Strategy for the Long Haul
Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and Opportunities
By Robert Martinage 2008 (abbreviated by R. Toomse)
Given the long expected service life of most of its major assets, the US military force structure, which underlies the concepts of operation that drive the US “way of war,” is still based primarily on the premises and experience of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Arguably, much of the current Program of Record (the forces the Department of Defense seeks to acquire in coming years) remains similarly reflective of that period. Yet the looming strategic challenges look to be significantly different. Thus there is a danger that many of the forces that the Defense Department plans to acquire may prove to be unsuitable for dealing with future threats.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are elite, highly trained military units that conduct operations that typically exceed the capabilities of conventional forces.
During the unconventional war against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom, SOF played a pivotal role by integrating US precision air power with the operations of irregular Afghan opposition forces to achieve rapid regime change and eliminate al Qaeda’s primary sanctuary. Since the fall of the Taliban, SOF have played a critical role in training and advising elements of the Afghan National Army, providing personal security for senior Afghan officials, and capturing or killing scores of senior Taliban and al Qaeda leaders and lower-level operatives. They are also currently conducting operations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and training elements of Pakistan’s Special Service Group.
In the early phases of the war with Iraq, SOF again played a central role in a special-operations-intensive campaign, providing the primary ground force element on two of three fronts, and performing a number of special reconnaissance, direct action, and unconventional warfare missions in support of the conventional campaign.
Over the past five years, they have been instrumental in training and advising Iraqi security forces, as well as in hunting down high-value al-Qaeda targets in Iraq. In the broader war against violent Islamic radicalism, to the extent their constrained capacity allows, SOF are building partner capacity, collecting intelligence, hunting high-value targets, and conducting other counterterrorism operations in multiple countries across several continents. The operations tempo currently being sustained by SOF is the highest in its history.
Defeating Salafi-Takfiri and Khomeinist terrorist groups will require a multifaceted approach — one in which the military instrument will often be far less important than effective foreign assistance, public and private diplomacy, strategic communications, and covert action. That being said, SOF will need to be shaped, sized, and postured to:
- Conduct proactive, sustained “manhunting” and disruption operations globally.
- Build partner capacity in relevant ground, air, and maritime capabilities in scores of countries on a steady-state basis.
- Help generate persistent air and maritime surveillance and strike coverage over “under-governed” areas and littoral zones.
- Employ unconventional warfare against state sponsors of terrorism and trans- national terrorist groups globally.
In the event that US efforts to shape Chinese behavior and bolster deterrence fail, however, there are at least four missions that SOF may be called upon to perform as part of a conventional campaign:
- Large-scale, overt unconventional warfare operations on China’s periphery to open up additional fronts.
- Information operations focused on accessing “closed” communications and computer networks.
- Clandestine special reconnaissance missions to locate hidden or mobile high-value targets for precision attack.
- Direct action against key targets that cannot be disabled by other means.
In addition to the potential threat posed by China, the US military must also be prepared to confront the prospective rise of authoritarian capitalist states, such as Russia. It is assumed here, however, that the latter challenge is in large part a lesser included case of the former. Andrew Krepinevich, Robert Martinage, and Bob Work, The Challenges to US National Security (Washington, DC, CSBA, 2008).
What Makes SOF “Special”?
The short answer to this question is: carefully selected, highly trained personnel that can conduct challenging missions — including in hostile, denied or politically sensitive environments — that often exceed the capabilities of general purpose forces.
SOF units are smaller and comprise more senior personnel than their conventional counterparts. Because of their advanced training, they can also use specialized equipment and employ tactics, techniques and procedures that are unavailable to general purpose forces. SOF units typically carry out missions with much smaller numbers of personnel than conventional units, making it possible to operate clandestinely in semi-permissive or denied areas. Their higher level of training (particularly linguistic and cultural expertise), combined with their relatively higher maturity and experience, also make them the preferred force for training and advising foreign militaries, especially in politically sensitive areas.
Total US SOF force structure, including active and reserve forces, accounts for only two percent of the overall joint force.
The Department of Defense defines special operations as “operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.”
