Mission Command —A Multifaceted Construct

Mission Command —A Multifaceted Construct

Richard N. Pedersen 

Mission Command is emerging as a multifaceted construct that integrates the functions and techniques of the art and science employed during the exercise of command authority over missions applying military and other instruments of national power.

The Army Operating Concept (AOC) defines mission command as the exercise of authority and direction by commanders and their staffs to integrate the warfighting functions using the operations process and mission orders to accomplish successful full-spectrum operations. This is a dramatic expansion of how Army doctrine previously defined mission command—the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders. This new definition is expected to be incorporated into the forthcoming FM 3-0 update.

The central idea expressed in the Mission Command Army Functional Concept (MC AFC), a derivative of the AOC, is that mission command fosters mutual trust, encourages initiative, and empowers lower echelons with the combined arms capabilities and authority to fight for information, create opportunities, and exploit advantage consistent with the commander’s intent and concept for accomplishing the mission. Although this describes the benefits of the new mission command, its net effect is to renew emphasis on existing ideas.

The outlook is that mission command is fundamentally the exercise of power to determine, adjudicate, or otherwise settle issues revolving around the warfighting functions during the conduct of the operations process. Currently, the Army’s warfighting functions line up directly with the six joint functions described in JP 3-0. The Army sees the newly defined mission command as an evolved concept encompassing both the Army’s philosophy of command and the integrating function that effectively combines all warfighting functional capabilities.

Army Supporting Ideas for Mission Command:

1) Empower the lowest possible echelon

2) Become skilled in the art of design

3) Educate and train leaders for an uncertain and complex operational environment

Army Tenants for Mission Command:

1) Mutual trust, understanding, and dutiful initiative

2) Decentralized decision-making

3) Decentralized combined arms capabilities

4) Adaptive, bold, audacious, and imaginative leaders

5) Well-trained, cohesive units

6) Nerve and restraint

7) Calculated risk

Marine Corps Key Ideas for Mission Command:

1) Decentralized decision making

2) Mission tactics

3) Human approach: boldness, initiative, personality, strength of will, imagination

4) Commanders forward

5) Shared danger and privation

6) Professional trust

7) Familiar relationships

8) Ability to thrive in chaos, uncertainty, and friction

Read more: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/602-pedersen.pdf

Closing Ranks

Closing Ranks

Leslie Susser

A series of critical reports points to the Israel Defense Forces failures in the second war in Lebanon, citing poor professional training, mistaken military philosophy and misguided values and principles.

 

(The Jerusalem Report. January 8, 2007)

From time to time raised voices could be heard in the corridor outside the conference room at the Israel Defense Forces headquarters in Tel Aviv, where the General Staff was discussing a report on its performance during the recent Lebanon war. The report, by Maj. Gen. Udi Shani, was damning, starting with the charge that Chief of Staff Dan Halutz had gone into the war against Hizballah without a plan for the ground forces, with ill-defined war aims and poorly formulated orders of battle…

Devastating as it was, the Shani report did not deal with the IDF as such, but only with the way the generals conducted the war. A similar presentation the week before, by a former head of the Northern Command, Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amiram Levin, had touched on much deeper structural and conceptual issues. The military philosophy of the past five years, he declared, had been a resounding failure. The army had been lulled into over-reliance on high-tech firepower and information technology at the expense of classic fighting values, including those the IDF had once excelled at, like large-scale land maneuver and officers leading from the front.

Winning in Afghanistan

Winning in Afghanistan

Ali A. Jalali

Seven years into the US-led effort to bring peace and stability to Afghan­istan, the mission is on the verge of failing. This unsettling new reality is the result of key international and Afghan actors having for years pur­sued a narrow strategy focused almost exclusively on short-term goals at the expense of a broader and more cohesive strategy. Afghanistan, conse­quently, is now plagued by a threat environment shaped and sustained by an expanding insurgency, widespread criminality, ineffective governance, and the absence of a coordinated response to continuing challenges. Vio­lence inside the country has risen steadily since 2006, and in 2008 levels of violence in Afghanistan exceeded levels of violence in Iraq.

The absence of a shared vision for Afghanistan has blurred the dis­tinction between means and ends. Means have too often defined goals, tactics too often driven strategy, supply too often determined demands, and short-term necessities too often took precedence over long-term priorities. This failed vision has also led many to question whether the US-led operation is aimed at securing Afghanistan, reshaping the whole of South Asia, or sim­ply setting the conditions for a responsible exit plan. American policymak­ers have undertaken several assessments of their Afghanistan strategy since last summer, and nearly all have found that the United States and the rest of the international community are guilty of setting unrealistic or shortsighted goals for the nation. In light of the current situation, the United States needs to take the lead in developing policies designed to reinforce any long-term stability in Afghanistan. These policies should be focused, coherent, and shared by all the actors, and they need to be targeted at freeing Afghanistan from the vicious cycle of insecurity, insurgency, impunity, and corruption in which it is trapped. Any continuation of the shortsighted efforts of the past seven years will lead international actors and the Afghan government to certain failure. This article looks at specific strategic challenges facing Af­ghanistan and presents ways in which leaders might transition to sustainable policies that will make peace and stability realistically obtainable.

