Tuesday, April 12, 2011

John Boyd and strategic theory in the postmodern era

John Boyd and strategic theory in the postmodern era
By Frans Osinga

We live in the postmodern era, the French sociologist Francois Lyotard told us in the early eighties. Postmodernism has come to signify a break with traditional modes of behavior. This includes warfare. Two dominant strands of strategic thought have both earned the label of postmodern warfare: Network Centric warfare (NCW) and Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW). One takes its inspiration from the postmodern information society, the other from the eroding authority and power of the modern-era political institutions. Both are also unified in a common conceptual father: the late USAF Colonel John Boyd, the first postmodern strategist. Few people in the past three decades have surpassed his influence on western military thought, but, like Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, he has also often been superficially read and understood.

Sunday, April 3, 2011

Great debate on military reform!

Great debate on military reform!
Here is a two and 2/3 hours of greatest debate I have ever heard on military affairs. It is on what is actually important in building a force to be able to win wars. I strongly recommend watching it to all military and military related people – makes you think and understand the priorities in creating the really successful defense of any State.
You will see Colonel John Boyd, Senator Gary Hart etc in front of the House Committee Armed Services in 1991. I can promise that the time will be well spent.
Some keywords: personnel policy, military education, doctrines, bureaucracy, high tech, maneuver warfare, Gulf War.
Credit goes to Major Donald Vandergriff (U.S.) for appointing it out. Thanks Don!

Tuesday, March 15, 2011

Mission Command: Questions for the Army Personnel System

Mission Command:  Questions for the Army Personnel System
Don Vandergriff

So, how do we create strategic corporals, strategic lieutenants, strategic majors, and strategic colonels?  The trick is to instill a culture like the one embodied in the Army’s new TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept Operational Adaptability—Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict.[1]  The emphasis is on evolving toward the practice and culture of Mission Command.  The essence of this approach is to ensure that we lead through Auftragstaktik, a German word that implies that once everyone understands the commanders’ intent (two levels up), then people are free to and indeed duty-bound to use their creativity and initiative to accomplish their missions within the intent. Within such an environment, teams will largely self-organize within the doctrinal framework to accomplish the mission. Such a military culture that supports Mission Command takes time to develop, must be embraced across the entire spectrum of the Army, practiced in every institution—operational and generating forces—while decrees from above cannot magically decentralize operations conducted by Adaptive leaders.[2]

Tuesday, March 8, 2011

Irregular Warfare and Adaptive Leadership

Irregular Warfare and Adaptive Leadership
Paul Yingling

When I was a battalion XO in Iraq in 2003, I served with a company commander whose vehicle was struck by an early version of an IED. The fragmentation shattered his windshield and severed his antennas, the smoke and dust obscured his vision and the blast temporarily deafened him. In the first critical seconds after the blast, the commander saw the ubiquitous white pickup leaving the blast area, but didn’t pursue it. His battalion commander was furious, and later harangued the captain for his failure to act. The company commander was crushed; he felt the battalion commander was questioning his courage, and in fact he was.

A Review of The Pentagon Labyrinth

A Review of The Pentagon Labyrinth
By Werther via Don Vandergriff

In a recent radio interview, the British historian Timothy Garton Ash stated that his overall impression of the United States was one of dynamism and entrepreneurial spirit, such as in the Silicon Valley. But Washington, D.C., he said, reminded him of Moscow in the former Soviet Union.
In the context of the interview, he probably intended that as a criticism of the U.S. capital as being stagnant, status quo, and wedded to obsolete theories. But in a more pointed way he may not have consciously meant, it is equally true that Washington is remarkably like late-Brezhnev era Moscow in the sense of being very visibly the capital of a garrison state. With its billboard adverts for fighter aircraft in local Metro stations, radio spots recruiting for “the National Clandestine Service,” its ubiquitous Jersey Wall checkpoints, and its electronic freeway signs admonishing motorists to report suspicious activity (whatever that may be), the District of Columbia quite accurately simulates the paranoid atmosphere of a cold war era capital of Eastern Europe, say, East Berlin or Bucharest, albeit at two orders of magnitude greater cost.