SOCOM, located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida, is responsible for organizing, training, equipping and deploying SOF to geographic combatant commanders. Furthermore, SOCOM is the “lead combatant command for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other combatant commanders.”25 In essence, SOCOM is a hybrid organization: like the Services, it is a force provider to the geographic combatant commands; and like other combatant commands, it is heavily involved in operational planning, force allocation, and, in rare cases, execution of military operations.
The small size of the ODAs combined with their sophisticated training allows SF to work flexibly and autonomously in hostile and politically sensitive environments.
In 2002, SF reactivated the 18-X program, which had been dormant since the 1970s, and began recruiting civilians “off the street” to help fill the training pipeline.
The Rangers are elite airborne light infantry. Similar in size and organization to conventional light infantry battalions, Ranger battalions are more selective in terms of personnel assessment and maintain higher training standards. As a consequence, Rangers can conduct missions that general purpose forces cannot, such as direct action (particularly hostile airfield seizures), counterterrorism and special reconnaissance.
SEAL (SEa Air Land) Teams primarily perform counterterrorism, direct action, and special reconnaissance missions, especially those that originate from, and return to, a swamp, delta, river, or ocean.
Joint Special Operations Command
JSOC, located at Pope Air Force Base near Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is, in theory at least, responsible for ensuring that joint special operations work seamlessly. In reality, JSOC’s SMUs (Special Mission Units) are the nation’s primary counterterrorism and counterproliferation force. JSOC’s exact structure is classified, but most sources agree that it contains the following subordinate units:
- 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta (also known as Delta Force, or the Combat Applications Group) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
- Naval Special Warfare Development Group (also known as DEVGRU or SEAL Team 6) at the Training Support Center, Hampton Roads, Dam Neck, Virginia.
- An Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) that focuses on clandestine operations, including human intelligence and signal intelligence collection.
- 24th Special Tactics Squadron at Pope Air Force Base.
- Joint Communications Unit (JCU).
In addition, elements of both the 75th Rangers and the 160th SOAR are frequently under the operational control of JSOC.43 JSOC units also work closely with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Hostage Rescue Team of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
JSOC primarily carries out counterterrorism, counterproliferation, special reconnaissance, and direct action missions of extreme political, operational or strategic importance. JSOC units have led the global manhunt for terrorists in support of the war against violent Islamic extremism. In addition, JSOC’s SMUs are the nation’s premier hostage-rescue forces and include the only US military personnel qualified to “render safe” a nuclear device. Many JSOC operators have cultural and language proficiencies in order to operate more effectively abroad. Furthermore, these units maintain relaxed uniform and grooming standards so as to blend into local populations.
To prevail in this war, the United States, along with its allies and partners, will need to conduct a sustained, multifaceted, global “smother campaign” to deny terrorists sanctuary whether in under-governed areas or state-controlled territory, sever the transnational links upon which they rely, impede recruitment and fundraising, track them down wherever they may be hiding and plotting, and disrupt their operations. The United States cannot successfully wage this campaign alone. It will be essential to build the security capabilities and capacities of as many partners — both nations and disaffected non-state actors — as possible.
Most critically, the US government must avoid making statements or taking actions that legitimize the call to defensive jihad. It should also take steps to ameliorate the social, economic, and political plight of the Muslim world and other so-called “root causes” of radical Islamic terrorism.
SOF will need to be shaped, sized, and postured to:
- Conduct proactive, sustained “manhunting” and disruption operations globally;
- Build partner capacity in relevant ground, air, and maritime capabilities in scores of countries on a steady-state basis;
- Help generate persistent air and maritime surveillance and strike coverage over “under-governed” areas and relevant littoral zones; and
- Employ unconventional warfare against state sponsors of terrorism and transnational terrorist groups globally.
These four operational tasks are critical to the formation of what is sometimes referred to as a global combating terrorism network (GCTN).
The idea is that, with time, this network will become so expansive and dense that transnational terrorist groups will no longer be able to operate effectively. The underlying goal is to increase dramatically the anticipated costs of conducting terrorist acts, convincing would-be terrorists that the probability of successfully orchestrating a major plot is very low, while punishment would be painful, swift and certain. In theory, by influencing the cost-benefit calculus associated with terrorism, the GCTN will deter terrorists from acting — and in the event deterrence fails, it will effectively disrupt terrorist plots before they are hatched.
