ISAF (COIN) Mission Specific Training Guidelines
COMISAF Assessment
COMISAF's initial assessment of his Command identified it as 'a conventional force that is poorly configured for COIN, inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare' adding that 'these intrinsic disadvantages are exacerbated by our current operational culture and how we operate' where 'pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us - physically and psychologically - from the people we seek to protect' and thus risk 'strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage’.
Existing approaches have, in some cases, contributed to a garrison posture and mentality that limits the effectiveness of NATO forces. COMISAF has directed that ISAF will change its operating culture to pursue a counterinsurgency approach that puts the Afghan people first. Understanding the environment, protecting the people and building relationships are necessary to defeat the insurgency - defined in this case by reducing it to a level where it no longer threatens the viability of the state.
Counterinsurgency operations require a different attitude of mind to that needed for conventional operations. Even though there will be times when troops are involved in intensive war fighting, for the most part, different low level tactics and procedures are required. More important than this is the mindset with which the troops carrying out counterinsurgency operations approach those tasks and the understanding they have for the overall aims and objectives. This implies that education and training have to reflect that different approach to operations. Furthermore, since the population is at the centre of gravity of much of what counterinsurgency hopes to achieve, it follows that cultural understanding has to be integrated to all training for such operations.
COIN Education
It has been said that we should train for the expected, educate for the unexpected. Whilst behaviors can be modified through training, education at all levels will be required to effect the change in culture from conventional to COIN operations, characterized by courageous restraint balanced with an offensive spirit. COMISAF identified 5 themes in his assessment which inform the COIN Mindset and need to be repeated and reinforced during all educational activities:
• The COIN Centre of Gravity is the will of the people
• Conventional Warfare culture is part of the problem
• Afghans must ultimately defeat the insurgency
• Need improved Unity of Effort
• Protecting the people means shielding them from all threats
COIN Training Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)
AJP 3.2 describes military activities as either Offensive, Defensive, Stabilization or Enabling. All of these activities will be employed during a COIN Campaign, in many cases simultaneously, and each must be viewed through the 'lens' of COIN attributes. This implies that if the operation is a counterinsurgency the training for all military activities should be considered with a COIN mindset - COIN Training is first and foremost an approach to training not just a selected subset of TTPs that can be ‘bolted on’. All training must be managed to highlight the NATO COIN attributes, or principles, which are:
• Political primacy
• A struggle for the population, not against the population
• The relevance of legitimacy
• The importance of intelligence
• Unity of effort
• Neutralize the insurgency and isolate insurgents from their support
• Prepare for a protracted campaign
• Security under the rule of law is essential
• Hand over reponsibility to the local forces as soon as practicable
• Learn and adapt quickly
Recent Guidance from COMISAF in theatre and amendments to the ACO Force Standards have indicated that certain key activities are essential for mission success in a COIN environment. This guidance emphasises training of language and cultures; knowledge of the ‘Human Terrain”; key leadership engagement (KLE); negotiation skills; information and knowledge management – both to facilitate a learning organization and enhance ISR and HUMINT; ANSF detainee processing; civil-military unity of effort – cooperative structures; Tactical Directives for CAS operations; and decentralized operations.
The educated COIN mindset must be applied when conducting these activities, many of which are at the tactical level. Existing NATO centralized training does not reach out to all of the forces that must be trained in these activities, thus Nations must make sure that these areas are addressed, with a COIN mindset, in National Pre-Deployment Training. These areas are introduced below, and amplified in the attached Annexes.
The Annexes include an opening statement cross-referencing to the points contained in COMISAF’S COIN Training Guidance issued in Nov 2009 (which are not limited/confined to specific annexes as their implications reach across a number of areas). NATO will continue to develop concepts and materials in these priority areas.
Specific areas for Improvement
Joint Land Operations Training for a COIN environment. Traditionally military forces have adopted either Manoeuvrist or attrition based approaches that are focused on the enemy. Counter Insurgency, as practiced in Afghanistan, is different because it is not focused on the enemy, but on the population. The purpose of Joint Land Operations in a COIN environment is to secure the population and thus neutralise the insurgents. Training for offensive and stabilisation activities, including security and control operations normally associated with ‘Peace Support Operations’, must be conducted with the right COIN Mindset. Operations are distributed and junior commanders are key. This will ensure that forces train as they are expected to operate in theatre, with partners. Further details and specific References are at Annex B.
Integrated Financial Operations Training. Integrated Financial Operations (IFO) is the name given to the method by which financial resources are used to achieve tactical and operational effects and/or mitigate adverse effects of ISAF operations on the civilian population. Nations who do not engage in IFO must nonetheless be aware of the impact of IFO in theatre, and the availability of Finance. Further details and specific References are at Annex C.
Training to Understand the People of Afghanistan. Individuals require an understanding of the operational environment that is appropriate to their role. This includes an understanding of the roles of other actors in the AOO; knowledge of the role of the International Community, NGOs and other agencies; knowledge of other NATO Coalition Forces (CF), composition and caveats and thorough knowledge of the ANSF composition and lay-down. However, the Afghan people must be the priority in a population centric campaign. This begins with local history, religion, culture, customs, and laws. Training should include a clear understanding of the essential nature and nuances of the conflict and of the motives, strengths and weak points of the parties involved. Further details and specific references are at Annex D.