Read more: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/09spring/jalali.pdf

Counterinsurgency 3.0

Counterinsurgency 3.0

Peter Charles Choharis and James A. Gavrilis

After eight years of war, more than 907 Americans dead and 4,400 wound­ed, and $227 billion in aid from the United States alone, Afghanistan was “deteriorating” badly, according to the NATO International Security As­sistance Force (ISAF) commander, General Stanley McChrystal, in an Au­gust 2009 report to the Secretary of Defense. Although General McChrystal has been more optimistic of late, the fact remains that the Taliban’s reach is more extensive now than at any time since being expelled from Kabul eight years ago. They have shadow governors in every province except Kabul. People turn to Taliban courts rather than state courts for justice in many parts of Afghanistan. And many Afghans prefer the Taliban’s austerity over the Karzai government’s corruption and incompetence. Why?

Why have the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies, who just a few years ago were reviled by the vast majority of Afghans for their brutality and fa­naticism, grown in strength and popularity during nearly a decade of US and international assistance? More broadly, why has massive international de­velopment assistance in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere failed to defeat the grip of extremist ideologies among many people who have benefited from billions of dollars worth of aid? Is it even possible for international develop­ment aid to help defeat radical Islam and other ideologies hostile to the West and, if so, how?

This article explains how civilian and military policy-makers have in­correctly assumed that international development aid is inherently beneficial to local populations; necessarily fosters stability; and invariably leads to a grateful populace that will shun insurgents, thereby advancing US strategic goals. The article posits that using international aid to combat radical Is­lamic insurgencies is more complex than aid advocates assume and outlines a different conception of what constitutes development. Finally, it explains how small-scale, micro-development based on corporate social responsibil­ity practices, rather than traditional foreign aid, will have the greatest and most enduring impact against Islamic insurgencies. Such an approach most effectively inculcates beliefs and institutionalizes behaviors that are conge­nial to the West while being sensitive to local conditions.

Read more: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/2010spring/40-1-2010_choharisAndGavrilis.pdf

ISAF (COIN) Mission Specific Training Guidelines

ISAF (COIN) Mission Specific Training Guidelines

COMISAF Assessment

COMISAF's initial assessment of his Command identified it as 'a conventional force that is poorly configured for COIN, inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare' adding that 'these intrinsic disadvantages are exacerbated by our current operational culture and how we operate' where 'pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us - physically and psychologically - from the people we seek to protect' and thus risk 'strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage’.

Existing approaches have, in some cases, contributed to a garrison posture and mentality that limits the effectiveness of NATO forces. COMISAF has directed that ISAF will change its operating culture to pursue a counterinsurgency approach that puts the Afghan people first. Understanding the environment, protecting the people and building relationships are necessary to defeat the insurgency - defined in this case by reducing it to a level where it no longer threatens the viability of the state.

Counterinsurgency operations require a different attitude of mind to that needed for conventional operations. Even though there will be times when troops are involved in intensive war fighting, for the most part, different low level tactics and procedures are required. More important than this is the mindset with which the troops carrying out counterinsurgency operations approach those tasks and the understanding they have for the overall aims and objectives. This implies that education and training have to reflect that different approach to operations. Furthermore, since the population is at the centre of gravity of much of what counterinsurgency hopes to achieve, it follows that cultural understanding has to be integrated to all training for such operations.

COIN Education

It has been said that we should train for the expected, educate for the unexpected. Whilst behaviors can be modified through training, education at all levels will be required to effect the change in culture from conventional to COIN operations, characterized by courageous restraint balanced with an offensive spirit. COMISAF identified 5 themes in his assessment which inform the COIN Mindset and need to be repeated and reinforced during all educational activities:

• The COIN Centre of Gravity is the will of the people

• Conventional Warfare culture is part of the problem

• Afghans must ultimately defeat the insurgency

• Need improved Unity of Effort

• Protecting the people means shielding them from all threats

COIN Training Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)

AJP 3.2 describes military activities as either Offensive, Defensive, Stabilization or Enabling. All of these activities will be employed during a COIN Campaign, in many cases simultaneously, and each must be viewed through the 'lens' of COIN attributes. This implies that if the operation is a counterinsurgency the training for all military activities should be considered with a COIN mindset - COIN Training is first and foremost an approach to training not just a selected subset of TTPs that can be ‘bolted on’. All training must be managed to highlight the NATO COIN attributes, or principles, which are:

• Political primacy

• A struggle for the population, not against the population

• The relevance of legitimacy

• The importance of intelligence

• Unity of effort

• Neutralize the insurgency and isolate insurgents from their support

• Prepare for a protracted campaign

• Security under the rule of law is essential

• Hand over reponsibility to the local forces as soon as practicable

• Learn and adapt quickly

Recent Guidance from COMISAF in theatre and amendments to the ACO Force Standards have indicated that certain key activities are essential for mission success in a COIN environment. This guidance emphasises training of language and cultures; knowledge of the ‘Human Terrain”; key leadership engagement (KLE); negotiation skills; information and knowledge management – both to facilitate a learning organization and enhance ISR and HUMINT; ANSF detainee processing; civil-military unity of effort – cooperative structures; Tactical Directives for CAS operations; and decentralized operations.

