Counterinsurgency as a Cultural System

Counterinsurgency as a Cultural System

David B. Edwards

Beginning in 2008, when news of the development of the Human Terrain Systems (HTS) program first came to public attention, a number of anthropologists began a systematic campaign to dismantle the program or at least ensure that it would never receive the imprimatur of legitimacy from professional organizations. Since the premise of HTS was that it would bring the insights of academic anthropology to the practice of military counterinsurgency, what might normally have constituted an irrelevant gesture (like the shy 9th grader deciding that she simply would not to go to the prom with the football captain, even if he asked) had some clout, in that many anthropology graduate students and unemployed PhDs who might otherwise have considered joining the program chose not to join for fear of being black listed and never landing a job in academia.

My own immediate response on hearing of the program was more ambivalent than that of most anthropologists, or at least than that of the ones who spoke out on the topic. As someone who has been studying Afghanistan for three decades, I was not ready to condemn the program out-of-hand. I am friends with many Afghans who would have to flee from their country – once again – if the Taliban came back to power, and I also knew that the US-led military efforts in that country were not only failing to dislodge the Taliban, but were also alienating the civilian population whose support was critical if the Afghan government was to consolidate its authority. Despite vastly superior training, leadership, and weaponry, the American military was gradually losing its grip, and one of the weaknesses of American efforts has been their lack of knowledge of the social context in which they were fighting. The social organization of tribal and non-tribal Afghans, the role of Islam, gender segregation, the protocols of respect and hospitality – these were all matters of central importance to Afghans, and matters of which American soldiers have been largely ignorant.

Read more: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/630-edwards.pdf

Updating close-air support. New doctrine and aircraft are needed for COIN warfare

Updating close-air support. New doctrine and aircraft are needed for COIN warfare

LT. COL Paul Darling and LT. Justin Lawlor

When Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal took command of Afghanistan, one of his first orders severely restricted the use of fixed-wing strike assets in support of combat operations. The newly appointed commander of the International Security Assistance Force, Gen. David Petraeus, has been reluctant to change the order.

The order received much criticism, with many complaining that restricting strike assets posed too great a danger to soldiers on the ground. The order, however, reflected an unspoken reality, namely that the doctrine, structure and airframes currently used for close-air support (CAS) are fundamentally flawed and are an expensive and ineffective framework for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Our current CAS structure is hampering our mission in Afghanistan and reflects a reversal of lessons learned not only by U.S. forces in Vietnam but also by countries around the world engaged in COIN for the past 40 years.

How did we get to the point where the one area where we have unquestioned dominance is deliberately neutered to the point of irrelevance? It wasn’t easy, but fixing it can be. We can not only dominate the air, but effectively use it to our advantage as long as the military acknowledges our current failures, uses an analysis of our successful past and encourages an effort by all service branches to adjust to a post-Cold War environment. We can fight better, cheaper and more effectively only when we understand where we are and from where we came.

Thinking Critically about COIN and Creatively about Strategy and War: An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile

Thinking Critically about COIN and Creatively about Strategy and War: An Interview with Colonel Gian Gentile

Octavian Manea

That has been the whole problem with the COIN narrative that developed at least in US Army circles since the end of the Vietnam War. It was, and is, premised on the idea that the Vietnam War could have been won by better counterinsurgency tactics and operations.

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When General David Petraeus talks of the “right inputs finally being in place” he betrays a deep seated adherence to the COIN narrative that better generals and reinvented armies can rescue failed strategy and policy. Unfortunately, upon inspection history demolishes this myth.

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The warning it should provide is that you should never think that improved tactics, whether it is a conventional or a counterinsurgency war, can rescue a failed strategy or policy. Sun Tzu offers one of the most profound statements on the relationship between tactics and strategy: Strategy without tactics is the slow road to victory, but tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat. Another historical example comes to mind. The German army up to a certain point in WWII was arguably one of the finest tactically fighting armies in history. But it lost. The warning is to be careful how much faith you place in the idea that better tactics can save a failed strategy or policy

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By the way, have we lost Clausewitz in Afghanistan? Because it seems to me that General Petraeus designed a highly integrated comprehensive approach in Afghanistan, one in which economical, civil and military resources are all put in the service of a unified political purpose. All of these things were put together in a sophisticated integrated operational approach which essentially is boiling down to a nation building at the barrel of the gun. Can it work? Sure. But it is not going to take a few years, but multiple years, decades. If one looks to history in the modern world when has a foreign occupying country been successful in this kind of nation building endeavor or operation in a similar context that you have in Afghanistan? I keep using the metaphor of a box - the methods, tactics and techniques of nation building that have come to eclipse consideration of strategy and policy. But if you step out of the box of the tactics and operations of counterinsurgency (which it seems that many folks are locked into) and view things from the level of strategy and say, ok maybe COIN can work in Afghanistan, but it is going to take a very long time that will require a huge commitment of American blood and treasure. Then strategy demands to ask the question of this war relative to what the policy objective given to the military by President Obama is for Afghanistan. And the policy objective, the political objective that was given to the American military by President Obama is actually quite limited. Disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda from using Afghanistan as a base for attacks. Our strategy seems to me out of sorts because we have a maximalist tactical approach to achieve a rather minimalist political objective.

