Mission Command: Questions for the Army Personnel System

Mission Command:  Questions for the Army Personnel System

Don Vandergriff

So, how do we create strategic corporals, strategic lieutenants, strategic majors, and strategic colonels?  The trick is to instill a culture like the one embodied in the Army’s new TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept Operational Adaptability—Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict.[1]  The emphasis is on evolving toward the practice and culture of Mission Command.  The essence of this approach is to ensure that we lead through Auftragstaktik, a German word that implies that once everyone understands the commanders’ intent (two levels up), then people are free to and indeed duty-bound to use their creativity and initiative to accomplish their missions within the intent. Within such an environment, teams will largely self-organize within the doctrinal framework to accomplish the mission. Such a military culture that supports Mission Command takes time to develop, must be embraced across the entire spectrum of the Army, practiced in every institution—operational and generating forces—while decrees from above cannot magically decentralize operations conducted by Adaptive leaders.[2]

“Adaptability” is a somewhat elusive term and its meaning can vary between two extremes. Adaptation can be passive or dynamic, or one can be either shaped by or shape the situation to his or her own advantage.  Innovation, being able to “think on one’s feet” and “improvise” is a prerequisite for dynamic, but not passive adaptability.  Thus, to develop Dynamically Adaptive Leaders, the Army must develop Innovative ones first, which is a very tall order and suggests why the “Journey” will be time consuming and less than straightforward. Developing Innovative, Adaptive Leaders forces two very basis questions:  What Leader attributes should Army development efforts address and How is the Army going to grow them? 

STUCK IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE

What does a culture that embraces Mission Command look like?  The U.S. Army has developed the most proficient training doctrine in the world. We are very good at skills training. It has also established a personnel system very good at supporting a mobilization based strategy fighting a linear war.  How does this translate to Mission Command?  First it is important to describe briefly the current culture in which the personnel system serves as its foundation.  In a complex system, everything has side effects.  History teaches us that centralized planning and control can’t be made to work (think Politburo). Things in isolation don’t work the way they do in context. Yet, this is how the majority of our personnel management are conducted.[3]

Today’s personnel system is a descendent of the industrial revolution (a descendant of the Cartesian worldview) and the corresponding machine metaphor is still the prevailing mindset. In this approach Soldiers are not craftsmen who master their art, but are instead considered mere technicians who perform rote tasks. The objective is not to invest them with any real abstract knowledge or skills that make them too valuable so they can be easily replaced. Yet, the Army at war is a craft organization. While at peace the Army has thrived on procedures and standard operating procedures, checklists and compliance. Upon the onset of conflict the organization becomes one where outcomes matter more than procedures, where initiative and creativity trump doctrine, where the ability to apply abstract knowledge to unforeseen circumstances trumps checklists and processes.[4]

In peacetime, you can afford to treat machine parts and drones (or conscripts) shabbily, but not craftsmen who possess the ability to apply their art. If you treat them badly they are likely to leave and take their talents elsewhere. In a machine the parts are interchangeable, but craftsmen are not. It is in the interest of current culture to have its members be as interchangeable as possible-- it makes those who manage the process jobs easier. How many times have you heard, "Any major will do, and the preferences of the officer are not important. Don't like it? Retire or resign." The notion of tailoring a career path to the talents, much less the interests, of the officer corps is terrifying to today’s culture. That looks like a load of nonstandard work. Machines don't like that.[5]

In fact we will remain in an Era of Persistent Conflict.[6] This is why there is the call for change from so many levels. Leaders at all levels recognize that while the Army is very good at process, recipes, format and application of skills, it must improve at adaptability. We have discovered over the last 9 years of war that the emphasis on skills, however, is for naught if the leaders lack the power of decision.  This latter factor, in turn, must be ascribed to three aspects of our emerging learning doctrine - the cult of decisiveness, the coup d'oeil, and the habit of leading from the front—in order for Mission Command to succeed.

Network enabled mission command will require an institutional culture that fosters trust among commanders, encourages initiative, and expects leaders to take prudent risk and make decisions based on incomplete information.  Network enabled mission command will also require commanders, staffs, and logisticians who understand the complexities of the emerging operational environment, as well as the highly-integrated joint, multinational, and interagency characteristics of full spectrum operations.[7]

Resolute action is consequently of first importance in war.  Every individual, from the highest commander to the lowest soldier, must always remember that supine inaction and neglect of opportunities will entail severer censure than an error in conception of the choice of means.  All leaders must be imbued with the idea that absence or delay in making a decision is to be considered worse than decisive action, even one erroneous in the choice of means.  These sentences embrace Mission Command as called for in 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept because they are an explicit expression of an emerging belief that imperfect action at the right moment is far better than more deliberate activity after the opportunity had been lost.