The educated COIN mindset must be applied when conducting these activities, many of which are at the tactical level. Existing NATO centralized training does not reach out to all of the forces that must be trained in these activities, thus Nations must make sure that these areas are addressed, with a COIN mindset, in National Pre-Deployment Training. These areas are introduced below, and amplified in the attached Annexes.

The Annexes include an opening statement cross-referencing to the points contained in COMISAF’S COIN Training Guidance issued in Nov 2009 (which are not limited/confined to specific annexes as their implications reach across a number of areas). NATO will continue to develop concepts and materials in these priority areas.

Specific areas for Improvement

Joint Land Operations Training for a COIN environment. Traditionally military forces have adopted either Manoeuvrist or attrition based approaches that are focused on the enemy. Counter Insurgency, as practiced in Afghanistan, is different because it is not focused on the enemy, but on the population. The purpose of Joint Land Operations in a COIN environment is to secure the population and thus neutralise the insurgents. Training for offensive and stabilisation activities, including security and control operations normally associated with ‘Peace Support Operations’, must be conducted with the right COIN Mindset. Operations are distributed and junior commanders are key. This will ensure that forces train as they are expected to operate in theatre, with partners. Further details and specific References are at Annex B.

Integrated Financial Operations Training. Integrated Financial Operations (IFO) is the name given to the method by which financial resources are used to achieve tactical and operational effects and/or mitigate adverse effects of ISAF operations on the civilian population. Nations who do not engage in IFO must nonetheless be aware of the impact of IFO in theatre, and the availability of Finance. Further details and specific References are at Annex C.

Training to Understand the People of Afghanistan. Individuals require an understanding of the operational environment that is appropriate to their role. This includes an understanding of the roles of other actors in the AOO; knowledge of the role of the International Community, NGOs and other agencies; knowledge of other NATO Coalition Forces (CF), composition and caveats and thorough knowledge of the ANSF composition and lay-down. However, the Afghan people must be the priority in a population centric campaign. This begins with local history, religion, culture, customs, and laws. Training should include a clear understanding of the essential nature and nuances of the conflict and of the motives, strengths and weak points of the parties involved. Further details and specific references are at Annex D.

Strategic Communications Training. Today’s military operations to counter the complex challenges of the global security environment require consideration and integration of the information factor throughout all processes. This integration demands that all decision-makers at all times appropriately understand the (possible) effects of their actions in the information environment; it is not just about deliberate activity using information through means of communication, it is the combination of words and deeds that delivers the ultimate effect. A systemic understanding of the information environment is vital in COIN. This is a new mind-set, which requires comprehensive education and training of all aspects of Strategic Communications. Further details and specific references are at Annex E

Civil-Military Training for a COIN Environment. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is an important cornerstone of the overall COIN strategy. Designated functional CIMIC specialists alone cannot deliver comprehensive effects in a COIN campaign. They rely on integrated CIV-MIL structures and comprehensive plans to be effective. In practice, all military service members supporting partnered and integrated CIV-MIL planning and operations perform the function of CIMIC. Further details and specific references are at Annex F.

Training for Embedded Partnering in a COIN Environment. Embedded Partnering (EbP) has emerged as an effective option in furthering Military Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) or Security Force Assistance (SFA). EbP goes further than existing doctrine and promotes the development of a habitual relationship, at all levels, between ANSF and ISAF which must pervade all aspects of an ANSF unit’s daily routine. This is accomplished through mutual cooperation and responsibility for planning, preparation, execution and post operational assessments. Partnering properly at all levels requires specific training. Further details and specific references are at Annex G.

Communication and Information Systems Training for COIN. In order to fully understand the implications of an integrated C2 system, all individuals should not only be trained in their individual competence, but need to understand and use the in-theatre Communication and Information System (CIS), Information Management (IM) and Exchange (IX) structures at the national and multinational levels. A thorough understanding of, and experience with the software applications and the CIS and it capacities/shortfalls, available within the respective Command is vital to manage information more efficiently and allows for the effective exploitation of information. Further details and specific references are at Annex H.

Intelligence Training for a COIN Environment. The function of intelligence in COIN is to facilitate a greater understanding of the operational environment. This requires a broader concept of actionable intelligence that relies on everyone being a collector; the focus shifting from being enemy centric to becoming population centric. Actionable intelligence in Afghanistan is not only focused on the adversary, but also what has changed in the operating environment, and what do those changes mean? Building a comprehensive understanding of the complex operating environment, and understanding what constitutes actionable intelligence, only comes over time and only if all actors persistently and pervasively operate among the people. Further details and specific references are at Annex I.