Galula, Thompson and Kitson defined the center of gravity in a COIN campaign as being “the people”. Protecting and controlling the people became also the main emphasis of FM 3-24. Could we find an alternative center of gravity in a COIN campaign?

Absolutely. Let's go back to Clausewitz. He said that the center of gravity is something to be discovered. The problem with FM 3-24 is that it has taken a center of gravity which could; in theory, looking at the strategy, based on the political objective, and judging the alternatives; be the population. But it doesn't have to be. Let me repeat, IT DOESN’T HAVE TO BE. When we make by rule the population as the center of gravity for any counterinsurgency, well, we have just allowed the tactics of population centric COIN to eclipse strategy. We are trapped therefore in the tactics of population centric counterinsurgency. To prove how much the American Army has become locked down by this rule just peruse the issues of the journal Military Review for 2010 and see how much we have accepted the rule that in ANY counterinsurgency the population is the prize, or the center of gravity. This supreme dogmatism seems to me to preside over the death of strategy. When you say that the population is the center of gravity then you derive a certain set of operational methods. And that is Galula: dispersion of troops, as many troops you can get, live out amongst population, do clear hold and build, protect them, inject energy and resources thus trying to win the population over to your side. The problem is that when you make by rule that the population is the center of gravity in any COIN then you have no more strategy since you have excluded other options or alternatives for dealing with the instability or insurgency.

Why are the core principles of the population-centric technology contestable? After all, they are grounded in historical experiences and validated by the history of COIN campaigns-as the best practices in field. They passed the empirical test in Algeria and Malaya.

They didn’t pass Algeria because the French lost. It’s not that you want to devalue the point of not studying them at all - the tactical and operational activity. No. But one must be careful about how far you go with elevating the importance of tactics and operations when France looses a war like in Algeria. And then with Malaya? No. This has been the construction of the counterinsurgency narrative that is premised in a key way on what people think that British did in Malaya and the notion that the British, once they put a better General, Gerald Templer, in command in February 1952, and then he turned his army on a dime and starting doing population centric counterinsurgency correctly (hearts and minds), they focused on population protection, injecting energy and resources and persuasion to bring people over to the government side which in the end, as this story goes, broke the back of the communist insurgents. No. It is wrong. It is not supported by current scholarship or supported by the historical record. In fact the Malayan communist insurgency was broken before even General Templer took command. And it was broken by large scale resettlement of the Malayan Chinese population that severed their physical link with the communist insurgents. So yes the British did win at counterinsurgency in Malaya, but they didn’t win through a population centric hearts and minds counterinsurgency.

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The idea that hearts and minds have been won by foreign occupying powers in modern counterinsurgency war is just simply hokum.

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So I don't buy at all the whole surge triumph narrative, based on a flawed understanding of Vietnam and an equal misunderstanding of Malaya, that the American Army fumbled in Iraq from 2003-2006 but was rescued in 2007 by a better General who armed his army with a new method of COIN (codified in FM 3-24), the American Army was thus reinvented and because of what it did differently that is what produced a lowering of violence in the summer of 2007. No.

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Personally, I think that it should be organized and optimized around the principles of firepower, protection and mobility and not around the principles of nation building, stability operations and counterinsurgency. If you have an army optimized for combined arms warfare it still can do other kinds of missions. However, if you optimize an army to do nation building and small wars it becomes much more problematic to step into the direction of doing fighting at the high end of the spectrum. History shows that this tends to be the case: look at the Israelis in Lebanon in 2006, South Vietnamese Army between 1973 and 1975, and the British Army in the second Boer War. These were all armies that became predominantly focused on counterinsurgencies and small wars and when confronted with a foe that fought them in a sophisticated way they had problems and they paid a heavy price.

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We should absolutely retain the lessons, the experience, the institutional knowledge that we have gained in the last eight or nine years of operations. But we should be aware of one key lesson: we should get beyond tactics and not place our faith in the idea that improvements in techniques and methods will somehow make the problem of strategy go away. It’s just doesn’t work that way. Nor should we think that Iraq and Afghanistan define the face of future war.

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Does the American Army today know how to plan and execute a population centric coin (nation building) campaign? Of course it does. But does it have the capability to plan and execute a movement to contact into Pakistan to secure lose nuclear weapons, or to conduct a strategic raid with ground forces into Yemen to punish tribes associated with al Qaeda, or to conduct an extensive occupation of North Korea after it collapses which will require a good deal of fighting recalcitrant North Korean infantry dug in along the way?

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Read more: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/625-manea.pdf

Hybrid Warfare and Challenges

Hybrid Warfare and Challenges

Frank G. Hoffman

In his classic history, Thucydides detailed the savage 27-year conflict between Sparta and Athens. Sparta was the overwhelming land power of its day, and its hoplites were drilled to perfection. The Athenians, led by Pericles, were the supreme maritime power, supported by a walled capital, a fleet of powerful triremes, and tributary allies.

The Spartan leader, Archidamius, warned his kinsmen about Athens’ relative power, but the Spartans and their supporters would not heed their king. In 431 BCE, the Spartans marched through Attica and ravaged the Athenian country estates and surrounding farms. They encamped and awaited the Athenian heralds and army for what they hoped would be a decisive battle and a short war.