Making bold decisions, however, is not the same as making good decisions.  The outcome of the decisions made by future leaders operating under Mission Command will be partially ascribed to their relentless development as well as identifying the opportunities given to them by the enemy.  Leaders must be prepared to respond to local opportunities. Leaders grown up under Mission Command will show a degree of tactical judgment that is not present in leadership developed under Industrial or Linear learning models.  Credit for this will be placed squarely at the feet of the emerging learning doctrine of Army leaders.  In particular, the soundness of future decisions made by Army leaders will be considered the result of what the emerging learning concept will embrace called the applicatory method.[8]

Generally associated with the late 19th century Prussian general Julius von Verdy du Vernois, the applicatory method sought to teach tactics by means of problems.  Some of the problems were simple - the tactical decision game (Planspiel or Planübung) was based on a sketch map and a one or two page scenario.  Others were more complicated - the rigid wargame contained enough charts and tables to gladden the heart of any present day board wargamer and the staff ride could last for days.  Whatever particular techniques were used - in most cases there was a mixture of many - the applicatory method was based on a solid consensus about the teaching of tactics.  Tactics was not a science to be taught be means of theory, or a simple task to be explained by lists of rule or acronyms.  Rather, it was an art to be learned by doing.[9]

The highest attainment of conducting Mission Command and taught through the applicatory method was what Frederick the Great called the coup d'oiel  - the ability to size up a tactical situation at a glance and, within seconds, begin to give the necessary orders.[10]  Coup d'oiel  is, in the blinking of an eye, being able to determine the general tactical situation.  Warfare against Hybrid opponents is creating circumstances never seen before.  As a result, innovation cannot be a step or series of steps that leader to a static outcome, but rather as a continuous ceaseless process of change and adaptation impelled not merely by technology, but also by the nature of the battlefield and of the enemy.  Today’s combat offers fleeting opportunities that disappear quickly if leaders—from general to rifleman—fail to grasp them.[11]

Mission Command demands that when necessary, all arms—combat or maneuver support—as well as civilians, should coordinate and act together even without direction from above.  The result will be an evolving command style that forces leaders and commanders to focus their attention downward and outward onto the battlefield.  The limited information flow of information up the chain of command will compel them to see for themselves, to lead from the front.

Today’s personnel system is an entirely highly centralized model—control from the top downward, from Army to battalion, company/team and platoon levels, even at the Soldier level, are touched by the centralized technological ability to manage all through information technology laid over an Industrial age force structure both in the operating and generating forces.  This “schematism” is a culture which forces commanders at every level inevitably focus not on what is happening on the battlefield but rather on providing information to those above them in the chain of command.

The evolving personnel system should encourage tomorrow’s Soldiers and leaders to devolve creative freedom and authority upon their juniors—an unprecedented and largely counterintuitive step. And those juniors—who include non-commissioned officers and civilians—require relentless schooling, training and encouragement in preparing to use that freedom under Mission Command wisely. The uncompromising goal of a new personnel system is to make each individual member of the Army a person who, in character, capability, and knowledge, is self-reliant, self confident, dedicated and joyful in taking responsibility as a person and a leader.

Instead, since the end of the Cold War, the Army has evolved its force structure to support current operations and national security strategy.   As the world situation changed, the Army evolved its readiness strategy through unit stabilization polices and force structure through modularity, but has not fully addressed how these new demands affect its Human Capital -- Soldiers.

The adaptation of Mission Command increases demands for responsibility and innovation at the NCO and junior officer level, and will force Civilians to step up as well. These demands place a greater premium on (1) adaptability to emergent situations, (2) operating with and within joint, interagency, and multinational organizations, (3) rapid responsiveness, and (4) the mental and physical agility to capitalize on opportunities in the field.  Key to the Army’s adjustment is the ability of personnel systems to support developing and empowering adaptability in individuals for operations in the future complex environment.  Additionally, these personnel systems must sustain the All Volunteer Force over presistant conflict and beyond.  The increasing demands of life long service in the profession of arms will strain individuals and the personnel systems that support them. 