The desired end-state is a world in which US partners can effectively suppress terrorist activity in their territory and regional neighborhoods with little or no American assistance.
First and foremost, SOF will need to build and maintain a persistent, low-visibility ground presence in several known or suspected terrorist operating areas around the world, as well as in expansive, under-governed areas that are vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. Second, SOF will need to be prepared to conduct clandestine operations (most likely unconventional warfare) and support CIA-led covert activities against state sponsors of terrorism, including those armed with significant anti-access capabilities.
An on-the-ground presence is essential not only for collecting tactical intelligence and developing local situational awareness, but also for supporting partner security forces and responding rapidly (either unilaterally or in a combined operation) if and when high-value terrorist targets are identified and located.
In countries willing to host SOF to train, advise, and equip their security forces, this expanded presence could be generated relatively easily. Personnel assigned to the overt foreign internal defense mission could leverage their in-country access for collecting tactical intelligence, making contacts with local government officials and civilians, and conducting a host of other preparation-of-the-environment activities.
Developing a low-visibility ground presence in countries that are not willing to host SOF will, of course, be more problematic. To support expanded clandestine military operations, SOF will need to invest in myriad capabilities to enable specially trained personnel to infiltrate into, exfiltrate from, and conduct operations within semi-permissible and denied areas. Among other things, they will require new cover mechanisms and means for defeating modern biometric identity verification technologies.
It will also be necessary to develop new tools, as well as supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures, in order to collect relevant tactical intelligence, especially with respect to locating and tracking high-value terrorist targets (and possibly WMD-related material) in what may often be very cluttered environments.
Because of their foreign language skills, cultural expertise, and familiarity with a wide range of commonly used foreign weapons, SF are the country’s premier force for training, advising, and equipping foreign security forces.
In short, while the general purpose force may reduce the foreign internal defense workload for SOF at the margins, one should harbor no illusions that it will be possible (or desirable) for SOF to divest the bulk of the foreign internal defense mission; it will unquestionably remain a major operational focus for SOF in the years ahead.
More proficiency will be needed in languages spoken in critical “front line” areas, most notably Arabic, Pashto, Farsi, Dari, Punjabi, Balochi, Bahasa, and Filipino.
Several steps should be taken to enhance unconventional warfare capabilities and expand current capacity. Improving unconventional warfare capabilities will require additional investment in languages, area knowledge, advanced special operations training, clandestine infiltration capabilities, and low-signature support infrastructure.
Accessing “Closed” Networks’
China has developed an extremely robust internal fiber-optic network for military command, control, and communications. In all likelihood, it has several dedicated, stand-alone communications and computer networks that are not connected to commercial networks, and are thus practically impossible to access remotely. Accordingly, SOF may be called upon to gain physical access to these networks — both in peacetime for intelligence-collection purposes and in wartime to spoof, exploit, or disable them. During peacetime, this mission would probably be assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency. However, in remote, difficult-to-access land areas, or for cables on the seabed, SOF could play an important role. During wartime, the network-access mission could become a core responsibility for SOF.
This mission has several important implications for SOF. First, SOF need to master the skills necessary to tap into fiber-optic or other communication lines, as well as to hack into protected computer networks. This will require the creation of new information operations training programs, as well as the development and procurement of specialized network-access “tool kits.”
SOF would likely support conventional operations by finding and, in a more limited set of cases, attacking high-value targets. They might be relied upon, for example, to locate cruise and ballistic missile launcher “hide sites,” including in deep inland areas, as well as coastal anti-ship cruise missile and surface-to-air missile launchers. To avoid revealing their location, hidden SOF units would either provide the GPS coordinates of confirmed targets using low-probability of detection communication systems or laser-designate them for precision air and missile strikes launched from orbiting aircraft and offshore ships. In rare circumstances, however, SOF might be called upon to conduct direct action missions against targets of high strategic or operational importance that cannot be reliably or safely neutralized by other means. Also be tasked with conducting “snatch and grab” operations such as rescuing and extracting imprisoned political opposition leaders.
SOF could potentially conduct unconventional warfare to bring about regime change in states aspiring to develop WMD. In rare circumstances, they might be called upon to undertake counterproliferation operations against critical WMD-related infrastructure that cannot be reliably and safely targeted by other means, including sites in denied, deep inland areas.
