Counterinsurgency 3.0

Counterinsurgency 3.0

Peter Charles Choharis and James A. Gavrilis

After eight years of war, more than 907 Americans dead and 4,400 wound­ed, and $227 billion in aid from the United States alone, Afghanistan was “deteriorating” badly, according to the NATO International Security As­sistance Force (ISAF) commander, General Stanley McChrystal, in an Au­gust 2009 report to the Secretary of Defense. Although General McChrystal has been more optimistic of late, the fact remains that the Taliban’s reach is more extensive now than at any time since being expelled from Kabul eight years ago. They have shadow governors in every province except Kabul. People turn to Taliban courts rather than state courts for justice in many parts of Afghanistan. And many Afghans prefer the Taliban’s austerity over the Karzai government’s corruption and incompetence. Why?

Why have the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies, who just a few years ago were reviled by the vast majority of Afghans for their brutality and fa­naticism, grown in strength and popularity during nearly a decade of US and international assistance? More broadly, why has massive international de­velopment assistance in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere failed to defeat the grip of extremist ideologies among many people who have benefited from billions of dollars worth of aid? Is it even possible for international develop­ment aid to help defeat radical Islam and other ideologies hostile to the West and, if so, how?

This article explains how civilian and military policy-makers have in­correctly assumed that international development aid is inherently beneficial to local populations; necessarily fosters stability; and invariably leads to a grateful populace that will shun insurgents, thereby advancing US strategic goals. The article posits that using international aid to combat radical Is­lamic insurgencies is more complex than aid advocates assume and outlines a different conception of what constitutes development. Finally, it explains how small-scale, micro-development based on corporate social responsibil­ity practices, rather than traditional foreign aid, will have the greatest and most enduring impact against Islamic insurgencies. Such an approach most effectively inculcates beliefs and institutionalizes behaviors that are conge­nial to the West while being sensitive to local conditions.

Read more: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/2010spring/40-1-2010_choharisAndGavrilis.pdf