The scarlet-clad Spartans learned the first lesson of military history—the enemy gets a vote. The Athenians elected to remain behind their walls and fight a protracted campaign that played to their strengths and worked against their enemies.  Thucydides’ ponderous tome on the carnage of the Peloponnesian War is an extended history of the operational adaptation of each side as they strove to gain a sustainable advantage over their enemy. These key lessons are, as he intended, a valuable “possession for all time.”

The Second Lebanon War, 2006

In many details, the amorphous Hizballah is representative of the rising hybrid threat. The 34-day battle in southern Lebanon revealed some weaknesses in the posture of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)—but it has implications for American defense planners, too. Mixing an organized political movement with decentralized cells employing adaptive tactics in ungoverned zones, Hizballah showed that it could inflict as well as take punishment. Its highly disciplined, well-trained distributed cells contested ground against a modern conventional force using an admixture of guerrilla tactics and technology in densely packed urban centers. Hizballah, like Islamic extremist defenders in the battles in Fallujah in Iraq during April and November of 2004, skillfully exploited the urban terrain to create ambushes and evade detection and to hold strong defensive fortifications in close proximity to noncombatants.

In the field, Israeli troops grudgingly admitted that the Hizballah defenders were tenacious and skilled. The organized resistance was several orders of magnitude more difficult than counterterrorism operations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. More importantly, the degree of training, fire discipline, and lethal technology demonstrated by Hizballah were much higher.

Tactical combinations and novel applications of technology by the defenders were noteworthy. In particular, the antitank guided missile systems employed by Hizballah against IDF armor and defensive positions, coupled with decentralized tactics, were a surprise. At the battle of Wadi Salouqi, a column of Israeli tanks was stopped in its tracks with telling precision. Hizballah’s antitank weapons include the Russian-made RPG–29, Russian AT–13 Metis, and AT–14 Kornet, which has a range of 3 miles. The IDF found the AT–13 and AT–14 formidable against their first line Merkava Mark IV tank. A total of 18 Merkavas were damaged, and it is estimated that antitank guided missiles accounted for 40 percent of IDF fatalities. Here we see the blurring of conventional systems with irregular forces and nontraditional tactics.

Hizballah even managed to launch a few armed unmanned aerial vehicles, which required the IDF to adapt in order to detect them. These included either the Iranian Mirsad-1 or Ababil-3 Swallow. These concerned Israeli strategists given their global positioning system– based navigational system, 450-kilometer range, and 50-kilogram explosive carrying capacity. There is evidence that Hizballah invested in signals intelligence and monitored IDF cell phone calls for some time, as well as unconfirmed reports that they managed to decrypt IDF radio traffic. The defenders also seemed to have advanced surveillance systems and very advanced night vision equipment. Hizballah’s use of C802 antiship cruise missiles against an Israeli missile ship represents another sample of what “hybrid warfare” might look like, which is certainly relevant to naval analysts as well.

Perhaps Hizballah’s unique capability is its inventory of 14,000 rockets. Many of these are relatively inaccurate older models, but thanks to Iranian or Syrian support, they possess a number of missile systems that can reach deep into Israel. They were used both to terrorize the civilian population and to attack Israel’s military infrastructure. Hizballah managed to fire over 4,100 rockets into Israel between July 12 and August 13, culminating with 250 rockets on the final day, the highest total of the war. Most of these were short range and inaccurate, but they achieved strategic effects both in the physical domain, by forcing Israel to evacuate tens of thousands of citizens, and in the media, by demonstrating their ability to lash back at the region’s most potent military.

Ralph Peters, who visited Lebanon during the fighting, observed that Hizballah displayed impressive flexibility, relying on the ability of cellular units to combine rapidly for specific operations or, when cut off, to operate independently after falling in on prepositioned stockpiles of weapons and ammunition. Hizballah’s combat cells were a hybrid of guerrillas and regular troops—a form of opponent that U.S. forces are apt to encounter with increasing frequency.

Compound Wars

Historians have noted that many if not most wars are characterized by both regular and irregular operations. When a significant degree of strategic coordination between separate regular and irregular forces in conflicts occurs, they can be considered “compound wars.” Compound wars are those major wars that had significant regular and irregular components fighting simultaneously under unified direction. The complementary effects of compound warfare are generated by its ability to exploit the advantages of each kind of force and increase the nature of the threat posed by each kind of force. The irregular force attacks weak areas, compelling a conventional opponent to disperse his security forces. The conventional force generally induces the adversary to concentrate for defense or to achieve critical mass for decisive offensive operations.

One can see this in the American Revolution, when George Washington’s more conventional troops stood as a force in being for much of the war, while the South Carolina campaign was characterized by militia and some irregular combat. The Napoleonic era is frequently viewed in terms of its massive armies marching back and forth across Europe. But the French invasion of Spain turned into a quagmire, with British regulars contesting Napoleon’s control of the major cities, while the Spanish guerrillas successfully harassed his lines of communication. Here again, strategic coordination was achieved, but overall in different battlespaces.

