Teaching How to Think, Not What to Think

by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey N. Rule

United States Marine Corps

United States Army War College, Class of 2013  

“Machines don’t fight wars. People do, and they use their minds.”

— Col John R. Boyd

Numerous articles and books have recently appeared criticizing current leadership of the Armed Services and their collective inability to think critically, to adapt, or to innovate quickly — as well as their lack of tactical, operational, or strategic agility.[1] Additionally, many of the same critiques have emanated from the services for decades — most notably during and after the Vietnam War. Furthermore, there is a large body of literature in the broad realm of “strategic studies” that seeks to offer insight and knowledge about how to operate in the most fraught wartime environments characterized by friction, uncertainty, disorder, fluidity, and complexity regardless of the type of competition. From Sun Tzu’s time, through Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and to the modern era, those elements of the environment remain constants in the nature of war.

All U.S. military institutions understand these constants and have, through the years, sought to comprehend and conquer them. The services have not sat idle: their individual doctrines, educational institutions, and professional journals abound with the need to create more adaptive and agile and thinking leaders — and have done so for quite some time. So, why is there a constant criticism inside and outside the services for collective failures in creating agile leaders able to cope successfully with the inherent complexity and unpredictability of war?

Misinterpretation and Confusion: What is Mission Command and Can the U.S. Army Make it Work?

By Donald E. Vandergriff

Introduction

The emphasis of Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept: Operational Adaptability—Operating Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict[1] discusses evolving toward the practice and culture of Mission Command. The essence of this approach is to ensure that the Army leads through Auftragstaktik, a German word that implies that once everyone understands the commanders’ intent (two levels up), then people are free to and indeed duty-bound to use their creativity and initiative to accomplish their missions within the intent, adapting to changing circumstances.

The Invasion of Iraq: A Balance Sheet

by Brian Michael Jenkins March 22, 2013 in RAND

Historically, wars were fought primarily for material gain: livestock, treasure, tribute, or territory. More recently, however, the profit motive for war has declined as life has become more precious and conquest and plunder have become less acceptable, although conflicts waged for control of diamonds and other precious commodities continue in parts of the world. International law generally prohibits military action by one state against another except for reasons of self-defense. In modern warfare, “gains” must be measured in less-tangible forms, such as preserving national security, liberating threatened populations from tyranny, protecting human rights. Military action to achieve such ends is considered unavoidable and is rarely assessed as an investment.

The invasion of Iraq was a war of choice, however, and therefore should be assessed in terms of costs and benefits. Neither the United States nor its allies had been attacked by Iraq, and there was no evidence that any attack was imminent. Saddam Hussein was a brutal tyrant, and his regime was an affront to human rights, but the country had suffered under his rule for many years. Iraq's liberation was not the reason for going to war. The official purpose of the invasion was to remove any threat posed by Iraq's presumed arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Regime change was a consequence, not a cause. And although Iraq's citizens are freer now, they are by no means more pro-American.

Six steps to fix a broken Mali

By Greg Mann

 

Posted on March 18, 2013 in Bridges from Bamako

 

It’s too soon to declare Operation Serval a success, and there are already concerns about its eventual end, but the French-led military intervention in Mali has at least brought the country back from the brink of disaster, and opened up a space in which Malians can finally begin to chart a way forward for their nation. If I were advising the people who hold Mali’s fate in their hands — not only Mali’s interim president, but members of influential donor governments in North America and Europe — here’s what I’d recommend: six steps to reform the Malian state, settle conflicts and restore stability.

Gen. McMaster: Raiders, Advisors And The Wrong Lessons From Iraq

By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

Published: March 20, 2013 in AOL Defense

WASHINGTON: On the tenth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq one of the Army's leading thinkers, warned Washington not to learn the wrong lessons.

Army Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster, now chief of the tank and infantry school at Fort Benning singled out two pitfalls in particular, one about over-reliance on Special Operations raiders, the other about over-reliance on proxies and advisors. Call them (our words, not his) the Zero Dark Thirty fallacy and the Lawrence of Arabia fallacy.

The first mistake is what McMaster called "a raiding mentality": the idea that we'll get a "fast, cheap, and efficient" victory if we can only identify the crucial "nodes" -- enemy leaders, nuclear weapons sites, whatever -- and take them out, whether with a Special Ops team like the one that killed Bin Laden, a long-range smart weapon, or a drone, McMaster said in his remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.