Training in Joint Fire Support and Targeting for a COIN Environment. The ability to call in both ground and air fire support is a critical task, as well as understanding when it is, or isn’t, appropriate to use force, even though legally permissible. While insurgent actions cause the most significant amount of civilian casualties (CIVCAS), fire support has been identified as one of the three types of operations that have also resulted in significant CIVCAS. Commanders, HQs, Units and operators (i.e. FACs) involved in the joint fires/targeting process must apply the COIN mindset and effectively select the proper combination of lethal/non-lethal actions to achieve the desired effects. NATO and multilateral opportunities must be explored in order to ensure the necessary training. Further details and specific references are at Annex J.

COIN Posture and Force Protection Measures Training. Force Protection must be balanced with the wider objective of protecting the people. Aggressive driving and other actions, meant to keep potential attackers at bay, alienate NATO and Coalition Forces from the people and have caused civilian casualties which threaten mission success. Courageous restraint and tactical patience might, at times, provide better Force Protection and support the mission. Revision of In-Theatre SOPs and TTPs are changing this posture by introducing more measured risks into our FP practices, including reducing the amount of PPE worn, and these must be thoroughly integrated into all training activities. Further details and specific references are at Annex K.

Legal Training in the COIN Context. The legal spectrum of COIN considerations is often more complex and demanding than in any other operational setting. In a COIN environment, the LEGAD must supplement a classical analysis of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) with, amongst other matters, human rights considerations, the legal considerations (including training methodology) of complex partnering with military and non-military agencies, both within and outside a Host Nation, and with a rule of law mindset. Further details and specific references are at Annex L.

Creating a COIN Learning Organisation. Troops deployed to Afghanistan have to be prepared to engage in COIN operations from the very first moment on. However, once they are in theatre, the learning does not stop but continues on a daily basis. Learning and sharing new knowledge and intelligence quickly is paramount to successful operations in a COIN environment. Further details and specific references are at Annex M.

Special Operations Training for a COIN Environment. MC 437/1 defines three principal tasks for NATO Special Operations Forces: (1) Direct Action (DA); (2) Special Reconnaissance (SR); and (3) Military Assistance (MA). However, unless ISAF SOF TCNs have a clear understanding of COIN and the align their pre-deployment training and intheatre activities with the tenants found in this MSTG and the references listed, they will not effectively support COMISAF operational objectives. Further details and specific references are at Annex N.

COIN Training Resources and References. There has been a huge amount of work, at many levels both within the NATO Command Structure and in Nations to produce documentation and direction for the successful prosecution of the COIN Campaign in Afghanistan. By maintaining a list of applicable reference material in one place, and updating it on a systematic basis, new direction and best practices can be shared and exploited. It is intended that these references will be made available, on Unclassified systems where possible, to provide a resource for all those who have an interest in improving the quality and standardisation of training. This annex must be a living document and contributions are invited. An initial list is at Annex O.

CONCLUSION

These Mission Specific Training Guidelines advocate a NATO COIN training philosophy that requires the implementation of a COIN mindset to all training activity for ISAF, be it for offensive, defensive, stabilization or enabling tactical activities.

These guidelines are fixed in the Afghan campaign context but are equally relevant for collective training at operational (NATO) and tactical (National) levels, and for individual education and training (from whatever provider) for all ranks. They will continue to develop through contributions from Theatre and national best practice. Existing training and training support activities should be reviewed with these guidelines in mind, with particular attention paid to the topics addressed in the Annexes.

Read more: https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/ACTIPT/JOUIPT/CounterIns/BiSCCOINTr/file/_WFS/IMSM-0489-2010_ENG_NU_COIN%20MSTG%20and%20Impl%20Plan.pdf

The Other Face of Al-Qaeda

The Other Face of Al-Qaeda

By Camille Tawil

The following study is without doubt a must-read for all al-Qaeda supporters and opponents, as well as those who are “on the fence” – as yet unsure whether to support or oppose the organization.

The aim is to take a more in-depth look and shed some light on the organization which was established by Osama bin Laden in the late eighties in the Afghan-Pakistan border areas.

Indeed, many will agree there is a pressing need to carefully consider and assess the organization’s acts and operations: have they truly served their alleged purpose of defending Muslim causes or are al-Qaeda’s opponents right in arguing that they have in fact precipitated an opposite outcome?

The reader will discover that al-Qaeda was aware that the 9/11 attacks would result in an American counter-attack on Afghanistan; what did come as a surprise however was the fact that it was to be a battle fought by American soldiers on the ground. Osama bin Laden had been mistaken in assuming the American "cowards" would not fight...

The report also highlights the differences that arose between Osama bin Laden and his opponents inside al-Qaeda as well as other jihadi groups. Their point of contention was the legality of the 2001 strikes with many factions protesting that they violated the directives of Taliban leader Mullah Omar, whom Osama bin Laden had supposedly pledged allegiance to.