Systems and procedures that empower individuals under Mission Command are essential to encouraging continued service and professional development.  This will require innovative and flexible ways of using personnel while Soldiers must expect to have different kinds of careers than previous and current Army senior leaders experienced. Evolutions in the way Soldiers are promoted, assigned and educated will bring about changes in the Army culture that will sustain the All Volunteer Force in the future complex operational environment. 

While current personnel systems have served the Army and its Soldiers well, it is unclear whether these systems will hold up under the strain of the “Long War” and transformation of the force.  Since the creation of the All Volunteer Force, systems to promote, assign and educate Soldiers have succeeded in attracting and retaining the quantity and quality of personnel required.  These systems ensured Soldiers had incentives to perform well, seek challenging personal and professionally rewarding positions and have the education and training required for training and leading Soldiers. 

Despite this success, the Army does not have objective information on whether personnel policies are adequate to support the current and future vision of a brigade based Army focused on practicing Mission Command.  Anecdotal information indicates that the Army’s retaining, recruiting, and increasing the All Volunteer Force are in question.  Additionally, operational lessons learned and wargaming of future operations clearly show need for innovative leaders and adaptable individuals throughout the force.  The dual challenges of new force structure and continual deployments to multi-dimensional battlefields indicate possible need to shift the Army to more decentralized personnel systems equipped to embrace the creativity, risk-taking, and flexibility while encouraging service in the Army as a profession. 

In short, supporting the adaptive and agile force envisioned for Mission Command suggests reassessment of existing personnel management systems, which were created in the Industrial Age for linear warfare.  This paper examines key processes of Army personnel management, which include promotions, assignments, and education, to considerations for improving Human Capital management, and more importantly entertains questions that must be addressed before evolving today’s personnel system to one that can support Mission Command.

WRONG PERSONNEL SYSTEM FOR MISSION COMMAND?

A tension exists in the Army today with requirements to both manage individuals and manage units under a mobilization based system and move them to one managed under Mission Command. Under a mobilization system, to manage individuals, the Army moves individuals from place to place in accordance with its defined need for trained individuals and to support the jobs desired of a “successful” career.   While in some cases this pattern is changing there is not enough evidence to determine if changes in personnel management systems have adequately addressed the tension of managing individuals and units.  There are a number of concerns with the existing methodology and the value of retaining this approach while promoting adaptability, encouraging innovation, and preparing Soldiers for the ever changing nature of proctrated conflict.

The Army is unable to resolve this core conflict because there are a number of questionable assumptions that drive Army personnel policies, practices and measures. Here are two examples.

The first assumption is that individuals must be managed by a centralized personnel system. This assumption was built into the Army personnel management system in the early 1900s when the War Department modeled its personnel management system on that of the Pennsylvania Railroad. It was strengthened during World War I and World War II when the size of the military increased dramatically and centralized control seemed essential for success. It was further reinforced in the 1950s when American corporations espoused the virtues of centralized control. Centralization continued into the 1970s and 1980s with the centralization of promotions of most officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), as well as the centralization of command selection.

The second assumption is that the personnel system must provide a surplus of qualified Army officers in the middle grades in order to support a future total mobilization similar to the mobilization experienced in World War II. At the end of World War II, the Army, having participated in the total mobilization for World War I and World War II, concluded that it was necessary to maintain a surplus of qualified officers to support a total mobilization that would create entirely new units to meet the needs of a future, multiyear war with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Army designed a personnel management system that would provide a surplus of qualified middle-level officers. Key to maintaining this surplus was an up-or-out requirement and a 20-year retirement that would create a large number of middle-level officers but would get them out of the Army before they became too old.

These assumptions have been “hard wired” into the system over many years and most officers, even most personnel experts, seem to be unaware of their existence.  Over the years the Army has found ways to mitigate some of the effects of these assumptions. For example, the new Army personnel policy calling for some officers to become specialists – in contrast to its longstanding emphasis on producing “generalists” – can be seen as a way of finding equitable solutions for excess officers. This policy has the added benefit of reducing the number of more senior officers, all generalists, who must become “command qualified.” These changes can be seen as an implicit effort to mitigate the impact of the mobilization assumption.