Friday, February 25, 2011

Petraeus’s Last Stand?

Petraeus’s Last Stand?

February 24, 2011 by Don Vandergriff


The author of this important report in Politics Daily (also attached below), Dave Wood, is a very experienced combat reporter and one of the very best US reporters covering Afghanistan. (Truth in advertising: I have known and admired Dave for 25 years.) Wood has produced an an excellent, if grim, Afghan SITREP that is well worth studying carefully, including its hotlinks.
I think it would be a mistake to conclude that the situation being in a kind a balance, because we are in a strategic stalemate, however. While it is probably true we are in a strategic stalemate in the strictest sense of term ‘strategic,’ every year the Taliban is able to maintain its menacing posture gives the insurgents additional leverage at the far more decisive grand-strategic level of conflict: To wit, ask yourself if any of the following five trends (which are inversions of the five criteria defining a successful grand strategy) is way out of line:
(1) Polls tell us that the political will at home to continue this war is slowing deteriorating;
(2) our allies are also going wobbly and some have already pulled the plug;
(3) uncommitted countries are not being attracted to our cause and our warlike activities are alienating many in the Muslim world;
(4) the insurgents’ will to resist shows no sign of weakening; and
(5) no one the US government has a clue how to end this conflict on favorable terms for the United States that do not sow the seeds of future conflict in the region, or with Islam.
The Afghan insurgents may not understand grand strategy in these terms, but they understand instinctively that they can outlast invaders, because they believe they have done it before to Alexander the Great, the British at the height of their imperial power, and the Soviets. Is there anyone who not think the insurgents’ moral is being boosted by the prospect of outlasting the Americans?
A simple grand-strategic analysis reveals that time is clearly on the Taliban’s side and to assume that battle hardened leaders of the Taliban do not understand this is just a tad optimistic, to put it charitably. In fact, the breakdown of President Obama’s strategic review last December, which devolved into a dispute over when to leave, simply reinforced the obvious.

Chuck Spinney

It Takes a Network

BY STANLEY A. MCCHRYSTAL

From the outset of my command in Afghanistan, two or three times each week, accompanied by a few aides and often my Afghan counterparts, I would leave the International Security Assistance Force headquarters in Kabul and travel across Afghanistan -- from critical cities like Kandahar to the most remote outposts in violent border regions. Ideally, we left early, traveling light and small, normally using a combination of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, to meet with Afghans and their leaders and to connect with our troops on the ground: Brits and Marines rolling back the enemy in Helmand, Afghan National Army troops training in Mazar-e-Sharif, French Foreign Legionnaires patrolling in Kapisa.


But I was not alone: There were other combatants circling the battlefield. Mirroring our movements, competing with us, were insurgent leaders. Connected to, and often directly dispatched by, the Taliban's leadership in Pakistan, they moved through the same areas of Afghanistan. They made shows of public support for Taliban shadow governors, motivated tattered ranks, recruited new troops, distributed funds, reviewed tactics, and updated strategy. And when the sky above became too thick with our drones, their leaders used cell phones and the Internet to issue orders and rally their fighters. They aimed to keep dispersed insurgent cells motivated, strategically wired, and continually informed, all without a rigid -- or targetable -- chain of command.

Read more: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network 

Monday, February 14, 2011

Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving

Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving

Tim Kane

Why are so many of the most talented officers now abandoning military life for the private sector? An exclusive survey of West Point graduates shows that it’s not just money. Increasingly, the military is creating a command structure that rewards conformism and ignores merit. As a result, it’s losing its vaunted ability to cultivate entrepreneurs in uniform.

Valgustatud kindral Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst

Valgustatud kindral Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorst

Aivar Jaeski
 
Ajateenistusele pani Euroopas aluse Prantsuse revolutsioon, mis kukutas Bourbonide ülemvõimu, tõi õigused kodanikele ning lõi vabariigi. Kuidas juhtus nii, et Esimese maailmasõja alguseks oli loodud õlitatud, hästi toimiv süsteem? Kes olid nende muudatuste taga?
 
Revolutsioonis tekkinud Prantsuse vabariik ei kestnud kaua, kuid see kogemus valgustas paljude Euroopa mõtlejate meeli. Käesolev artikkel käsitleb ühte valgustatud meest, kindral Gerhard Johann David von Scharnhorsti, kes tutvustas ajateenistuse ideed Preisi aristokraatidele. Scharnhorst väärib tutvustamist ka juba kas või seepärast, et ta oli kuulsa sõjandusteoreetiku Carl von Clausewitzi õpetaja. Huntington on nimetanud Scharnhorsti refomistiks, kes pani aluse tõelisele lääne sõjaväelase elukutsele.
Teema käsitlemine on raske, sest vähene hulk seda puudutavaid materjale elas üle Teise maailmasõja. Maailmakaardilt on kadunud ka Preisi riik ning jäänud on vaid mälestus vapratest meestest, kes 1815. aasta juunis jõudsid Waterloo lahinguväljale napilt enne Wellingtoni armee kokkukukkumist. Ühe põhjuse, miks Scharnhorsti vähe teatakse, toob välja Charles Eduard White raamatus „Valgustatud sõjamees" („The enlightened soldier"). Tema väitel ignoreerivad nüüdisaja ajaloolased Preisimaa toonased reforme seetõttu, et Natsi-Saksamaa kolleegid neid liigselt imetlesid.

Monday, January 24, 2011

Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and Opportunities


Strategy for the Long Haul
Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and Opportunities
By Robert Martinage 2008 (abbreviated by R. Toomse)

Given the long expected service life of most of its major assets, the US military force structure, which underlies the concepts of operation that drive the US “way of war,” is still based primarily on the premises and experience of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Arguably, much of the current Program of Record (the forces the Department of Defense seeks to acquire in coming years) remains similarly reflective of that period. Yet the looming strategic challenges look to be significantly different. Thus there is a danger that many of the forces that the Defense Department plans to acquire may prove to be unsuitable for dealing with future threats.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are elite, highly trained military units that conduct operations that typically exceed the capabilities of conventional forces.

Sunday, January 2, 2011

NATO Special Operations Forces Study

NATO Special Operations Forces Study
NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre 2008

There is a common perspective among a variety of defence and security establishments around the world that the nature of the current and future security environment we face presents complex and irregular challenges that are not readily apparent and are difficult to anticipate. Governments are faced with “unusual” or “unconventional” threats that dominate the attention of their political and defence leaders. The diverse set of threats are interconnected and have the potential to undermine wider international stability by creating a state of low level persistent conflict for the foreseeable future.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) provide an inherently agile instrument ideally suited to this ambiguous and dynamic irregular environment while allowing national and collective defence establishments to retain freedom of action through employing economy of force. SOF are characterized as strategic assets because of their ability to achieve political, military, psychological, and informational objectives that represent the foundational instruments of national power. SOF operate outside the realm of conventional operations or beyond the standard capabilities of conventional forces, thus providing a solution to extraordinary circumstances of political interest when no other option is available.
To assure the feasibility of the alternative options SOF provide to decision makers, successful special operations require optimized performance beyond that found in conventional forces. Optimized performance is that which is made as perfect, functional or effective as possible to mitigate the inherent political and physical risk.
A trend is evident from the evolution within many nations that the critical ingredient to optimize SOF is a dedicated national special operations organisation to provide coherent, long term stewardship, authority, and direction over all aspect of special operations. Just as chiefs of the military services serve in a custodial role, the national level SOF organization ensures that SOF are appropriately designed, organized, trained, equipped, and employed to achieve success.
No short cut exists to create SOF when crises arise. Instead, years of training, education, and experience acquired through an investment in time and resources are necessary to prepare SOF units to successfully perform special operations. In comparison to other defence expenditures, such a SOF capability requires a comparatively minor expenditure of total defence costs, especially when compared to the potential return on investment.
As strategic assets, SOF are understandably viewed primarily through the lens of national interests. However, the increasingly prevalent security perspective indicates that multinational collective security arrangements are a prerequisite for confronting the disparate and complex security challenges of the 21st century. Multilateral and collective SOF solutions will enhance national as well as collective SOF capabilities while capitalizing on the strengths of some and compensating for gaps among others.