Read more: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/stories/pdfs/the-other-face-of-al-qaeda.pdf?dm_i=JI3,AZ98,2Q5RQ7,UGW9,1

Message of Mullah Omar on the occasion of Eid-ul-Odha

Here is a comprehensive message of Mullah Omar and it is worth of analyzing on his policy perspective. I would say it sounds alarming; this is the message what people want to follow and offer their support. That also includes a political platform in case of democratic elections should take place. The question of the day is - if people vote for him - what then? Can we actually stop him or is the try to do so rape of democracy? Are our values being truly put on work against us?

Rene

 

Message of Mullah Omar on the occasion of Eid-ul-Odha (extracts)

Regarding the Internal Developments of the Country:
The moments of defeat of the invaders have approached now due to the special victory and the sincere sacrifices of the Mujahideen. The enemy has been defeated at the battle field. Now they rely on media hypes and portray themselves as if making advancement but the ground realities are what you and we are witnessing. The enemy is retreating and facing siege in all parts of the country day in and day out. 

Regarding the Puppet Kabul Regime:
The situation of the Afghan people and the beloved country is going from bad to worse during this reign of the surrogate Karzai regime. Hardships, starvations, poverty, homelessness, civilian casualties, various diseases, aberrations of the youth and cultural and social deviation in the name of democracy are touching its climax. 

Corruption is at its epic. This is not what we say but the founders and masters of this regime admit that their puppet regime ranks 2nd at the index of the most corrupt regimes of the world. This is because the rulers of the regime have been installed by others and they are not interested in the future and prosperity of the country. They are only hankering after filling their pockets with money and fleecing the masses. Many of them have foreign nationality and do not consider Afghanistan as their own country.

The number of those who have left the ranks of the enemy has increased following our previous call to do so. This is a commendable phenomenon. We have instructed all Mujadeen to favor them with special incentives and acclamations.

Regarding the Rumors of Peace Talks by the Americans:
The Islamic Emirate still holds its previous stand regarding the current issue of the country. Islamic Emirate believes that the solution of the issue lies in withdrawal of the foreign invading troops and establishment of a true Islamic and independent system in the country.

Claims about negotiation, flexibility in the stance of the Islamic Emirate, are mere baseless propaganda. The enemy wants to cover up its failure in Afghanistan by wrongfully raising hollow hopes in the hearts of their respective people. The believing people of Afghanistan and the public of the world should not trust any news report or rumor about the stance of the Islamic Emirate disseminated by any one rather than the leadership of the Islamic Emirate or the designated spokesmen, because such new reports are spread by the intelligence agencies of the hostile countries. 

The former Jihadi leaders and influential based in Kabul should know that, as the invading Americans already used you against the Mujahideen in the framework of peace council, they will again use you for their illegitimate objectives besides the puppet regime of Kabul. 

If you want to extricate yourself of this dilemma and lead a life like a proud Muslim Afghan, the only way of honor and dignity is the way of the sacred Jihad and independence of the country. Come and compensate for your mistakes of the previous years by honestly embarking on the path of struggle against the invaders. This does not mean that every one has to join the stronghold but every one should utilize his capability in support of the current resistance. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has comprehensive policy for the efficiency of the future government of Afghanistan; about true security, Islamic justice, education, economic progress, national unity and a foreign policy based on norms to protect itself from the harms of others and convince the world that the future Afghanistan will not harm them.

Regarding the Military Situation of the Country:
Our coming military programs will forge ahead on the basis of the climate of the country and the geographical locations as per the plans now at the disposal of the Mujahideen. The aim is to entangle the enemy in an exhausting war of attrition and wear it away like the former Soviet Union. This will force it face disintegration after dealing a crushing and decisive blow at it that it would not be able to hold itself thereafter. To achieve this, we have hammered out short term and long term plans. We are optimistic about the results of these plans. Our strategy is to increase our operations step by step and spread them to all parts of the country to compel the enemy to come out from their hideouts and then crush them through tactical raids. 

Pay attention to the life and property of the civilians so that, may Allah (swt) forbid, your Jihadic activities will not become a cause for destruction of property and loss of life of people. Any thing that is not permissible in Islam, has no place in our military policy. Spread fraternity among yourselves and help each other during the time of distress and ordeal. Maintain close contact with the people, seek the advice of local influential and hear their constructive advice and consultation and put them into practice.

To the Young Educated Generation and Men of Letters of the Country and the Students of Universities:
As a young educated generation and men of letters (writers) of our Islamic country, you are the leaders of tomorrow of the country. Our enemy is turning every stone to spread their cultural and ideological influence over the young generation of this Muslim country and thus jeopardize our history, religious values and our future. Our religious and historical enemy has cunningly launched a propaganda drive, spending huge amount of money in order to gradually strip our young generation of their Afghan and Islamic identity. As a young generation of this Islamic country, you have an Islamic and Afghani responsibility to confront these hostile anti-Islamic and anti-Afghan endeavors of the enemy with all your capability of tongue and pen and indefatigable struggle. Do not let your historical, religious and cultural enemy succeed. You should know that the cunning enemy financially and extensively fund some sold-out Afghan circles in a surreptitious manner to flare up a domestic war on the basis of language and geographical locations.  