SOF would likely also play a role in retaliatory attacks against those who employ WMD. Their primary contribution to the US government’s response to this challenge, however, will likely be in tracking down and rendering safe “loose” WMD material or devices.
SOF will need to shift from an episodic deployment force to a persistent-presence force — with more forces forward, in more places, for longer periods of time.
Consequently, the dominant modes of operation will be indirect (working with and through allies) and covert (conducting operations in which the involvement of the US government is concealed). Accordingly, SOF will need to place increased emphasis not only upon unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, but also upon working more closely with the CIA’s National Clandestine Service.
SOCOM accounts for less than 2 percent of the national defense budget.
It is imperative to expand special operations rotary-wing capacity, as well as increase civil affairs and PSYOPS force structure.
Under current plans, one battalion will be added to each of the five active SFGs. To date, one new battalion has been created and a second is expected to become operational by the end of 2008 or early 2009. By most accounts, however, standing up the three remaining battalions by 2013 without sacrificing quality will be challenging, owing to the limited size of the recruitment pool, the still-high proportion of “wash-outs” from the assessment and training process, and anticipated difficulties in maintaining adequate retention because of growing competition from the private sector and family pressures stemming from high deployment rates. Attention on what it terms the three “pillars” for growing the force: improved recruiting, expansion of the training base, and retention incentives.
In terms of recruitment, USASOC has not only stepped up efforts to target individuals within the traditional Ranger recruiting pool, but has also taken full advantage of the 18-X program, which was re-activated in 2002 to recruit talented individuals “off the street.” While many SF personnel feared that 18-X recruits would lead to an influx of poorly qualified enlistees that would dilute the force, this has turned out not to be the case — at least thus far.
SOCOM has authorized an array of retention bonuses and compensation incentives targeted at the most senior operators.102 Likewise, SOCOM should consider retention incentives for mid-career personnel. Novel retention ideas should be explored as well such as extending current operator benefits (e.g., college and advanced degree reimbursement) to family members.
Increase targeted recruitment of native speakers through the 18-X program or other mechanisms.
It might be possible to recruit legal aliens, non-citizen nationals, and foreign nationals to serve in SOF.
Under Section 328 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, members of the US Armed Services who serve honorably for at least one year can have residency and physical presence requirements for naturalization waived. Since 2001, the US Citizenship and Immigration Services has naturalized nearly 37,000 members of the US Armed Forces. The primary obstacle to feeding naturalized recruits into SOF would be their ability to obtain required security clearances. US Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Naturalization through Military Service,” Fact Sheet, January 28, 2008. For a discussion of the possible merits of expanding the numbers of foreigners in the US military, see also Stephen M. Kosiak, Military Manpower (Washington, DC, CSBA, 2008).
Rangers become the prime source of candidates after 3 years or 4 years in the Rangers to go in to regular Army special forces and into the Delta force. And so what it does is it gives you a better pool to draw from, or it gives you a larger pool, so that you could build those forces…
The Delta force is probably 70 percent Rangers who have come out of either a Ranger special forces track or directly from a Ranger regiment to Delta (Downing, Testimony to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, June 29, 2006, p. 22.)
The senior leadership of al Qaeda is keenly aware of the importance of the “media war” in achieving their strategic goals. In a letter to Mullah Mohammed Omar, for example, Osama bin Laden observed that propaganda is one of the jihadist’s most powerful weapons. “It is obvious,” he says, “that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the battles.”
In Ayman al-Zawahiri’s letter to the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in July 2005, he asserted that “we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media” and that the Salafi-Takfiri movement is “in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.”
Civil Affairs and PSYOPS will be essential for maintaining host-nation support for effective, long-term counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns.
Civil Affairs and PSYOPS units should routinely accompany SOF ground units involved in partner-capacity-building missions and, to a lesser extent, sustained manhunting operations in countries around the world. While they could augment SF cultural expertise, they would be especially useful for providing Rangers, SEALs, and selected MARSOC units with the cultural and linguistic expertise they lack. Finally, Civil Affairs and PSYOPS units could also lead independent operations focused on winning over the hearts and minds of populations in more permissible areas.
