Measuring Effects in COIN

Measuring Effects in COIN

Kilcullen (I): Here’s what not to measure in a COIN campaign

When David Kilcullen is at his best, he is unexcelled at discussing how to wage a counterinsurgency campaign. And I think the Australian infantry officer turned political anthropologist/COIN guru is at his best when he gathers field observations, boils them down to distilled principles, and then describes those rules in a clear, practical manner. 

So I want to take some time to go through a paper he wrote recently in Afghanistan. (I didn't get it from him, by the way.) While it ostensibly is about metrics in COIN campaigning, it amounts to a thorough discussion of what works in such warfare, what doesn't, and -- especially -- how to tell the difference. It is written about the current campaign in Afghanistan, but clearly has broader applications. ...

After some initial throat-clearing (one of my rules when I was an editor was to see if I could cut the first three pages of any long article), Kilcullen's first major section is about metrics to be avoided. These are:

• "Body count." As he says, when you have 100 enemy and kill 20 of them, you may wind up with 120 live enemies, because you just created 40 more. It's more algebra than arithmetic. ‘Nuff said? Sure, but as Sean Naylor's excellent reporting in Army Times lately has shown, there are still some Army commanders who disagree with this basic point.
• "Military accessibility." Yes! One of my many peeves in Iraq was when a battalion or brigade commander would say that a route was "green" because his up-armored Humvees generally could use it without getting blown up. That may have been true, but it also was irrelevant to the security experience of the average Iraqi on the street. When I asked about that, he just didn't seem to know, or care. So I was pleased to see this high up on Kilcullen's list of don'ts. His point is a bit different from that here. It is just because you don't get hit on a road doesn't mean it is under your control. Rather, it may just mean that the enemy doesn't care to engage you there. This may be because it lacks support there, or conversely because it doesn't want to fight in an area where it is popular. Why risk blowing up your own peeps? 
• "SIGACTs, especially those involving violence against the coalition." This is a related point. Be wary of SIGACTs trends. Violence may be low in an area simply because it is in the uncontested control of the enemy.
• "Dialog with the enemy." An interesting point, because there has been so much talk lately about various parties talking to the Taliban. In our tradition, we stop talking to the enemy when the fighting starts. Not so the Afghans, Kilcullen notes. Also, he adds, "the mere fact that our local partners are in dialog with the enemy is not an indicator, in and of itself, of disloyalty to the government."
• "Any input metric." Megadittoes. This was another thing that used to drive me nuts in Iraq, listening to Americans boast about money spent, projects initiated, patrols conducted, and such. "These indicators tell us what we are doing, but not the effect we are having." Rather, he advocates, look at outcomes, and especially the effect on the population. How to measure those will be the subject of our next installment on this insightful essay.

 

Kilcullen (II): How to tell the effect of your operations on the population

Back to David Kilcullen's essay on what works in counterinsurgency, what doesn't, and how to tell the difference.

But first, a couple of points in response to yesterday's rasher of comments. First, to my knowledge, the paper hasn't been published anywhere -- but I'll skate as close to the copyright laws as I can and give you a good overview. Second, Kilcullen isn't out to attack all metrics, just bad metrics. Which leads us to the point of today's post. Yesterday, he told you why he dismisses certain metrics as unhelpful. Today, he discusses how to tell what effect your operations are  having on the people:

• "Voluntary reporting." How many tips are you getting from the population? And how many of them are unsolicited? He warns that this metric must be assessed in the context of how many tips pan out. The more accurate the tips, the more confidence the population has in your and your allies in the host government.
• "IEDs reported versus IEDs found." This one took me a moment to get my mind around. "Accurate reporting indicates that the population is willing to act voluntarily to protect the security forces." Variations in this rate may be a good indicator of local support for security forces and the government, he says.

• "Prices of exotic vegetables" and "Transportation prices." Now we are getting into the nitty gritty. Anything that embarrasses your S-3 as he discusses it in the briefing probably is a good metric. Until now most of DK's recommendations have been more or less rooted in common sense. But to understand this weird one, you need to understand local conditions. What people are paying for vegetables grown outside their district is a quick indicator of road security. Trucking companies factor in the risks they face, as well as the cost of bribes and other forms of corruption. So variations over time may be a helpful indicator of trends in public perception of security conditions and the corruption level of government security forces.
• "Progress of NGO construction projects." A better indicator than government-sponsored works, which, he notes, "the insurgents may attack on principle." NGO projects go well when materials prices are stable, the labor supply is adequate, and security problems aren't interfering.
• "Influence of Taliban versus government courts." If the locals trust the Taliban-run courts more than the government's, you have a problem. How many cases are each handling in a given district?
• "Participation rate in programs." Both the government and the Taliban have a variety of economic and community programs. Which are more popular?
• "Taxation collection." What is the compliance rate with government taxes, vs. Taliban taxes?  
• "Afghan-on-Afghan violence." Unlike sigacts against coalition forces, he says, this is a good measure of public security.
• "Rate of new business formation and loan repayment." A good indicator of public confidence. He notes that Afghans tend to have a low rate of business formation but a high rate of repayment.
• "Urban construction new start rate." Another good indicator of confidence in a given area.
• "Percentage of local people with secure title to their house and land." This one really surprised me. Kilcullen says that the Taliban has used land disputes adroitly, sometimes settling them justly to further their influence, and at other times exacerbating them to gain the allegiance of one side. The higher the percentage of secure titles in a given area, the less chance for the Taliban to step in and exploit the situation. Can you imagine being a new battalion commander in the area trying to keep up with this stuff? Tribes, women, feuds, land disputes, religion -- it is just too hillbilly for me. Where is Andrew Exum when you need him? Probably off writing up the new policy for Afghanistan.

Kilcullen (III): How to take the measure of an Afghan official

Next in his essay on what works in counterinsurgency, what doesn't, and how to tell the crucial difference, David Kilcullen turns to the question of measuring the performance of the host government.

Significantly, this is a long section. That's appropriate, I think, because the single biggest problem we face in Afghanistan isn't how to contain the Taliban, it is how to alter the rapacious behavior of the Karzai government. 

• "Assassination and kidnapping rate." Well duh, I hear you say. But the devil is in the details. Don't just look at high level officials. Track the sub-district governors, mayors and police chiefs. Are they getting killed? Are they just quitting? These may be indicators of a concerted insurgent push, he warns. But stability and lack of violence might not necessarily be a good indicator, because, he adds, if the area also has a low rate of voluntary reporting, it may be "an enemy district that is stable under insurgent control."

• "Civilian accessibility." Can government officials move around without an escort? Do local people avoid a given area? Even if there are not high levels of violence, this may indicate insurgent control.
• "Where local officials sleep." I really like this one because it is so simple, but it never occurred to me. In fact, I have never seen it listed before in works on metrics in warfare. But it makes sense. DK writes that, "A large proportion of Afghan government officials currently do not sleep in the districts for which they are responsible." He recommends looking into whether they fear for their safety, or perhaps are outsiders not really welcome in the districts. Both reasons are important, but have far different significance for your operations. 
• "Officials' business interests." Map them out, he says. The locals know about them, and you should make it your job to do so also. For example, he says, when there is violence against a local construction company working on an aid project, does a local official own a rival company? More insidiously, he offers the example of an official who engages enthusiastically in opium crop eradication, but has his own opium fields elsewhere. He may simply be eliminating the competition. Try to compile and regularly update a "register of officials' assets" -- and keep it in mind as you try to understand violent incidents in a given area.
• "Percentage of officials purchasing their positions." This is a warning sign. The more people are buying official positions, the higher the likely rate of corruption will be, as they have to re-pay their funders or recoup their investments, and so the more likely that abused locals will play ball with the Taliban.
• "Budget execution." Dull But Important, as I said the other day about another article on Afghanistan. Be careful of using CERP funds a quick fix to get around budget roadblocks-you may just be cementing in those roadblocks. Think beyond the length of your rotation, and consider whether your fixes are going to make life harder for your successor.
• "Capital flight." This is as close as Kilcullen comes to criticizing the Obama Administration. During the Great Afghan Policy Dither of 2009 (my phrase, not his), he notes, "we saw millions of dollars leaving the country on a weekly basis."
• "Rate of anti-insurgent lashkar formation." Another novel observation and metric. Kilcullen says these local militias tend to be indicators of districts that distrust both the government and the Taliban and are going autarkical.
• "Public safety function." Do the locals call the Taliban's 911 line (they effectively have them, he writes, and that is news to me) or the government's?