To Peoples and Governments of the Islamic World:
On this occasion of Eid-ul-odha and on behalf of the Islamic Emirate and as a member of the world Islamic family, I would like to remind the governments and people of the Islamic world to forget the issue of the occupied Afghanistan and the miserable condition of the people of this country. You should remember that the Afghan people have played prideful role for the defense of Islam and Islamic world, offering numerous sacrifices in this way throughout different stages of the history. This nation stood as a wall of iron in front of the invasions of Genghis, Britons and the communist colonialists, saving the Islamic world. 

To American and European Peoples and to Members of Parliaments:
Afghanistan is an independent Islamic country. It has a prideful history and freedom-loving people at the level of the region and world. This nation has not harmed the independence of other countries and, throughout the history, has not permitted any one else to take their independence. Now when your forces have invaded this territory for the achievement of some colonialist objectives and goals, so it is the religious and humane obligation of the Afghans to stand up to your forces. Think, if your country is invaded by some one else, would you remain indifferent in such circumstances? What do you think, should our people allow the invasion and aggression in their country and remain insouciant vis-avis the invaders? And should not they show any reaction in front of the aggression against their honor religious values, national dignity and independence?

This is the country of the Afghans. The Afghan will not relinquish of it. The resistance will continue as long as the invaders are stationed there. You should review the historical facts to learn some essential points from them. It is more rationale to stop adding fuel to the flames of war by leaving this region. The presence of foreign forces on our soil, paves the way for intensification and aggravation of the war--consequent upon which you will have to face colossal financial and life losses.

To the Neighboring and Regional Countries of Afghanistan:
As an independent country, Afghanistan has been forced to wage a sanguinary war for the attainment of its identity. The colonialist countries led by America, want to turn our historical and independent country into a military base under various pretexts. It has persuaded some other countries to align with them and even have compelled the World Body of the United Nations to issue resolutions palatable to the USA. It has turned the World Body, defacto, into personal entity of America.

I urge you to find for yourselves the ground realities instead of listening to the futile propaganda of the colonialists. Do not forget your responsibilities in the way of independence of our oppressed country.

Peace be on you all
The servant of Islam
Amir-ul-Momineen
Mullah Mohammad Omar Mujahid

Read more:

http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/International/15-Nov-2010/Message-of-Mullah-Omar-on-the-occasion-of-EidulOdha/

 

   

        

The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan

The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan

Gilles Dorronsoro

A misunderstanding of the insurgency is at the heart of the difficulties facing the International Coalition in Afghanistan. The Taliban are often described as an umbrella movement comprising loosely connected groups that are essentially local and unorganized. On the contrary, this report’s analysis of the structure and strategy of the insurgency reveals a resilient adversary, engaged in strategic planning and coordinated action.

The Taliban are a revolutionary movement, deeply opposed to the Afghan tribal system and focused on the rebuilding of the Islamic Emirate. Their propaganda and intelligence are efficient, and the local autonomy of their commanders in the field allow them both flexibility and cohesion. They have made clever use of ethnic tensions, the rejection of foreign forces by the Afghan people, and the lack of local administration to gain support in the population. In so doing the Taliban have achieved their objectives in the South and East of the country, isolating the Coalition, marginalizing the local Afghan administration, and establishing a parallel administration (mainly to dispense Sharia justice and collect taxes). In recent months, a more professional Taliban have succeeded in making significant inroads by recruiting from non-Pashtun communities.

These developments, and the strength of the insurgency makes the current Coalition strategy of focusing its reinforcements in the South (Helmand and Kandahar) unwise to say the least. The lack of local Afghan institutions there will require a long term presence and therefore a need for even more reinforcements in the coming year. Meanwhile, the pace of Taliban progress in other provinces far outstrips the ability of the Coalition to stabilize the South. The Coalition should change the priorities of its current strategy, shifting resources to stop and reverse the Taliban’s progress in the North, while reinforcing and safeguarding the Kabul region or risk losing control of the entire country.

Key points:

• The Taliban have built a parallel government in areas they control to fulfill two basic needs: justice and security. An almost nonexistent local government and the population’s distrust of the international coalition allowed the Taliban to expand their influence.
• Focusing resources in the South and East, where the insurgency is strongest, is risky, especially since the Afghan army is not ready to replace U.S. forces there.
• The Taliban have opened a front in the northern provinces, having consolidated their grip on the South and East. If the International Coalition does not counter this thrust, the insurgency will spread throughout Afghanistan within two to three years and the coalition will not be able to bear the financial and human costs of fighting. 
• The insurgency cannot be defeated while the Taliban retain a safe haven in Pakistan. The Taliban can conduct hit-and-run attacks from their refuge in Pakistan, and the North remains open to infiltration.
• The United States must pressure Pakistan to take action against the Taliban’s central command in Quetta. The current offensive in Pakistan is aimed at Pakistani Taliban and does not indicate a major shift in Pakistani policy toward Afghanistan.