Clandestinely inserted by SEAL Delivery Vehicles or Advanced SEAL Delivery System mini-submarines, SEALs could:
- Tap into or disrupt fiber-optic lines and sensors on the seafloor;
- Plant beacons or limpet mines on high-value warships prior to the onset of hostilities;
- Conduct underwater demolition operations against critical ports (including submarine pens that have been carved into the sides of mountains to reduce their vulnerability to air and missile attack) and supporting infrastructure; and
- Conduct on and off-shore intelligence collection, including locating time-sensitive, high-value targets such as anti-ship cruise missile launchers, air defense radars, and surface-to-air missile launchers hidden in China’s cluttered littoral landscape.
SEAL Team 6 specializes in maritime operations such as ship takedowns, and Delta specializes in rescue operations against hijacked aircraft. Alternating responsibility for reactive counterterrorism operations between the two SMUs would thus result in additional operational risk. The capacity of both SMUs to conduct distributed counterterrorism operations, therefore, will likely need to be increased over the coming decade, though not necessarily to the same extent.
At a minimum, this will likely mean increasing human intelligence capacity (i.e., creating a human intelligence squadron within each SMU) and either creating additional operational squadrons or increasing the number of “shooters” within existing squadrons.
The potential global diffusion of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction over the coming decades could dramatically increase demand for JSOC’s highly specialized “render safe” capability. Given the time it takes to train operators to locate, characterize, and disarm nuclear weapons or, more likely, improved nuclear devices, it might be prudent to anticipate this potential demand and begin investing in additional capacity in this area now. To improve JSOC’s speed of response for reactive CP missions, consideration should be given to forward basing a small number of personnel in Europe, Central Asia, and/or East Asia. While serving in this capacity, JSOC units, possibly augmented by Department of Energy personnel, could train selected foreign partners in “render safe” tactics, techniques, and procedures.
By conducting local air traffic control and coordinating precision fire support while embedded with SOF ground units, Combat Controller Teams can significantly increase overall combat effectiveness, leveraging US precision air power to its full effect. Globally distributed teams of SOF conducting unilateral counterterrorism operations, combined operations with partner nations, and unconventional warfare operations with irregular forces will all require Combat Controller Team support.
Reorient Ground General Purpose Forces Toward Irregular Warfare
As part of a broader reorientation toward irregular warfare and away from conventional, combined-arms mechanized warfare, the Army and Marine Corps must develop the capabilities and capacities needed to train and advise foreign security forces in multiple, widely dispersed countries simultaneously. As Secretary Gates observed, “Looking forward, tasks such as standing up and mentoring indigenous armies and police — once the province of the Special Forces — are now a key mission for the military as a whole.”
In addition, DoD needs to create a “preventive surge” capability, meaning the ability to deploy a relatively large number of specialized security, stability, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) units to stabilize weak or failing states before they collapse by providing capacity in areas in which indigenous resources are inadequate, while simultaneously building host-nation capacity.
DoD may not only be called upon to provide and build capacity for internal security and law enforcement, but for other “non-military” areas critical to the stability of the state (e.g., electrical power generation and distribution, water treatment and distribution, provision and distribution of food, sanitation, and medical care).
Improving skill sets for irregular warfare — and partner capacity-building and SSTR operations more narrowly — will require the US Army and Marine Corps to dedicate significant resources to introducing or, in some cases, expanding the following specialized capabilities: intelligence collection and analysis, military police, explosive ordnance handling, psychological operations, civil affairs, language/cultural expertise, medics, and engineers.
The professional military education system and current training programs need to be restructured to focus on building an institutional competence in counterinsurgency strategy and operations, as well as on developing and refining IW focused tactics, techniques, and procedures. To accomplish this across the force in a reasonable timeframe, it will likely be necessary to create new training infrastructure. Increased investment in simulation tools to facilitate mission planning, rehearsal and execution at the small–unit level is warranted. It may also make sense to create specialized, standing IW units, especially for training and advising missions in relatively benign threat environments.
By taking on a portion of the capacity-building mission, even if it is a small one because of host-nation political reluctance to invite in relatively large conventional US military units, the general purpose forces could free up SOF for other tasks that more fully leverage their unique capabilities.174 SOF would, however, remain responsible for training, equipping, and advising missions in politically sensitive areas where a low-visibility presence is essential, as well as for instructing foreign special operations units.
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