Thomas Theiner
in Euromaidan Press 2015/04/03
The Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are the most
endangered. Freed from the Russian yoke but 25 years ago and for
centuries oppressed and enslaved by Russia, the Baltic people are most
aware of the threat posed by Russia’s resurgent nationalism… or at least
Estonia is, because Latvia’s and Lithuania’s defense preparations are
ridiculous. They scream for help, solidarity and Western forces to
defend them, but have way too few soldiers, way too small defense
budgets and an amazing lack of urgency. Personally I believe that if
within this year both do not rectify this situation, NATO should only
defend them while on its way to stand and fight with Estonia.
Latvia, with silly grandstanding, which would embarrass every other
nation, announced that for 2015 it will spend an additional €28 million
on its defense… let that sink in: €28 million or in the words of Latvia’s defense minister Vejonis:
“Boosting national defense capabilities is our priority, which is
clearly visible in the increased 2015 budget.” Now Latvia spends 1% of
GDP on defense. NATO’s target is 2%, but for a nation under threat it
should be more like 3%. According to the EU commission, Latvia’s GDP in 2014 was €23.8 billion
and by the end of 2015 it should be approximately €24.5 billion. If
Latvia would spend the bare minimum on defense, namely 2%, it would
spend at a least €490 million for 2015. It’s actual spending: €253.8
million.
Lithuania used to be a similar defense spending laggard, but this year it increased defense spending by over 30% and will now spend €424.5 million.
Lithuania also re-introduced conscription. However, as Lithuania was
spending the lowest percentage of GDP on defense in the entire EU, even
after this increase its spending is still a paltry 1.11% of GDP.
Estonia, on the other hand, always took defense seriously and
continuously spent 2% of GDP and increased this to 2.05% for 2015. This
year the smallest of the three Baltic nations will spend €412 million.
All three of the Baltic nations can spend more on defense. Their
economies are growing; their national debts are low and their budget
deficits well under the EU’s threshold of 3%. According to the EU
Commission on 5 February 2015, Lithuania’s budget deficit was -1.4% of GDP and its national debt 41.8% of GDP, Latvia’s deficit was -1.1% and its debt 36.5% and Estonia’s -0.6% and 9.6%. Lithuania and Latvia could easily ramp up defense spending to 2%, especially as their corporate income taxes rates are 15%,
which are the lowest in the European Union safe for Bulgaria. And
radically raising defense spending is absolutely viable as shown by a
guy named Vladimir Putin, who increased the Russian defense budget by
43% in his first year in office and by an average of 21% every year
since.
If all the Baltic nations were as serious as Estonia and spent 2% on
defense, then their combined defense budget would be €1.62 billion
instead of the current €1.09 billion. But 2% is not enough. At the end
of the Cold War, Germany was spending 2.8% of GDP on defense, South
Korea will spend 2.5% this year and Israel 5.6%. Therefore, the Baltic
nations should spend at least 2.5% a year on defense. That would amount
to €1.83 billion a year or nearly €750 million more than now. With a
defense budget of this size, the Baltics could finance the forces to
withstand a Russian attack for the three to four days it will take the
US Air Force to smite Kaliningrad and attain air supremacy.
But even with an increased defense budget, the Baltics will not
withstand a Russian attack because of the insanely small amount of
active and reserve troops they field. Israel fields 2,142 active
soldiers per 100,000 citizens, Greece 1,008 and the most serious Baltic
nation Estonia 418 active troops per 100,000 citizens. That is actually
an exceptional high number compared to Lithuania’s 269 troops
and Latvia’s 232 troops. Why should an American president ask his 425
troops per 100,000 citizens fight and die for Latvia or Lithuania, who
don’t ask the same of their citizens?
The whole lack of seriousness of Latvia and Lithuania becomes evident
when compared to Finland and Israel: Finland with 12% less population
than the three Baltic nations combined fields six brigades in peacetime
with 208 Leopard 2A4 tanks and an air force with 62 F-18 fighters,
whereas the three Baltic nations field three active brigades with 0
tanks and 0 fighters. Israel with a population that is 32.4% bigger
fields nine active brigades with over 2,000 tanks and over 400 fighters
during peace; in case of war Israel will field an amazing 41 combat
brigades, the while the Baltics will field at best 10 brigades during
a war.