Dorronsoro concludes:

“The Taliban have a strategy and a coherent organization to implement it, and they have been successful so far. They have achieved most of their objectives in the South and East and are making inroads in the North. They are unlikely to change their strategy in the face of the U.S. troop surge. Rather than concentrating forces to challenge the International Coalition, the Taliban could decide to exert more pressure on Kabul, Ghazni, and Kandahar, which they have infiltrated. The insurgency does have weaknesses, though. If the Coalition reinforced the Afghan police and military in the North, the insurgents could be stopped relatively easily.” 

Read more: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf

Uncut: Lessons Learned From Six and a Half Years in Afghanistan

Uncut: Lessons Learned  From Six and a Half Years in Afghanistan

David Prugh

Friends in the Coalition,

As I depart, I would like to thank the thousands of fellow members of the Coalition with whom I’ve had the pleasure to serve these past 6 ½ years. I’d also like to pass on a few things for you to consider… for what it’s worth. If you like the observations, make them your own.

This is definitely a stream-of-consciousness effort. I expect, though, that each of you will be able to readily grasp what I’m talking about because each of you has at least partially “seen the elephant”. (More on that elephant later).

You may agree with some points / observations and disagree with others. That’s fine, of course. My main purpose for writing this is to give you something to chew on.

Here are the topics I’ll cover:

• Disclaimer – The Blind Men and the Elephant
• The myth of the Uneducated Afghan
• Don’t worry; your counterpart is getting it.
• Chronic Underestimation
• He who sticks his neck out…
• Building Bridges
• Making Progress
• Cronyism and the Bazaars
• Security thru commerce
• Are Afghan Logistics really the problem??
• The Bright Light Always Shines
• Relax. Take a deep breath.
• Get out and Get Around
• US Officer Development System - a two-edged sword
• Gravitating toward a comfort zone
• A canary in a coal mine
• Long lead-time projects
• The Main Effort is the Reserve??
• Unity of Command, Bizarro Style

Read more: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/413-prugh.pdf

Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency

Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency

Dr David J. Kilcullen

We meet today in the shadow of continuing counterinsurgencies that have cost thousands of lives and a fortune in financial, moral and political capital. And we meet under the threat of similar insurgencies to come. Any smart future enemy will likely sidestep our unprecedented superiority in traditional, force-on-force, state-on-state warfare. And so insurgency, including terrorism, will be our enemies’ weapon of choice until we prove we can master it. Like Bill Murray in Groundhog Day, we are going to live this day over, and over, and over again — until we get it right.

This means we need a way to generate purposeful collaboration between a host of actors we do not control. No doctrinal handbook will ever be flexible enough for such a fluid environment (though, something tells me, we will develop one anyway). Rather, we need an easily grasped mental model that helps individuals and agencies cooperate, creates platforms for collaboration, and forms a basis for improvisation. In conventional war we might call this an “operational design”, or “commander’s intent”. I will call it a “model”.

There are two parts to this model. The first is a description of the “conflict ecosystem” that forms the environment for 21st century counterinsurgency operations. The second is a tentative framework for whole-of-government counterinsurgency in that environment.

The Conflict Environment

An insurgency is a struggle for control over a contested political space, between a state (or group of states or occupying powers), and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers. Insurgencies are popular uprisings that grow from, and are conducted through pre-existing social networks (village, tribe, family, neighborhood, political or religious party) and exist in a complex social, informational and physical environment. Think of this environment as a sort of “conflict ecosystem”.

It includes many independent but interlinked actors, each seeking to maximize their own survivability and advantage in a chaotic, combative environment. Pursuing the ecological metaphor, these actors are constantly evolving and adapting, some seeking a secure niche while others seek to become “top predator” or scavenge on the environment. Some actors existed in the environment before the conflict. They include government, ethnic, tribal, clan or community groups, social classes, urban and rural populations, and economic and political institutions. In normal times, these actors behave in a collaborative or competitive way: but now, due to the internal power struggle, they are combative and destructive. The relatively healthy competition and creative tension that sustains normal society has spun out of control, and the conflict threatens to destroy the society.

This new state of the environment also produces new actors. These include local armed organizations, and foreign armed groups drawn into the conflict from outside. Often, that includes intervening counterinsurgent forces such as ourselves. Foreign terrorists are also increasingly “swarming” from one conflict to another in pursuit of their global agenda. In addition, the conflict produces refugees, displaced persons and sometimes mass migration. It creates economic dislocation, leading to unemployment and crime, and creating armed groups such as bandits, narcotics traffickers, smugglers, couriers and black marketeers.

This might be illustrated graphically as in figure 1.

It is critically important to realize that we, the intervening counterinsurgent, are not outside this ecosystem, looking in at a Petrie dish of unsavory microbes. Rather, we are inside the system. The theater of operations is not a supine, inert medium on which we practice our operational art. Rather it is a dynamic, living system that changes in response to our actions and requires continuous balancing between competing requirements.