The generalist assumption has been a part of American military culture since the late 19th century and early 20th century, when the United States rejected Emory Upton’s efforts to create a professional Army and general staff whose officers were rigidly selected and trained in technical areas. This generalist concept was enhanced at the end of World War II with the reforms of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (OPA 47). The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 enshrines this thinking and was institutional

Industrial Age personnel management systems are designed to promote, assign, and educate personnel for initial and continued service. The accessions system lays out standards based on systematic and tangible criteria to become an enlisted Soldier, and officer. This has been likened as “mass production” or an “assembly line” personnel system.  The dominate criteria for initial Soldier entry is a high school diploma and for an officer a college degree. The promotion system clearly defines the rank structure and describes the responsibilities attending each rank. The criteria for promotion are explicit, detailed, and common knowledge among members competing for promotion. In the lower ranks, the use of explicit criteria that depend on objectively measured elements, such as written and hands-on tests of skill and knowledge, physical fitness, marksmanship, successful completion of training, awards and decorations, and additional education, help to promote openness and fairness.

The assignment system for enlisted personnel operates centrally and matches available, qualified personnel to position openings (“faces to spaces”). Although at times, Soldiers are allowed to choose the location of their next assignment as a retention incentive, assignments typically occur independently of individual preferences and therefore offer no significant opportunity for influence activities. Officer assignments are also made centrally, but recommendations from senior officers are often taken into account.  Such recommendations also impact on senior NCO assignments.

Finally, education and training help “round out” our human capital.  Military training helps the individual build an identity with the organization while increasing unit cohesion along with understanding of the command and control system, and the importance of following orders. Advanced training and military professional education contribute to the development of leadership and communication skills and provide a thorough understanding of the roles, missions, equipment, tactics, and decisions required by those in positions of authority.

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A PERSONNEL SYSTEM FOR MISSION COMMAND

The current war is forcing the Army and the other services to examine a new doctrine that emphasizes increased responsibility for lower ranks. At the same time, the Army must struggle with embracing and integrating Mission Command. The Army, therefore, has no choice but to be bold and create a new institutional culture. This new culture will create, nurture and promote human resource leaders who thrive on change in general and, in particular, on the increased demands that doctrine writers are advocating and, most importantly, the future challenges our foes create. This is a different culture from the one we have now. We cannot continue to write glowing documents advocating adaptability, yet subtly support peacetime politically correct practices that shore up bureaucratic qualities rather than combat leadership qualities.

Unfortunately, when leaders come up for promotion and selection, the out-of-date system too often selects out the most creative and dynamic of leaders and subordinates. To prepare leaders for the Army in the 21st century, we must:

• Continue to replace the individual personnel system with a unit personnel system. Revolve all personnel policies around a modular, unit-based system and move to an Army force structure that can be supported by a unit replacement system.
• Eliminate the up-or-out promotion system and replace it with an up-or-stay promotion system using tougher accessions.
• Replace the specific branches such as Armor, Field Artillery, Infantry, Aviation, Quartermaster, Transportation, etc., and replace them with Maneuver, Fires, Logistics and Technical.  Place officers on a track or category system at the captain (O-3) or major (O-4) level. Retain NCOs in their branches until they reach master sergeant or first sergeant (E-8). Make personnel management more flexible by setting up a database system that lists a person’s attributes and traits in order to put that person in the place where they best can serve the Army and nation.
• Revise the officer evaluation system to involve a narrative Evaluation Report (ER) on character with a periodic examination to enter the officer corps, as well as attendance at the Command and General Staff College. Add the 360-degree evaluation system with the ER as one part of that system.
• Adapt Outcomes Based Training and Education (OBT&E) as the new training doctrine to support Mission Command. This also provides the core for the leader development for officers, NCOs and civilians at all levels.

The purpose of these reforms is to change the incentive system. It is time to usher in human-resource leadership. Human-resource leaders must seek to reward strength of character, especially as manifested in a willingness to set priorities (i.e. in the order of people, etc.), make decisions, take action and penalize those who simply go along to get along, get by while doing nothing and passionately embrace risk avoidance.

It does no good to call for promoting the risk-takers when the incentives all work the other way. Once strength of character is rewarded, then loyalty to the nation, the Army and unit can be established over loyalty to self, which is the centerpiece of today’s personnel management science. It is the reasoning behind the personnel system’s advocacy of the individualist focus “be all you can be,” and it underlies the belief that people must be constantly moved and promoted, as well as make-work opportunities hyped, to give the appearance of it-happened-on-my-watch promotion points.