The Baltic States do not need to reach Israeli levels in active
personnel numbers or field 1,677 active citizen-soldiers per 100,000
people as Switzerland does, but the Baltic Nations must increase their
forces substantially. Estonia is already on the right path and aims to
have 90,000 reserve forces by 2022. With such a high number of
reservists Estonia will even overtake Israel and will be on par with the
reserve levels of Finland. However, to its South Latvia and Lithuania
are both undermining the brave work of Estonia by not fielding more
troops. At least all three should field 600 active troops per 100,000
citizens and thus give them an active force of 37,000 troops, which
is 5,000 more than the Russian troops garrisoned within 100 km of the
Baltic States.
I group the Baltic nations together since the best way forward for
the three is to merge part of their defense structure: a trilateral
treaty binding Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to spend 2.5% of GDP on
defense, obliging them to have 600 active troops per 100,000 citizens,
forcing them to coordinate acquisition of equipment and establishing
joint units for the most expensive equipment would create much stronger,
more capable and harder to defeat armies. Right now the three countries
waste immense amounts of money by going alone on everything. If they
want to remain free, they need to stop this.
A few examples: together the three nations field 18 helicopters of 5
different types, thus needing 5 different training teams, 5 different
maintenance teams and 5 different logistic supports units. Last year
Estonia bought 44 CV90 tracked infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) from the
Netherlands, while Latvia bought 123 CVR(T) from the United Kingdom.
Two sets of vehicles with completely unrelated maintenance needs. If
Lithuania will now buy something else all three countries will have to
build up their own training, maintenance and logistic structure for
their vehicles instead of one training center and one central
logistic/maintenance depot. Also if the three nations coordinated and
bought the same weapon systems together, the price per item would drop.
But now the Latvian CVR(T) Scimitars have a 30mm cannon and the Estonian
CV90 have a 35mm cannon, making even ammunition sharing impossible.
Next in Estonia’s plans is buying a self-propelled artillery system.
If it buys it alone then it will be able to afford 24 at best.
Lithuania’s artillery is also in dire need of modernization as the M101
howitzers it uses were produced between 1941 to 1953… Latvia uses an old
Czech model, which cannot even fire standard NATO ammunition. Now if
the three nations agreed to merge their procurement and agree on a
common brigade structure, then they could acquire a modern and much more
capable artillery system together. As together the three nations would
buy up to 72 systems, all sellers would be very open to produce the
system in the Baltic States, thus giving the three nations a chance to
develop their own defense industries and thus spend their money on their
soil. The brilliant Swedish Archer, the light French CAESAR, the
tracked Polish AHS Krab or the American M109A7 – all of them could be
partially produced and assembled in the Baltic States and with one
system in use a single common training center will suffice. Spares and
supplies – again buying in bulk will reduce the cost and having just one
main depot will cut costs again. With defense spending at 2.5% and
costs reduced by cooperating closely, it will be possible for the Baltic
States to buy larger amounts of more modern equipment.
What the triple alliance members need: for their armies – tanks,
tracked infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled artillery, for
their territorial defense units – wheeled infantry fighting vehicles and
light howitzers, for their air forces – utility helicopters, drones and
a medium-range air-defense system. What they do not need is more ships
and a fighter wing. A fighter wing is highly expensive and with all
Baltic air bases in range of Russian anti-air and cruise missiles,
fighters either won’t be able to take to the skies or will be shot down
within minutes. And if the Baltic nations ever invest in their
own fighter wing, then Western NATO members would abandon the Baltic Air
Policing mission. Therefore NEVER ever must the Baltics buy their own
fighters. As for the Baltic Naval forces: the Russian Baltic Fleet is
too strong and therefore a coastal missile battalion must suffice.
Poland already employs the Norwegian Naval Strike Missile and the Baltic
nations should acquire it too to sink Russian ships before they come
near a Baltic shore.
But, like with other expensive and highly specialized equipment, the
Baltic nations should first set up common battalions to employ this
equipment. If they buy the Naval Strike Missile, then beforehand they
should create a tri-national Coastal Artillery battalion. Such a
tri-national battalion would field three Naval Strike Missile equipped
companies, one Estonian, one Latvian, one Lithuanian, supported by a
maintenance company and a supply company, with three platoons each (an
Estonian, a Latvian and a Lithuanian platoon). During peacetime, the
battalion would be managed by a tri-national command company, which will
ensure that the three combat companies are well trained, maintained and
equipped. If Russia attacks, the three companies, with their respective
support platoons, will leave the battalion’s base and head to their
nation to fight there.
With the same structure the Baltic nations should set up a
tri-national helicopter wing with 24 utility helicopters in three
squadrons that can deploy to their respective nations in case of war.