Likewise, the American Civil War is framed by famous battles at Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Antietam. Yet partisan warfare and famous units like John Mosby’s 43d Virginia Cavalry provided less conventional capabilities as an economy of force operation. T.E. Lawrence’s role as an advisor to the Arab revolt against the Ottomans is another classic case of compound war, which materially assisted General Edmund Allenby’s thrusts with the British Expeditionary Force against Jerusalem and Damascus. But here again, Lawrence’s raiders did not fight alongside the British; they were strategically directed by the British and supplied with advisors, arms, and gold only. Vietnam is another classic case of the strategic synergy created by compound wars, posing the irregular tactics of the Viet Cong with the more conventional capabilities of the North Vietnamese army. The ambiguity between conventional and unconventional approaches vexed military planners for several years. Even long afterward, Americans debated what kind of war they actually fought and lost.

Hybrid Wars

As difficult as compound wars have been, the operational fusion of conventional and irregular capabilities in hybrid conflicts may be even more complicated. Compound wars offered synergy and combinations at the strategic level, but not the complexity, fusion, and simultaneity we anticipate at the operational and even tactical levels in wars where one or both sides is blending and fusing the full range of methods and modes of conflict into the battlespace. Irregular forces in cases of compound wars operated largely as a distraction or economy of force measure in a separate theater or adjacent operating area including the rear echelon. Because it is based on operationally separate forces, the compound concept did not capture the merger or blurring modes of war identified in past case studies such as Hizballah in the second Lebanon war of 2006 or future projections.

Thus, the future does not portend a suite of distinct challengers into separate boxes of a matrix chart. Traditional conflict will still pose the most dangerous form of human conflict, especially in scale. With increasing probability, however, we will face adversaries who blur and blend the different methods or modes of warfare. The most distinctive change in the character of modern war is the blurred or blended nature of combat. We do not face a widening number of distinct challenges but their convergence into hybrid wars.

These hybrid wars blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare. In such conflicts, future adversaries (states, state-sponsored groups, or self-funded actors) will exploit access to modern military capabilities, including encrypted command systems, man-portable air-to-surface missiles, and other modern lethal systems, as well as promote protracted insurgencies that employ ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and coercive assassinations. This could include states blending high-tech capabilities such as antisatellite weapons with terrorism and cyber warfare directed against financial targets.

Implications

The rise of hybrid warfare does not represent the end of traditional or conventional warfare. But it does present a complicating factor for defense planning in the 21st century. The implications could be significant. John Arquilla of the Naval Postgraduate School has noted, “While history provides some useful examples to stimulate strategic thought about such problems, coping with networks that can fight in so many different ways—sparking myriad, hybrid forms of conflict—is going to require some innovative thinking.”

Tomorrow’s conflicts will not be easily categorized into conventional or irregular. The emerging character of conflict is more complicated than that. A binary choice of big and conventional versus small or irregular is too simplistic. The United States cannot imagine all future threats as state-based and completely conventional, nor should it assume that state-based conflict has passed into history’s dustbin. Many have made that mistake before. State-based conflict is less likely, but it is not extinct. But neither should we assume that all state-based warfare will be entirely conventional. As this article suggests, the future poses combinations and mergers of the various methods available to our antagonists. Numerous security analysts have acknowledged the blurring of lines between modes of war. Hybrid challengers have passed from a concept to a reality, thanks to Hizballah.

Read more: http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqhoffman.pdf

The goal and objectives in the US AFPAK policy

The goal and objectives in the US AFPAK policy

Following the August 2009 national election in Afghanistan, President Obama led a strategic review or the overall U.S. policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. On December 1, 2009, in a speech at West Point, New York, the President reaffirmed his goal in Afghanistan and Pakistan to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida and its extremist allies and prevent their return to either country. In support of that goal, there are eight objectives that form the framework for our quarterly assessments. The eight supporting objectives, along with the lead responsible departments are:

I. Disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks. (Office of the Director of National Intelligence);

II. Please see the classified annex for details concerning this objective;

III. Assist efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan. (Department of State);

IV. Develop Pakistan counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities; continue to support Pakistan's efforts to defeat terrorist and insurgent groups. (Department of Defense);

V. Involve the international community more actively to forge an international consensus to stabilize Pakistan. (Department of State);

VI. In Afghanistan reverse the Taliban's momentum and build Afghan National Security Force capability so that we can begin to transition responsibility for security to the Afghan Government and decrease our troop presence by July 2011. (Department of Defense);

VII. Selectively build the capacity of the Afghan Government which enables Afghans to assume responsibility in the four-step process of clear – hold – build - transfer.(Department of State);

VIII. Involve the international community more actively to forge an international consensus to stabilize Afghanistan. (Department of State).

Classified Annex

Details concerning progress in our objective to "disrupt terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terrorist attacks" are included within the classified annex. An eighth objective (Objective II) is classified entirely and fully discussed in the classified annex.

Read more: http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/wh-afpak.pdf

A Well Worn Path: The Soviet and American Approaches to the Critical Tasks of Counter Insurgency

A Well Worn Path: The Soviet and American Approaches to the Critical Tasks of Counter Insurgency

Bart Howard

The conflict in Afghanistan is clearly at the top of the list of U.S. foreign policy challenges. Each year more and more resources are committed to the effort to stabilize and secure Afghanistan. The cost of this effort is more than just monetary. U.S. “blood and treasure” is being spilled as Americans debate the potential success or failure in this enigmatic and distant country. Soon all discussion and debate will intensify on the concept of “transition” sometime in the near future.