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MORE THAN SAYING IT ON POWER POINT

In forcing this implementation for a personnel system to support Mission Command, the Army needs to follow the lead of Army chief of staff, World War II and Korean War hero, Gen. Matthew Ridgway, who said, “My greatest contribution as chief of staff was to nourish the mavericks.” To paraphrase the famous folk singers, Peter, Paul and Mary: “Where have all the mavericks gone? Long time passing.”

Mavericks lead with courage, creativity, boldness, vision, and at times irreverence. The Army culture under Mission Command must understand it is acceptable, even admirable, to have a love quarrel with the institution that they serve while still remaining loyal. The Army and the other services must adapt an organizational model and personnel system that will nourish the mavericks and keep them from leaving, thereby nurturing the innovators and not the saboteurs. It is time the services paid attention to their officer corps and the need to become true professionals.  

True professional soldiers who are not popular in peacetime must be kept around because the art of war is best learned through the course of several campaigns. They will defend us in our old age, and more importantly, defend our progeny.  No utopian, brave new, politically correct, gender neutral, nonlethal, hightech- clean-war generation is stepping forward to replace the hard chargers now abandoning the Army, and none is going to. It is time that we now lay the blame where the fault lies for this conversion of our Army to something less than it needs to be, and use the “L” word: leadership. Human resource leaders know that embracing change does not mean seizing upon every idea or opportunity. “Civilization didn’t get this far by embracing every idea that came along; it got this far by accepting certain changes that were inevitable and certain others that were demonstrably beneficial, and by opposing, sometimes violently, changes that would have imperiled the species. Interesting, some think a good leader has to be a change killer as well as a change agent.”

In deciding what to keep and what to replace or reform, leaders of the Army must always focus on the probability that in the future, wars may be very short and intense, requiring rapid and important decisions by many different levels of command. Much depends on proper planning and preparation to ensure that leaders and their units can perform in the best way possible during the critical initial days of combat. The Army, the military and nation may not have three years to prepare. The Army, or any service for that matter, may not have sufficient time to organize to organize, so the Army (and DOD) needs to be ready beyond what technology can provide us. Such complex change requires leadership by extraordinary civilian and military leaders possessing vision. Our leaders must provide the beginnings to a revolution of change that is even more dramatic than the ones conducted by Elihu Root and George Marshall. Indeed, we need a generation of mavericks.

No one makes a better case for military mavericks than Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and retired Col. Mike Wyly, U.S. Marine Corps. Gates and Wyly recognize the brilliance of one of DOD’s most stellar mavericks, the late Col. John Boyd. Wyly wrote in the Armed Forces Journal of July 2008 of how Gates, inspired by “Genghis John” Boyd, called upon a gathering of young uniformed officers to be like the irreverent Boyd.  Gates, using Boyd’s own words, challenged these young officers to be principled, creative and reform-minded leaders who “want to do something, not be somebody.” Wyly notes that for a defense secretary to quote the maverick Boyd, who left the Air Force as a pariah in the minds of some, was an incredibly bold and risky step. Nevertheless, Wyly lays bare how, today, we need brilliant mavericks throughout all the services with the abilities “to overcome bureaucratic resistance and institutional hostility.”

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[1] Department of the Army, TRADOC (2009). The Army’s Future Force Capstone Concept. Operational Adaptability: Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict. Fort Monroe, VA. Training and Doctrine Command. Known here on as Army Capstone Concept.

[2] The author is indebted to the insights of Dr. Steven Stewart and Dr. Bruce I Gudmundsson in the writing of this concept.

[3] Thanks for the insights of COL Casey Haskins behind this thought

[4] Vandergriff, D.E. (2002). Path to Victory, America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, pp. 1-21.

[5] Unified Quest 10 Leader Development Seminar Papers at https://wiki.kc.us.army.mil/wiki/Leader_Development_Event_Integration. This very issue was brought several times during the three Unified Quest Workshops from January through March 2010.

[6] Army Capstone Concept. pp. 10-13.

[7] Army Capstone Concept. pp. 29.

[8] Doughty, R. A.  (1990, June).  The breaking point: Sedan and the fall of France, 1940.  Hamden, CT: Archon Books, pp. 27-32

[9] Interview with Dr. Bruce I Gudmundsson, 21 May 2010.

[10] Pronounced so as to rhyme with "new boy", coup d'oiel is French for "strike of the eye."

[11] Samuals, Martin (1995). Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918. London.