A framework for inter-agency counterinsurgency

Obviously enough, you cannot command what you do not control. Therefore, “unity of command” (between agencies or among government and non-government actors) means little in this environment. Instead, we need to create “unity of effort” at best, and collaboration or deconfliction at least. This depends less on a shared command and control hierarchy, and more on a shared diagnosis of the problem, platforms for collaboration, information sharing and deconfliction. Each player must understand the others’ strengths, weaknesses, capabilities and objectives, and inter-agency teams must be structured for versatility (the ability to perform a wide variety of tasks) and agility (the ability to transition rapidly and smoothly between tasks).

A possible framework for inter-agency counterinsurgency operations, as a means to creating such a shared diagnosis, is the “three pillars” model depicted at Figure 2.

This is a framework, not a template. It helps people see where their efforts fit into a campaign, rather than telling them what to do in a given situation. It provides a basis for measuring progress and is an aid to collaboration rather than an operational plan. And clearly, it applies not only to counterinsurgency but also to peace operations, Stabilization and Reconstruction, and complex humanitarian emergencies. The model is structured as a base (Information), three pillars (Security, Political and Economic) and a roof (Control). This approach builds on “classical” counterinsurgency theory, but also incorporates best practices that have emerged through experience in peacekeeping, development, fragile states and complex emergencies in the past several decades.

Within this “three pillars” model, information is the basis for all other activities. This is because perception is crucial in developing control and influence over population groups. Substantive security, political and economic measures are critical but to be effective they must rest upon, and integrate with a broader information strategy. Every action in counterinsurgency sends a message; the purpose of the information campaign is to consolidate and unify this message. It includes intelligence collection, analysis and distribution, information operations, media operations (including public diplomacy) and measures to counter insurgent motivation, sanctuary and ideology. It also includes efforts to understand the environment through census data, public opinion polling, collection of cultural and “human terrain” information in denied areas. And it involves understanding the effects of our operations on the population, adversaries and the environment. Clearly, not all actors will collaborate in these efforts; but until an information base is developed, the other pillars of counterinsurgency cannot be effective. Importantly, the information campaign has to be conducted at a global, regional and local level — because modern insurgents draw upon global networks of sympathy, support, funding and recruitment.

Resting on this base are three pillars of equal importance. Indeed, as Figure 2 illustrates, unless they are developed in parallel, the campaign becomes unbalanced: too much economic assistance with inadequate security, for example, simply creates an array of soft targets for the insurgents. Similarly, too much security assistance without political consensus or governance simply creates more capable armed groups. In developing each pillar, we measure progress by gauging effectiveness (capability and capacity) and legitimacy (the degree to which the population accepts that government actions are in its interest).

In achieving control, we typically seek to manage the tempo of activity, the level of violence, and the degree of stability in the environment. The intent is not to reduce violence to zero or to kill every insurgent, but rather to return the overall system to normality — noting that “normality” in one society may look different from normality in another. In each case, we seek not only to establish control, but also to consolidate that control and then transfer it to permanent, effective and legitimate institutions.

Operationalizing the “Three Pillars”

If this model represents a possible framework for inter-agency counterinsurgency, how might we apply it in practice?

Personnel policies to develop human capital also require effort, but might be less of a burden than we currently envisage. Rather than sweeping policy changes, we simply need relatively minor modifications such as the ability to identify and record civilian officials with appropriate skills for conflict environments, track them throughout their careers, provide financial and legal cover for deployments, give them the necessary individual and team training to operate in hostile areas, and create career structures (perhaps in the form of “additional skills identifiers”) that recognize time in conflict zones as equivalent, for career purposes, to time in standard postings.

Systems capabilities (electronic and otherwise) require significant work. These might include skills registers, personnel databases, and field capabilities such as communications, transportation and protection equipment. We could also benefit from electronic platforms to enable sharing of information between agencies, including non-government organizations. ReliefWeb is a good example of this, allowing multiple agencies to post and share information, identify opportunities to collaborate, and deconflict efforts. Security protocols allow information to be shared only with authorized participants, while public information can be widely disseminated. ReliefWeb’s Afghanistan page (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc104?OpenForm&rc=3&cc=afg) covers many components of the “three pillars” model, in the context of a complex emergency. Building on this would be less difficult, and less expensive, than one might think.

Training and education (for civil, military, and non-government personnel) would also create shared understanding, and spread best practices throughout a “counterinsurgency community” — again helping us achieve collaboration across a wide variety of players whom we cannot control. Besides specific educational outcomes, these programs develop personal relationships and erode institutional paranoia. Specific training needs include the development of civilian teams capable of “early entry” into environments not yet secured by military or police forces, with the movement, communications and self-protection skills and equipment to operate in these areas. Other needs are a capability for “denied area ethnography” to collect human terrain and population data for effective planning, and education for military leaders in the significant body of expertise that aid, humanitarian assistance and development communities have built up over time.

Finally, doctrine might be useful. But it should now be clear that, without a common mental model for the environment and the pillars of a counterinsurgency effort, and without the personnel, organizations, systems, training and education elements of capability in place, merely producing a doctrinal handbook is likely to be as little use in 2006 as it was in 1962.

Read more: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf