Naval Postgraduate School
June 2005
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines a largely unexplored area of deterrence theory – unconventional deterrence. Unconventional deterrence
is defined herein
as “persuading the opponent
not to attack, via threats of unconventional
warfare, such as guerrilla resistance and terrorism.” It treats terrorism as a punishment strategy, through which the one deterring threatens to punish the
aggressor’s population. Guerrilla
warfare is a denial strategy, through which the one deterring threatens to protract a war and deny the aggressor his political objectives.
This study questions the underlying hypothesis of
deterrence theory which
says that the balance of the opponents’ military capabilities is the basic determinant of successful deterrence.
Rather, the hypothesis here is that the deterrer may deter the aggressor from attacking by adopting a strategy that makes the
aggressor’s military superiority irrelevant. The present thesis
focuses primarily on relatively weak states. Unconventional deterrence is explored as a means for a weaker state to deter a
considerably stronger opponent.
This thesis
discusses the requirements for successful deterrence, and the
peculiarities of unconventional deterrence. As well, the dynamics
of small
wars are explored in order to unfold a paradoxical phenomenon: the possibility of an underdog’s victory in war. Two case studies:
(1) the Vietnam
War of 1964-73 and (2) the Afghanistan War of 1979-89 – are explored
as examples of the weak
denying the strong their objectives.
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