust) and auftragstaktik (moral contract) between the leader and the led, or between contemporary team members, is not coincidental. In formation flying perhaps the ultimate expression of coordinated behavior and especially in combat situations, trust among air crews must be complete and unequivocal. Loyalty, integrity and commitment of each air crew (both leader and wingmen) to one another and to the successful execution of the mission essential and unquestioned. Lives depend on it.

Subtopics:

The Wingman Concept

The Foundation of the Wingman Concept

The Wingman in Business

A Mutual Reinforcement Culture

http://www.goalsys.com/systemsthinking/documents/Part-11-TheWingmanConcept.pdf

Part 12: Logic and Emotion in Changing Minds

“When you’ve got them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow.” —Framed needlepoint reputedly on the wall of the office of Charles Colson, President Nixon’s legal counsel in 1973

A paradigm-changing decision, such as the embrace of new management methods or products, is more likely when a company and its executive find themselves in a “survival” situation, where they must do something different or die. If things are going “okay”—not great, but not that bad, either—the odds are very low that an executive will embrace a revolutionary change…

Subtopics:

Change and Risk

The Technology Adoption Life-Cycle

Mental Models

Evolutionary Psychology

Paradigms

Synthesizing Everything

Mental Models: The Role of Security and Satisfaction

Executive Acceptance

Implications

How New Ideas “Get In.”

Executive-Led Change

A Change Implementation Model

Behavioral Reinforcement

http://www.goalsys.com/systemsthinking/documents/Part-12-LogicandEmotioninChangingMinds.pdf

About author:

H. WILLIAM "Bill" DETTMER. Senior Partner. Author of The Logical Thinking Process (ASQ Quality Press, 2007) and Breaking the Constraints to World-Class Performance (ASQ Quality Press, 1998), two books around which Goal Systems International's Thinking Process Course is based; Strategic Navigation (ASQ Quality Press, 2003); and Brainpower Networking Using the Crawford Slip Method (Trafford Publishing, 2003). Co-author (with Eli Schragenheim) of Manufacturing at Warp Speed (CRC St. Lucie Press, 2000).

Twenty-three years' experience in military operations, logistics, strategic planning, operational planning, training, large-scale systems deployment, project management, and contracting. Eight years graduate level teaching of systems management, systems analysis, human factors, management control systems, organizational behavior and development, Theory of Constraints, Total Quality Management, and management of research, development, testing, and evaluation. Studied constraint theory and tools at the Avraham Y. Goldratt Institute of New Haven, Connecticut. Teaches the TOC Thinking Process, Strategy Development, and Simplified Drum-Buffer-Rope courses. B.A., Rutgers University, 1966. M.S., University of Southern California, 1982. Adjunct faculty, University of Southern California, 1988-1997.