Possible models are the American UH-60M Black Hawk and the European
NH90. A common airlift wing providing tactical transport to all three
nations can be set up with the same structure and a tri-national
paratrooper battalion should be located right next to it. A HIMARS
multiple rocket launch system with MGM-140 ATACMS missiles, if bought
by the three nations together and managed in a common battalion,
suddenly becomes a feasible weapon system. A UAV battalion, an
Electronic Warfare battalion, even an air wing flying 12 South Korean
KAI TA-50 Golden Eagle or Italian M-346 Master trainer aircraft would be
a possibility. Unite and be strong or do your own thing and be weak and
easy prey.
Most importantly, the three Baltic nations need a modern medium range
air-defense system and tanks. The air-defense systems currently in
service, namely RBS-70, Mistral, Stinger and Grom systems, do not reach
higher than 4-5km and have a range of just 6-8 km. The three Baltic
nations do not need a high-end long-range system like the SAMP/T or the
MIM-104 Patriot as Putin won’t fire a nuke at the three nations and risk
contaminating his own troops, country or main shipping lane. Naturally,
if the US, pleased by the common Baltic defense alliance and the
increase in Baltic defense spending, increases its Foreign Military
Financing to the Baltic nations, then one could always ask to get a
battalion worth of MIM-104 launchers and radars for a tri-national
battalion.
US politicians would love such a common battalion, but in
case the US will not provide an anti-air system, either the Norwegian
NASAMS 2 or the Swedish BAMSE must be on the Baltics’ shopping list. The
NASAMS 2 can use a mix of IRIS-T and AIM-9X Sidewinder infrared homing
missiles, and AIM-120 AMRAAM and RIM-162 ESSM radar homing missiles and a
range of up to 40km and can hit targets 14km above ground. Likewise,
the Swedish BAMSE system can hit targets up to 15km above ground and
20km away. Eight nations already field the NASAMS 2, including Norway
and Finland, while the BAMSE is in service with Sweden. The big
advantage for BAMSE is that both Lithuania and Estonia already operate
BAMSE’s Giraffe AMB radar, thus making integration of the Fire Control
Radar and missile launchers easy.
As for tanks, the Baltics would be well advised to opt for a
light tank design as those are more agile than main battle tanks (MBT).
MBTs weigh around 60 tonnes due to their thick composite armor while
light tanks weigh 25-30 tonnes and are much cheaper to procure.
Combining a light tank with an active protection system like the Israeli
Trophy or the German AMAP-ADS would offer the same level of protection
against anti-tank missiles and rocket propelled grenades as the thicker
armor of MBTs, but at half the price. Two light tank models that would
operate well in the Baltic States are the Polish-British PL-01, which is
based on the Swedish CV90, and the CV90105, which is a variant of the
CV90. Poland intends to buy a large number of PL-01 to equip its
armored forces and as Poland, like the Baltic States, also needs a
large number of tracked IFV, all four nations should agree on a common
tank and IFV design and then produce and maintain it together to reduce
costs and improve interoperability.
Fielding a large number of mixed
units of light tanks with a 105mm canon and tracked IFVs, some of which
armed with anti-tank guided missiles, would give Baltic Armies the
ability to ambush and decimate Russian forces and then retreat into the
vast forests of the three nations to redeploy unseen for the next strike
(Lithuania’s soil is 33% forested, Latvia’s 42% and Estonia’s
50%). A mobile short-range air-defense system and an engineering vehicle
built on the same chassis as the tank and IFV should be added to the
aforementioned units to protect them from Russian attack helicopters and
provide them with a vehicle capable to clear a path through the
forests.
Ultimately, the defense of the Baltic nations stands and falls with
their level of cooperation. Sweden has the easiest task: defend and hold
Gotland, while Poland faces the unenviable task to fend off attacks on
two sides: from Kaliningrad and Belarus, while at the same time being
the main reserve force for the Baltics. Therefore, Poland has much
higher financial, logistic and preparatory hurdles to clear before its
military is capable to withstand each and every type of Russian attack.
But as for the Baltics, nothing will give them as better chance to deter
a Russian attack and in the worst case withstand it until help arrives,
than combing their defense structures and leaving just operational
command in national hands (for now).
All five nations under threat along the Baltic Sea will have to plan
and prepare to fight on their own, as help from Western European nations
is not something they can count on. Therefore, these nations, just like
Romania and Ukraine, will have to prepare for the worst and with the
current nationalistic hysteria sweeping Russia the worst is yet to come
and it will come. Therefore either be prepared or surrender and
acquiesce to living under the Russian yoke once more. I for my part say:
Never!
This article is part of the article series Peace is Over,
which also includes the following in-depth analysis of the current
military capabilities and the required changes to defend
Sweden and Poland:
