Interview with Dr. John Nagl
Octavian Manea
“Counterinsurgencies are after all learning competitions.”
How important is the developing of the local troops for winning a COIN campaign?
Ultimately foreign countries cannot defeat an insurgency. Only the host nation forces can do that. But the intervening powers bring enormous advantages to the fight and if you can properly integrate the host nation forces and the intervening forces you can multiply the effects of both and the natural advantages of both. That is the objective, but we have struggled to do that as effectively as we could, both in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Ultimately foreign countries cannot defeat an insurgency. Only the host nation forces can do that. But the intervening powers bring enormous advantages to the fight and if you can properly integrate the host nation forces and the intervening forces you can multiply the effects of both and the natural advantages of both. That is the objective, but we have struggled to do that as effectively as we could, both in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Could you explain why insurgencies are governing competitors?
It is often said that in a COIN campaign where the counterinsurgent is losing it is not being outfought, it is being out-governed. The counterinsurgent and insurgent are both competing to win the support of the population. The insurgent has some advantages in this fight; he can use violence, intimidation, and terror to coerce support from the population and he doesn’t need to be everywhere all the time. He only has to present a credible threat once in order to coerce support. The counterinsurgent on the other hand has to be everywhere all the time and has to be able to continuously protect the population in order to win the loyalty and the support of the population and ultimately drain the sea in which the insurgents swim. This is why the number of the counterinsurgents required is so great - 50 for every 1000 in the population. These are enormous numbers of counterinsurgents that cannot be provided by an external power. And this is why the creation of capable, competent well trained and equipped host nation security forces that understand the responsibility to protect population is of the utmost importance. It is not what Jominian thinking militaries see as their primary responsibility, but it is probably the single most important task in a counterinsurgency campaign.
It is often said that in a COIN campaign where the counterinsurgent is losing it is not being outfought, it is being out-governed. The counterinsurgent and insurgent are both competing to win the support of the population. The insurgent has some advantages in this fight; he can use violence, intimidation, and terror to coerce support from the population and he doesn’t need to be everywhere all the time. He only has to present a credible threat once in order to coerce support. The counterinsurgent on the other hand has to be everywhere all the time and has to be able to continuously protect the population in order to win the loyalty and the support of the population and ultimately drain the sea in which the insurgents swim. This is why the number of the counterinsurgents required is so great - 50 for every 1000 in the population. These are enormous numbers of counterinsurgents that cannot be provided by an external power. And this is why the creation of capable, competent well trained and equipped host nation security forces that understand the responsibility to protect population is of the utmost importance. It is not what Jominian thinking militaries see as their primary responsibility, but it is probably the single most important task in a counterinsurgency campaign.
How do insurgencies end?
Insurgencies are rarely defeated militarily. Insurgencies end through political accommodation; some degree of political accommodation is essential in convincing the least committed insurgents that politics rather than force is a viable way to pursue their objectives. Insurgencies are composed of large numbers of individuals who have different motivations and different degrees of commitment to the cause. What happens is that the least committed fighters tend to be peeled away by fear of being captured or killed, by more effective security forces, by payments to join the security forces as happened in during Anbar Awakening in Iraq, by other economic opportunities or incentives. Historically, successful counterinsurgents have defeated their opponents by peeling off the less ideologically committed sub-elements with promises of political progress toward their ultimate goals. As the less committed insurgents are peeled away, insurgencies are boiled down to a hard core, people who have to be captured or killed. Insurgencies tend not to end with surrender ceremonies, they tend to fade away.
Insurgencies are rarely defeated militarily. Insurgencies end through political accommodation; some degree of political accommodation is essential in convincing the least committed insurgents that politics rather than force is a viable way to pursue their objectives. Insurgencies are composed of large numbers of individuals who have different motivations and different degrees of commitment to the cause. What happens is that the least committed fighters tend to be peeled away by fear of being captured or killed, by more effective security forces, by payments to join the security forces as happened in during Anbar Awakening in Iraq, by other economic opportunities or incentives. Historically, successful counterinsurgents have defeated their opponents by peeling off the less ideologically committed sub-elements with promises of political progress toward their ultimate goals. As the less committed insurgents are peeled away, insurgencies are boiled down to a hard core, people who have to be captured or killed. Insurgencies tend not to end with surrender ceremonies, they tend to fade away.
Which are the most important principles of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual?
There are two main principles at the heart of FM 3-24; protect the population and counterinsurgent forces must be able to learn and adapt. In COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly usually wins. Counterinsurgencies are after all learning competitions. As FM 3-24 put it: “Learning organizations defeat insurgencies; bureaucratic hierarchies do not”. Those are the twin pillars of the COIN Field Manual.
There are two main principles at the heart of FM 3-24; protect the population and counterinsurgent forces must be able to learn and adapt. In COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly usually wins. Counterinsurgencies are after all learning competitions. As FM 3-24 put it: “Learning organizations defeat insurgencies; bureaucratic hierarchies do not”. Those are the twin pillars of the COIN Field Manual.
How important is it for the counterinsurgent to develop local relationships?
You win these kinds of wars by drinking tea, lots of tea. Ultimately, to earn the support of the population, you have to gain their trust and the way you gain their trust is by developing personal relationships. You must be more than a uniform and it is important for the leaders to take their helmets off, take their protective glasses off, body armor off and demonstrate that they trust people whose support they are trying to earn.
You win these kinds of wars by drinking tea, lots of tea. Ultimately, to earn the support of the population, you have to gain their trust and the way you gain their trust is by developing personal relationships. You must be more than a uniform and it is important for the leaders to take their helmets off, take their protective glasses off, body armor off and demonstrate that they trust people whose support they are trying to earn.
What is the future of COIN?
The Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns are certainly not the model that we hope to follow in the future. In both cases we have overthrown the existing governments, disbanded the existing security forces and created ourselves enormous problems. A better example of the kind of campaign we prefer to wage in the future is Yemen, where there is an existing government affected by an insurgency, it is a weak government but it has security forces and does have a degree of popular legitimacy. Today, we are assisting that government with Special Operations Forces, training and equipment. This sort of small footprint model is the way I believe we should think about the future of COIN campaigns, while maintaining the ability to conduct large scale campaigns, but only as a last resort. In his book The Accidental Guerrilla, David Kilcullen argues that our COIN efforts, because of a failure of cultural understanding, have contributed to the creation of insurgents and guerillas. We have increased the number of insurgents rather than decreasing them. So Kilcullen argues that with a light footprint, the targeted use of military force, an increased focus on advisory role, and with a smarter use of economic support, we can conduct COIN using far less American resources while relying on local assets. That said, we must understand that this model might not always succeed.
The Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns are certainly not the model that we hope to follow in the future. In both cases we have overthrown the existing governments, disbanded the existing security forces and created ourselves enormous problems. A better example of the kind of campaign we prefer to wage in the future is Yemen, where there is an existing government affected by an insurgency, it is a weak government but it has security forces and does have a degree of popular legitimacy. Today, we are assisting that government with Special Operations Forces, training and equipment. This sort of small footprint model is the way I believe we should think about the future of COIN campaigns, while maintaining the ability to conduct large scale campaigns, but only as a last resort. In his book The Accidental Guerrilla, David Kilcullen argues that our COIN efforts, because of a failure of cultural understanding, have contributed to the creation of insurgents and guerillas. We have increased the number of insurgents rather than decreasing them. So Kilcullen argues that with a light footprint, the targeted use of military force, an increased focus on advisory role, and with a smarter use of economic support, we can conduct COIN using far less American resources while relying on local assets. That said, we must understand that this model might not always succeed.
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