Strategic Communications Training. Today’s military operations to counter the complex challenges of the global security environment require consideration and integration of the information factor throughout all processes. This integration demands that all decision-makers at all times appropriately understand the (possible) effects of their actions in the information environment; it is not just about deliberate activity using information through means of communication, it is the combination of words and deeds that delivers the ultimate effect. A systemic understanding of the information environment is vital in COIN. This is a new mind-set, which requires comprehensive education and training of all aspects of Strategic Communications. Further details and specific references are at Annex E
Civil-Military Training for a COIN Environment. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is an important cornerstone of the overall COIN strategy. Designated functional CIMIC specialists alone cannot deliver comprehensive effects in a COIN campaign. They rely on integrated CIV-MIL structures and comprehensive plans to be effective. In practice, all military service members supporting partnered and integrated CIV-MIL planning and operations perform the function of CIMIC. Further details and specific references are at Annex F.
Training for Embedded Partnering in a COIN Environment. Embedded Partnering (EbP) has emerged as an effective option in furthering Military Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) or Security Force Assistance (SFA). EbP goes further than existing doctrine and promotes the development of a habitual relationship, at all levels, between ANSF and ISAF which must pervade all aspects of an ANSF unit’s daily routine. This is accomplished through mutual cooperation and responsibility for planning, preparation, execution and post operational assessments. Partnering properly at all levels requires specific training. Further details and specific references are at Annex G.
Communication and Information Systems Training for COIN. In order to fully understand the implications of an integrated C2 system, all individuals should not only be trained in their individual competence, but need to understand and use the in-theatre Communication and Information System (CIS), Information Management (IM) and Exchange (IX) structures at the national and multinational levels. A thorough understanding of, and experience with the software applications and the CIS and it capacities/shortfalls, available within the respective Command is vital to manage information more efficiently and allows for the effective exploitation of information. Further details and specific references are at Annex H.
Intelligence Training for a COIN Environment. The function of intelligence in COIN is to facilitate a greater understanding of the operational environment. This requires a broader concept of actionable intelligence that relies on everyone being a collector; the focus shifting from being enemy centric to becoming population centric. Actionable intelligence in Afghanistan is not only focused on the adversary, but also what has changed in the operating environment, and what do those changes mean? Building a comprehensive understanding of the complex operating environment, and understanding what constitutes actionable intelligence, only comes over time and only if all actors persistently and pervasively operate among the people. Further details and specific references are at Annex I.
Training in Joint Fire Support and Targeting for a COIN Environment. The ability to call in both ground and air fire support is a critical task, as well as understanding when it is, or isn’t, appropriate to use force, even though legally permissible. While insurgent actions cause the most significant amount of civilian casualties (CIVCAS), fire support has been identified as one of the three types of operations that have also resulted in significant CIVCAS. Commanders, HQs, Units and operators (i.e. FACs) involved in the joint fires/targeting process must apply the COIN mindset and effectively select the proper combination of lethal/non-lethal actions to achieve the desired effects. NATO and multilateral opportunities must be explored in order to ensure the necessary training. Further details and specific references are at Annex J.
COIN Posture and Force Protection Measures Training. Force Protection must be balanced with the wider objective of protecting the people. Aggressive driving and other actions, meant to keep potential attackers at bay, alienate NATO and Coalition Forces from the people and have caused civilian casualties which threaten mission success. Courageous restraint and tactical patience might, at times, provide better Force Protection and support the mission. Revision of In-Theatre SOPs and TTPs are changing this posture by introducing more measured risks into our FP practices, including reducing the amount of PPE worn, and these must be thoroughly integrated into all training activities. Further details and specific references are at Annex K.
Legal Training in the COIN Context. The legal spectrum of COIN considerations is often more complex and demanding than in any other operational setting. In a COIN environment, the LEGAD must supplement a classical analysis of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) with, amongst other matters, human rights considerations, the legal considerations (including training methodology) of complex partnering with military and non-military agencies, both within and outside a Host Nation, and with a rule of law mindset. Further details and specific references are at Annex L.
Creating a COIN Learning Organisation. Troops deployed to Afghanistan have to be prepared to engage in COIN operations from the very first moment on. However, once they are in theatre, the learning does not stop but continues on a daily basis. Learning and sharing new knowledge and intelligence quickly is paramount to successful operations in a COIN environment. Further details and specific references are at Annex M.
Special Operations Training for a COIN Environment. MC 437/1 defines three principal tasks for NATO Special Operations Forces: (1) Direct Action (DA); (2) Special Reconnaissance (SR); and (3) Military Assistance (MA). However, unless ISAF SOF TCNs have a clear understanding of COIN and the align their pre-deployment training and intheatre activities with the tenants found in this MSTG and the references listed, they will not effectively support COMISAF operational objectives. Further details and specific references are at Annex N.
COIN Training Resources and References. There has been a huge amount of work, at many levels both within the NATO Command Structure and in Nations to produce documentation and direction for the successful prosecution of the COIN Campaign in Afghanistan. By maintaining a list of applicable reference material in one place, and updating it on a systematic basis, new direction and best practices can be shared and exploited. It is intended that these references will be made available, on Unclassified systems where possible, to provide a resource for all those who have an interest in improving the quality and standardisation of training. This annex must be a living document and contributions are invited. An initial list is at Annex O.
CONCLUSION
These Mission Specific Training Guidelines advocate a NATO COIN training philosophy that requires the implementation of a COIN mindset to all training activity for ISAF, be it for offensive, defensive, stabilization or enabling tactical activities.
These guidelines are fixed in the Afghan campaign context but are equally relevant for collective training at operational (NATO) and tactical (National) levels, and for individual education and training (from whatever provider) for all ranks. They will continue to develop through contributions from Theatre and national best practice. Existing training and training support activities should be reviewed with these guidelines in mind, with particular attention paid to the topics addressed in the Annexes.
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