Tactical success of German troops during the First World War: exploiting talents

Tactical success of German troops during the First World War: exploiting talents
(unknown author)

Despite the fact that Germany was defeated in the First World War, and their strategic conduct of the operations was often erroneous, on the tactical level, they were successful. The main reasons for this success were ability to exploit the talents in tactics development and application, systematic approach to the doctrinal changes, and flexible application of tactical procedures. The rest of the world often sees the German Army as rigid, drill-based, authoritarian organization unable to be flexible. During the First World War, it proved false, especially considering that German General Stuff requested the ideas from lower ranks, encouraged the application of principles according to the situation, and used the ideas of the enemy’s talents.

Most of the ideas for new tactics that were eventually executed on the field, emerged from the talents of the junior ranks, and their lessons learned on the battlefield. General Staff solicited ideas from subordinate units and tasked talented company-grade officers to develop new tactical doctrine. Furthermore, higher officers were able to put their egos aside, and accept the fact that talented men of all ranks on the field are primary resource for sound changes in tactical doctrine of the whole army.

Secondly, when distributing new tactical doctrine to the frontline units, the higher command of the army expected the flexible application of the tactical principles, because they believed in the talent of their junior commanders. The principles were general enough to apply in different situations, and they were not formulas to apply without any judgment. Every situation on the battlefield is unique and the tactician has to be an artist, using his own best judgment considering the time, terrain, enemy, his mission and the abilities of his troops.
Finally, the Germans did not regard the enemy as an annoying obstacle on their way to the victory on the battlefield, but often thought that they were more talented than they actually were. For example in 1916, the Germans captured a copy of the pamphlet, written by French captain Laffargue, where he described his experiences and ideas of the attack. The French Army did not pay much attention to this pamphlet, and British disregarded it completely. Inspired of that, the Germans translated the pamphlet immediately, and issued the copy to their units. It was said that it became almost a tactical manual for German infantry, and although all captain Laffargue’s ideas were adopted, the Germans developed it further.

In conclusion, the German General Stuff asked the ideas from subordinate units and respected the talents of the enemy, when developing the new tactical doctrine of the army. In addition, they relied on the talent of small-unit commanders, when encouraging them to think critically, and apply tactical principles according to the situation. The ability to listen to the men on the frontline when preparing doctrinal changes made these changes more easily acceptable by subordinate units and fostered the mental flexibility of small-unit commanders. The doctrine was not a set of ultimate formulas, and there was constant need for a good judgment in applying it to the situation. Overall, generals listening to the talented people on all levels is what makes the army great.