Afghanistan has been called a “graveyard of empires” because of the long list of nations that have previously attempted to conduct military campaigns that have ended in failure. 1 The most recent super power to wage a counterinsurgency in Afghanistan was the Soviet Union, which fought an expensive and costly campaign spanning from 1979-1989. Although Russia committed billions of dollars and lost thousands lives in the undertaking, the resulting withdraw and eventual collapse of the Afghan government was perceived as a humiliating defeat for Russia.

After nearly a decade of very mixed results, the United States must ask the inevitable question, is this working? Although the records of other nation’s adventures in Afghanistan are dismal, it does not mean that history will merely repeat itself, but it does bring to light the importance of looking at the efforts of the current campaign in Afghanistan through the lens of history. The experience of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan should not be dismissed; in fact it should be seriously examined to reveal if there are key lessons that can be gleaned in the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign.

How did the Soviet Union and the United States approach two critical tasks in conducting a counterinsurgency; Denying sanctuary to insurgents and Building effective host nation forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations?

Read more: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/612-howard.pdf  

3-D Soviet Style: Lessons Learned from the Soviet Experience in Afghanistan

3-D Soviet Style: Lessons Learned from the Soviet Experience in Afghanistan

Anton Minkov, Ph.D.

Gregory Smolynec. Ph.D.

3-D Soviet Style examines the evolution of Soviet strategy in Afghanistan from the initial invasion to the withdrawal of Soviet combat forces in 1989. The paper analyzes Soviet efforts in building Afghan security forces. It includes information on Soviet counterinsurgency practices in Afghanistan and on the adjustments the Soviets made to their force structure and equipment in response to the exigencies of the operational situations they faced. It examines the Soviet approach to civil affairs in their Afghan operations, and outlines the state-building efforts the Soviets undertook in Afghanistan as well as their social and economic policies. The paper also examines the policy of “National Reconciliation” adopted by the pro-Soviet government of Afghanistan to stabilize the country. Among other lessons from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan that can be applied in the current situation, the paper stresses that engaging and enfranchising local populations and power centres is of critical importance; that the economic stability and independence of Afghanistan is a key element in successful state-building; that successive battlefield victories do not guarantee strategic success and that building Afghan security forces is vital. The movement of insurgents and materiel across the Afghan - Pakistan border is a paramount strategic problem.

Read more: http://www.thecornwallisgroup.org/pdf/CXII_2007_13_Minkov.pdf

Mission Command —A Multifaceted Construct

Mission Command —A Multifaceted Construct

Richard N. Pedersen 

Mission Command is emerging as a multifaceted construct that integrates the functions and techniques of the art and science employed during the exercise of command authority over missions applying military and other instruments of national power.

The Army Operating Concept (AOC) defines mission command as the exercise of authority and direction by commanders and their staffs to integrate the warfighting functions using the operations process and mission orders to accomplish successful full-spectrum operations. This is a dramatic expansion of how Army doctrine previously defined mission command—the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders. This new definition is expected to be incorporated into the forthcoming FM 3-0 update.

The central idea expressed in the Mission Command Army Functional Concept (MC AFC), a derivative of the AOC, is that mission command fosters mutual trust, encourages initiative, and empowers lower echelons with the combined arms capabilities and authority to fight for information, create opportunities, and exploit advantage consistent with the commander’s intent and concept for accomplishing the mission. Although this describes the benefits of the new mission command, its net effect is to renew emphasis on existing ideas.

The outlook is that mission command is fundamentally the exercise of power to determine, adjudicate, or otherwise settle issues revolving around the warfighting functions during the conduct of the operations process. Currently, the Army’s warfighting functions line up directly with the six joint functions described in JP 3-0. The Army sees the newly defined mission command as an evolved concept encompassing both the Army’s philosophy of command and the integrating function that effectively combines all warfighting functional capabilities.

Army Supporting Ideas for Mission Command:

1) Empower the lowest possible echelon

2) Become skilled in the art of design

3) Educate and train leaders for an uncertain and complex operational environment

Army Tenants for Mission Command:

1) Mutual trust, understanding, and dutiful initiative

2) Decentralized decision-making

3) Decentralized combined arms capabilities

4) Adaptive, bold, audacious, and imaginative leaders

5) Well-trained, cohesive units

6) Nerve and restraint

7) Calculated risk

Marine Corps Key Ideas for Mission Command:

1) Decentralized decision making

2) Mission tactics

3) Human approach: boldness, initiative, personality, strength of will, imagination

4) Commanders forward

5) Shared danger and privation

6) Professional trust

7) Familiar relationships

8) Ability to thrive in chaos, uncertainty, and friction

Read more: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/602-pedersen.pdf

Closing Ranks

Closing Ranks

Leslie Susser

A series of critical reports points to the Israel Defense Forces failures in the second war in Lebanon, citing poor professional training, mistaken military philosophy and misguided values and principles.

 

(The Jerusalem Report. January 8, 2007)

From time to time raised voices could be heard in the corridor outside the conference room at the Israel Defense Forces headquarters in Tel Aviv, where the General Staff was discussing a report on its performance during the recent Lebanon war. The report, by Maj. Gen. Udi Shani, was damning, starting with the charge that Chief of Staff Dan Halutz had gone into the war against Hizballah without a plan for the ground forces, with ill-defined war aims and poorly formulated orders of battle…

Devastating as it was, the Shani report did not deal with the IDF as such, but only with the way the generals conducted the war. A similar presentation the week before, by a former head of the Northern Command, Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amiram Levin, had touched on much deeper structural and conceptual issues. The military philosophy of the past five years, he declared, had been a resounding failure. The army had been lulled into over-reliance on high-tech firepower and information technology at the expense of classic fighting values, including those the IDF had once excelled at, like large-scale land maneuver and officers leading from the front.

Winning in Afghanistan

Winning in Afghanistan

Ali A. Jalali

Seven years into the US-led effort to bring peace and stability to Afghan­istan, the mission is on the verge of failing. This unsettling new reality is the result of key international and Afghan actors having for years pur­sued a narrow strategy focused almost exclusively on short-term goals at the expense of a broader and more cohesive strategy. Afghanistan, conse­quently, is now plagued by a threat environment shaped and sustained by an expanding insurgency, widespread criminality, ineffective governance, and the absence of a coordinated response to continuing challenges. Vio­lence inside the country has risen steadily since 2006, and in 2008 levels of violence in Afghanistan exceeded levels of violence in Iraq.

The absence of a shared vision for Afghanistan has blurred the dis­tinction between means and ends. Means have too often defined goals, tactics too often driven strategy, supply too often determined demands, and short-term necessities too often took precedence over long-term priorities. This failed vision has also led many to question whether the US-led operation is aimed at securing Afghanistan, reshaping the whole of South Asia, or sim­ply setting the conditions for a responsible exit plan. American policymak­ers have undertaken several assessments of their Afghanistan strategy since last summer, and nearly all have found that the United States and the rest of the international community are guilty of setting unrealistic or shortsighted goals for the nation. In light of the current situation, the United States needs to take the lead in developing policies designed to reinforce any long-term stability in Afghanistan. These policies should be focused, coherent, and shared by all the actors, and they need to be targeted at freeing Afghanistan from the vicious cycle of insecurity, insurgency, impunity, and corruption in which it is trapped. Any continuation of the shortsighted efforts of the past seven years will lead international actors and the Afghan government to certain failure. This article looks at specific strategic challenges facing Af­ghanistan and presents ways in which leaders might transition to sustainable policies that will make peace and stability realistically obtainable.

Read more: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/09spring/jalali.pdf

Counterinsurgency 3.0

Counterinsurgency 3.0

Peter Charles Choharis and James A. Gavrilis

After eight years of war, more than 907 Americans dead and 4,400 wound­ed, and $227 billion in aid from the United States alone, Afghanistan was “deteriorating” badly, according to the NATO International Security As­sistance Force (ISAF) commander, General Stanley McChrystal, in an Au­gust 2009 report to the Secretary of Defense. Although General McChrystal has been more optimistic of late, the fact remains that the Taliban’s reach is more extensive now than at any time since being expelled from Kabul eight years ago. They have shadow governors in every province except Kabul. People turn to Taliban courts rather than state courts for justice in many parts of Afghanistan. And many Afghans prefer the Taliban’s austerity over the Karzai government’s corruption and incompetence. Why?

Why have the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies, who just a few years ago were reviled by the vast majority of Afghans for their brutality and fa­naticism, grown in strength and popularity during nearly a decade of US and international assistance? More broadly, why has massive international de­velopment assistance in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere failed to defeat the grip of extremist ideologies among many people who have benefited from billions of dollars worth of aid? Is it even possible for international develop­ment aid to help defeat radical Islam and other ideologies hostile to the West and, if so, how?

This article explains how civilian and military policy-makers have in­correctly assumed that international development aid is inherently beneficial to local populations; necessarily fosters stability; and invariably leads to a grateful populace that will shun insurgents, thereby advancing US strategic goals. The article posits that using international aid to combat radical Is­lamic insurgencies is more complex than aid advocates assume and outlines a different conception of what constitutes development. Finally, it explains how small-scale, micro-development based on corporate social responsibil­ity practices, rather than traditional foreign aid, will have the greatest and most enduring impact against Islamic insurgencies. Such an approach most effectively inculcates beliefs and institutionalizes behaviors that are conge­nial to the West while being sensitive to local conditions.

Read more: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/2010spring/40-1-2010_choharisAndGavrilis.pdf

ISAF (COIN) Mission Specific Training Guidelines

ISAF (COIN) Mission Specific Training Guidelines

COMISAF Assessment

COMISAF's initial assessment of his Command identified it as 'a conventional force that is poorly configured for COIN, inexperienced in local languages and culture, and struggling with challenges inherent to coalition warfare' adding that 'these intrinsic disadvantages are exacerbated by our current operational culture and how we operate' where 'pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us - physically and psychologically - from the people we seek to protect' and thus risk 'strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage’.

Existing approaches have, in some cases, contributed to a garrison posture and mentality that limits the effectiveness of NATO forces. COMISAF has directed that ISAF will change its operating culture to pursue a counterinsurgency approach that puts the Afghan people first. Understanding the environment, protecting the people and building relationships are necessary to defeat the insurgency - defined in this case by reducing it to a level where it no longer threatens the viability of the state.

Counterinsurgency operations require a different attitude of mind to that needed for conventional operations. Even though there will be times when troops are involved in intensive war fighting, for the most part, different low level tactics and procedures are required. More important than this is the mindset with which the troops carrying out counterinsurgency operations approach those tasks and the understanding they have for the overall aims and objectives. This implies that education and training have to reflect that different approach to operations. Furthermore, since the population is at the centre of gravity of much of what counterinsurgency hopes to achieve, it follows that cultural understanding has to be integrated to all training for such operations.

COIN Education

It has been said that we should train for the expected, educate for the unexpected. Whilst behaviors can be modified through training, education at all levels will be required to effect the change in culture from conventional to COIN operations, characterized by courageous restraint balanced with an offensive spirit. COMISAF identified 5 themes in his assessment which inform the COIN Mindset and need to be repeated and reinforced during all educational activities:

• The COIN Centre of Gravity is the will of the people

• Conventional Warfare culture is part of the problem

• Afghans must ultimately defeat the insurgency

• Need improved Unity of Effort

• Protecting the people means shielding them from all threats

COIN Training Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)

AJP 3.2 describes military activities as either Offensive, Defensive, Stabilization or Enabling. All of these activities will be employed during a COIN Campaign, in many cases simultaneously, and each must be viewed through the 'lens' of COIN attributes. This implies that if the operation is a counterinsurgency the training for all military activities should be considered with a COIN mindset - COIN Training is first and foremost an approach to training not just a selected subset of TTPs that can be ‘bolted on’. All training must be managed to highlight the NATO COIN attributes, or principles, which are:

• Political primacy

• A struggle for the population, not against the population

• The relevance of legitimacy

• The importance of intelligence

• Unity of effort

• Neutralize the insurgency and isolate insurgents from their support

• Prepare for a protracted campaign

• Security under the rule of law is essential

• Hand over reponsibility to the local forces as soon as practicable

• Learn and adapt quickly

Recent Guidance from COMISAF in theatre and amendments to the ACO Force Standards have indicated that certain key activities are essential for mission success in a COIN environment. This guidance emphasises training of language and cultures; knowledge of the ‘Human Terrain”; key leadership engagement (KLE); negotiation skills; information and knowledge management – both to facilitate a learning organization and enhance ISR and HUMINT; ANSF detainee processing; civil-military unity of effort – cooperative structures; Tactical Directives for CAS operations; and decentralized operations.

The educated COIN mindset must be applied when conducting these activities, many of which are at the tactical level. Existing NATO centralized training does not reach out to all of the forces that must be trained in these activities, thus Nations must make sure that these areas are addressed, with a COIN mindset, in National Pre-Deployment Training. These areas are introduced below, and amplified in the attached Annexes.

The Annexes include an opening statement cross-referencing to the points contained in COMISAF’S COIN Training Guidance issued in Nov 2009 (which are not limited/confined to specific annexes as their implications reach across a number of areas). NATO will continue to develop concepts and materials in these priority areas.

Specific areas for Improvement

Joint Land Operations Training for a COIN environment. Traditionally military forces have adopted either Manoeuvrist or attrition based approaches that are focused on the enemy. Counter Insurgency, as practiced in Afghanistan, is different because it is not focused on the enemy, but on the population. The purpose of Joint Land Operations in a COIN environment is to secure the population and thus neutralise the insurgents. Training for offensive and stabilisation activities, including security and control operations normally associated with ‘Peace Support Operations’, must be conducted with the right COIN Mindset. Operations are distributed and junior commanders are key. This will ensure that forces train as they are expected to operate in theatre, with partners. Further details and specific References are at Annex B.

Integrated Financial Operations Training. Integrated Financial Operations (IFO) is the name given to the method by which financial resources are used to achieve tactical and operational effects and/or mitigate adverse effects of ISAF operations on the civilian population. Nations who do not engage in IFO must nonetheless be aware of the impact of IFO in theatre, and the availability of Finance. Further details and specific References are at Annex C.

Training to Understand the People of Afghanistan. Individuals require an understanding of the operational environment that is appropriate to their role. This includes an understanding of the roles of other actors in the AOO; knowledge of the role of the International Community, NGOs and other agencies; knowledge of other NATO Coalition Forces (CF), composition and caveats and thorough knowledge of the ANSF composition and lay-down. However, the Afghan people must be the priority in a population centric campaign. This begins with local history, religion, culture, customs, and laws. Training should include a clear understanding of the essential nature and nuances of the conflict and of the motives, strengths and weak points of the parties involved. Further details and specific references are at Annex D.

Strategic Communications Training. Today’s military operations to counter the complex challenges of the global security environment require consideration and integration of the information factor throughout all processes. This integration demands that all decision-makers at all times appropriately understand the (possible) effects of their actions in the information environment; it is not just about deliberate activity using information through means of communication, it is the combination of words and deeds that delivers the ultimate effect. A systemic understanding of the information environment is vital in COIN. This is a new mind-set, which requires comprehensive education and training of all aspects of Strategic Communications. Further details and specific references are at Annex E

Civil-Military Training for a COIN Environment. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is an important cornerstone of the overall COIN strategy. Designated functional CIMIC specialists alone cannot deliver comprehensive effects in a COIN campaign. They rely on integrated CIV-MIL structures and comprehensive plans to be effective. In practice, all military service members supporting partnered and integrated CIV-MIL planning and operations perform the function of CIMIC. Further details and specific references are at Annex F.

Training for Embedded Partnering in a COIN Environment. Embedded Partnering (EbP) has emerged as an effective option in furthering Military Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) or Security Force Assistance (SFA). EbP goes further than existing doctrine and promotes the development of a habitual relationship, at all levels, between ANSF and ISAF which must pervade all aspects of an ANSF unit’s daily routine. This is accomplished through mutual cooperation and responsibility for planning, preparation, execution and post operational assessments. Partnering properly at all levels requires specific training. Further details and specific references are at Annex G.

Communication and Information Systems Training for COIN. In order to fully understand the implications of an integrated C2 system, all individuals should not only be trained in their individual competence, but need to understand and use the in-theatre Communication and Information System (CIS), Information Management (IM) and Exchange (IX) structures at the national and multinational levels. A thorough understanding of, and experience with the software applications and the CIS and it capacities/shortfalls, available within the respective Command is vital to manage information more efficiently and allows for the effective exploitation of information. Further details and specific references are at Annex H.

Intelligence Training for a COIN Environment. The function of intelligence in COIN is to facilitate a greater understanding of the operational environment. This requires a broader concept of actionable intelligence that relies on everyone being a collector; the focus shifting from being enemy centric to becoming population centric. Actionable intelligence in Afghanistan is not only focused on the adversary, but also what has changed in the operating environment, and what do those changes mean? Building a comprehensive understanding of the complex operating environment, and understanding what constitutes actionable intelligence, only comes over time and only if all actors persistently and pervasively operate among the people. Further details and specific references are at Annex I.

Training in Joint Fire Support and Targeting for a COIN Environment. The ability to call in both ground and air fire support is a critical task, as well as understanding when it is, or isn’t, appropriate to use force, even though legally permissible. While insurgent actions cause the most significant amount of civilian casualties (CIVCAS), fire support has been identified as one of the three types of operations that have also resulted in significant CIVCAS. Commanders, HQs, Units and operators (i.e. FACs) involved in the joint fires/targeting process must apply the COIN mindset and effectively select the proper combination of lethal/non-lethal actions to achieve the desired effects. NATO and multilateral opportunities must be explored in order to ensure the necessary training. Further details and specific references are at Annex J.

COIN Posture and Force Protection Measures Training. Force Protection must be balanced with the wider objective of protecting the people. Aggressive driving and other actions, meant to keep potential attackers at bay, alienate NATO and Coalition Forces from the people and have caused civilian casualties which threaten mission success. Courageous restraint and tactical patience might, at times, provide better Force Protection and support the mission. Revision of In-Theatre SOPs and TTPs are changing this posture by introducing more measured risks into our FP practices, including reducing the amount of PPE worn, and these must be thoroughly integrated into all training activities. Further details and specific references are at Annex K.

Legal Training in the COIN Context. The legal spectrum of COIN considerations is often more complex and demanding than in any other operational setting. In a COIN environment, the LEGAD must supplement a classical analysis of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) with, amongst other matters, human rights considerations, the legal considerations (including training methodology) of complex partnering with military and non-military agencies, both within and outside a Host Nation, and with a rule of law mindset. Further details and specific references are at Annex L.

Creating a COIN Learning Organisation. Troops deployed to Afghanistan have to be prepared to engage in COIN operations from the very first moment on. However, once they are in theatre, the learning does not stop but continues on a daily basis. Learning and sharing new knowledge and intelligence quickly is paramount to successful operations in a COIN environment. Further details and specific references are at Annex M.

Special Operations Training for a COIN Environment. MC 437/1 defines three principal tasks for NATO Special Operations Forces: (1) Direct Action (DA); (2) Special Reconnaissance (SR); and (3) Military Assistance (MA). However, unless ISAF SOF TCNs have a clear understanding of COIN and the align their pre-deployment training and intheatre activities with the tenants found in this MSTG and the references listed, they will not effectively support COMISAF operational objectives. Further details and specific references are at Annex N.

COIN Training Resources and References. There has been a huge amount of work, at many levels both within the NATO Command Structure and in Nations to produce documentation and direction for the successful prosecution of the COIN Campaign in Afghanistan. By maintaining a list of applicable reference material in one place, and updating it on a systematic basis, new direction and best practices can be shared and exploited. It is intended that these references will be made available, on Unclassified systems where possible, to provide a resource for all those who have an interest in improving the quality and standardisation of training. This annex must be a living document and contributions are invited. An initial list is at Annex O.

CONCLUSION

These Mission Specific Training Guidelines advocate a NATO COIN training philosophy that requires the implementation of a COIN mindset to all training activity for ISAF, be it for offensive, defensive, stabilization or enabling tactical activities.

These guidelines are fixed in the Afghan campaign context but are equally relevant for collective training at operational (NATO) and tactical (National) levels, and for individual education and training (from whatever provider) for all ranks. They will continue to develop through contributions from Theatre and national best practice. Existing training and training support activities should be reviewed with these guidelines in mind, with particular attention paid to the topics addressed in the Annexes.

Read more: https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/ACTIPT/JOUIPT/CounterIns/BiSCCOINTr/file/_WFS/IMSM-0489-2010_ENG_NU_COIN%20MSTG%20and%20Impl%20Plan.pdf